Whose Politics? Whose Rights? Transparency, Capture and Dual-Use Export Controls

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Ben Wagner

Abstract What kinds of politics do export controls entail and whose rights do they enable? The following article will take a critical perspective on the governance challenges associated with export controls of dual-use technologies. After discussing challenges around transparency, the performance of human rights and export control havens, this article will then turn to looking at policy solutions, including audits, transparency and targeted international governance mechanisms. With conclusion, export controls continue to constitute an important policy tool to promote human rights and can be improved considerably to strengthen human rights further.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Machiko Kanetake

Abstract Dual-use export control regulates the trade of items which serve both civilian and military purposes. Justification for imposing export controls has been furnished by the need for safeguarding regional and international security, especially the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The rationale for applying export controls has been subject to challenges, however. This Security and Human Rights special issue addresses the underlying justification for imposing export controls by focusing on their technological fronts. Scott A. Jones’ piece sheds light on the regulatory challenges that have arisen for the US’ control over so-called “emerging” technologies. Cindy Whang moves on to compare the US’ approach with that of the EU’s dual-use export control. Ben Wagner proposes a set of policy options for the design of export controls on digital technologies, so that they can serve as an effective vehicle for promoting the protection of human rights.


Significance It establishes a comprehensive framework for restricting export of military and dual-use products and technologies on national security grounds or for public policy reasons. It creates a legal basis for mandatory licensing or outright prohibition of the export of products, services or technologies based on their features, their end-users and end-uses, and geographical destinations. Impacts Export controls will help to maintain the international competitiveness of Chinese firms as their technological capabilities advance. Foreign companies may find themselves under investigation in China for acts they perform elsewhere. The law covers transportation, so shipping companies may need to reconsider their routing decisions.


2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Luo

After World War II, the non-proliferation of weapons of massive destruction (WMD) and the export controls of conventional weapons and civilian and military dual use technologies have been one of the most important focal point of international cooperation. Many international treaties have been signed and the international organizations have been established to promote these non-proliferation and export control efforts. The industrialized countries and the developing countries of China, India, and Pakistan that possess nuclear weapons and missile technologies have also enacted domestic laws and set up administrative regimes to control these goods and technologies from flowing to other countries or undesirable people. Among these countries, the United States has been the leader strongly advocating non-proliferation of WMD and export controls of civilian and military dual use goods. In fact, the United States has established a very sophisticated export control system to prevent its weapons and technologies from going to the hands of any adversaries. Because the complicities and overlaps of international treaties and domestic laws on this topic, it warrants a research guide for would-be researchers to walk through the maze of international and domestic export control regimes.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Scott A. Jones

Abstract “Emerging technologies” and the growing inventory of their dual-use applications increasingly challenge policymakers with how to balance technological development, economic competitiveness, and national security priorities. While dual-use export control regulators have always struggled with balancing economic and security interests, emerging technologies are challenging controls systems ill-equipped to define or practically control them. As the most advanced case, the US export control effort is an instructive regarding the challenges of deploying conventional controls over defining and controlling rapidly developing technology sets. This article reviews the US case in light of the current challenges posed by emerging and foundational technologies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Cindy Whang

Abstract Export controls are domestic trade restrictions placed on technologies that have been determined to be important to the national security concerns of a country. In recent years, the policy purpose for maintaining export control regulations have shifted, and how these new export control regulations would interact with new emerging technologies is something that should be analyzed and considered. The passage of the United States (US) Export Control Reform Act (ecra) of 2018 and the proposed regulatory changes for the European Union’s (EU) Council Regulation (ec) No. 428/2009 have shifted the focus of dual-use export controls so that the national security goals of these controls have broadened to include economic security and human rights concerns. This paper argues that the infusion of geoeconomics into US national security considerations and the proposed expansion to include human rights considerations into EU export control regulations are made mutually exclusive of each other and were not made to expand the reach of export controls in a unifying way. Rather, the purpose and structural change to export control regulations serves to create more regulatory barriers on the trade of emerging technology industries that would not only impact the US and the EU, but also their international trading partners.


Author(s):  
Eric L. Hirschhorn ◽  
Brian J. Egan ◽  
Edward J. Krauland

U.S. Export Controls and Economic Sanctions is a must for those who deal with U.S. government export control and economic sanctions regulations. Written as a user’s manual rather than an academic or historical treatise, it covers in considerable detail—but in language that is intelligible to non-lawyers as well as lawyers—the Commerce Department’s controls on exports of commercial, “dual-use” (having both commercial and military utility), and low-level military items, the State Department’s controls on higher-level military items, the Treasury Department’s approximately thirty different economic sanctions programs, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s controls on nuclear-related commodities, and the Energy Department’s restrictions on assistance to foreign nuclear programs. Given the authors’ decades of experience with these regulations, the book not only explains the legal rules but also offers tips—not necessarily reflected in the regulations themselves—about how to interpret the regulations and deal with the regulators.


2002 ◽  
Vol 58 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 205-242
Author(s):  
A. Baskaran

Multilateral export control regimes such as the London Club and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aim to prevent the flow of complex dual-use technologies to certain ‘target’ countries. The underlying belief has been that these regimes would be able to delay or cripple strategic weapon programmes in ‘target’ countries. However, little attention has been paid to understand the factors that influence the effectiveness of these regimes. In recent years, the limitations of export controls have become increasingly clear. This paper introduces a conceptual framework and analyses the case of India'S space and missile programmes to trace the factors that determine the effectiveness of export control regimes and to understand why these regimes, particularly the MTCR are increasingly ineffective on certain ‘target’ countries.


Author(s):  
Machiko Kanetake

Export of cyber technology can undermine human rights in countries of destination. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, political controversies have arisen around EU-exported cyber surveillance technology, which allegedly helped autocratic states monitor and arrest dissidents. While cyber technology is indispensable to our lives, it can be used to suppress the right to privacy, the freedom of expression and the freedom of association, not only in the EU, but also in the countries it trades with. The EU has taken a proactive role in reforming the export of human rights-sensitive cyber technology. In September 2016 the European Commission proposed the integration of human rights due diligence in the process of export control. The Commission’s proposal, however, invited strong contestations both from industry and Member States. Essentially, dual-use export control has developed in order to mitigate military risks. Attempts to integrate human rights risks in export control have thus invited discomfort among stakeholders. This paper unpacks normative tensions arising from the EU’s attempts to integrate human rights risks in its export control regimes. By so doing, the paper highlights fundamental tensions embedded in the EU’s value-based Common Commercial Policy, of which dual-use export control forms an integral part.


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