Rorty as Virtue Liberal

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 400-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. Curtis
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Liberal Politics ◽  
Ethical Pluralism ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Modus Vivendi ◽  
Liberal Citizenship ◽  
Political Liberal

Virtue liberalism holds that the success of liberal politics and society depends on the citizenry possessing a set of liberal virtues, including traits like open-mindedness, toleration, and individual autonomy. Virtue liberalism is thus an ethically demanding conception of liberalism that is at odds with conceptions, like Rawlsian political liberalism and modus vivendi liberalism, that attempt to minimize liberalism’s ethical impact in order to accommodate a greater range of ethical pluralism. Although he claims to be a Rawlsian political liberal, Richard Rorty’s pragmatic liberalism is best understood as a version of virtue liberalism that, in particular, recommends a controversial civic virtue of irony for good liberal citizenship. Indeed, Rorty ultimately joins Dewey in conceiving of liberal democracy as a “way of life,” rather than merely a set of political relations that have a minimal effect on our characters or on the shape of our private commitments and projects.

Toleration, Political Liberalism, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Muslim World

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Regimes

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.

SHOULD POLITICAL LIBERALS BE COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATIVES? PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE FAITH-BASED INITIATIVE

2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Liberal Politics ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Faith Based ◽  
The Past ◽  
Liberal Approach ◽  
Political Liberal

It is easy and popular these days to be a political liberal. Compared to ‘ethical liberals’, who justify the use of state power by way of one or another conception of people's true moral nature, ‘political liberals’ seek a less controversial foundation for liberal politics. Pioneered within the past twenty years by John Rawls and Charles Larmore, the ‘political liberal’ approach seeks to justify the coercive power of the state by reference to general political ideas about persons and society. Since it abandons the debates about personal moral value that have historically dogged liberal theory, political liberalism offers itself as a more latitudinarian, indeed a more liberal, form of liberalism. Being a political liberal is not the only way to be a good liberal, but this approach has become prevalent enough that I shall focus upon it here.

Hyper-pluralism and the multivariate democratic polity

2012 ◽  
Vol 38 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 435-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Ferrara
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Conflict ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Democratic Polity ◽  
Modus Vivendi ◽  
The Law ◽  
Global World

In the global world, momentous migratory tides have produced hyper-pluralism on the domestic scale, bringing citizens with radically different conceptions of life, justice and the good to coexist side by side. Conjectural arguments about the acceptance of pluralism, the next best to public reason when shared premises are too thin, may not succeed in convincing all constituencies. What resources, then, can liberal democracy mobilize? The multivariate democratic polity is the original answer to this question, based on an interpretation of Rawls which revisits Political Liberalism in the light of The Law of Peoples. The unscrutinized assumption is highlighted, often read into Rawls’s Political Liberalism, that a polity moves homogeneously and all of a piece from religious conflict to modus vivendi, constitutional consensus and finally to overlapping consensus. Drawing on The Law of Peoples, a different picture can be obtained.

Toleration, Political Liberalism, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Muslim World

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Regimes

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.

scholarly journals Liberalismo y metafísica. Sobre “Los substratos metafísicos de la teoría demo-liberal” de C. Kohn

1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Francés
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reasonable Description

RESUMENEste trabajo tiene como objetivo responder a las críticas al liberalismo formuladas en un reciente trabajo de Carlos Kohn. Para mostrar esto expondré, en primer lugar, por qué pienso que Kohn generaliza ilegítimamente una concepción bastante estrecha de liberalismo, relacionada con la economía. En segundo lugar señalaré los límites de esa concepción, y cómo puede definirse otra más comprehensiva, en la que enmarcaré la mayor parte del liberalismo político contemporáneo y, un tanto audazmente, el contractualismo clásico de Hobbes. En tercer lugar, trateré de mostrar que, esta versión comprehensiva es una razonable descripción de la política, que no depende lógicamente de suposiciones dudosas sobre los presupuestos y requisitos de la economía de mercado y que, por ello, escapa indemne a la crítica de KohnPALABRAS CLAVELIBERALISMO-LIBERALISMO POLÍTICO-DEMOCRACIA LIBERAL-CAPITALISMOABSTRACTThe paper aims to revise the critiques to liberalism recently formulated by Carlos Kohn. i will explain, firstly, why I think Kohn wrongly generalizes a quite thin conception of liberalism, related to the economy. Secondly, I will suggest the limitations of that conception. Instead, another, more comprehensive notion can be formulated that can encompass both contemporary political liberalism and, even audaciously, Hobbes' cassical contractualism. Thirdly, I will argue that this comprehensive notion is a reasonable description of politics. it does not depend on doubtfull assumptions over the principles of market economy. hence, it escapes Kohn's critique.KEYWORDSLIBERALISM- POLITICAL LIBERALISM-LIBERAL DEMOCRACY-CAPITALISM

Personal Law and Citizenship in India's Transition to Independence

2011 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELEANOR NEWBIGIN
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Religious Identity ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Colonial State ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Liberal Citizenship ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Personal Law

AbstractStudies of the post-colonial state have often presented it as a structure that has fallen under the control of self-interested sections of the Indian elite. In terms of citizenship, the failure of the state to do more to realize the egalitarian promise of the Fundamental Rights, set out in the Constitution of 1950, has often been attributed to interference by these powerful elite. Tracing the interplay between debates about Hindu property rights and popular support or tolerance for the notion of individual, liberal citizenship, this paper argues that the principles espoused in the Fundamental Rights were never neutral abstractions but, long before independence, were firmly embedded in the material world of late-colonial political relations. Thus, in certain key regards, the citizen-subject of the Indian Constitution was not the individual, freed from ascriptive categories of gender or religious identity, but firmly tied to the power structures of the community governed by Hindu law.

Does Liberal Democracy Require a Gandhian Approach to Religion?

Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Unity In Diversity

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.

scholarly journals A Modest Proposal for a Basic Agreement on Peaceful Cross-Strait Development

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-148
Author(s):  
Ya-chung Chang
Keyword(s):  
Future Development ◽  
Taiwan Strait ◽  
Territorial Integrity ◽  
Modest Proposal ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Modus Vivendi ◽  
Peaceful Development ◽  
The Taiwan Strait

In order to promote peaceful development in cross-Strait relations, this article proposes that both sides of the Taiwan Strait sign a “Basic Agreement on Peaceful Cross-Strait Development” – a temporary agreement ( modus vivendi) to determine political relations and future development across the Strait. Three major points should be included in this agreement: first, both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one “Whole China” and both sides have no intention to separate from this “Whole China”; furthermore, both sides pledge not to split the “Whole China”, but to work in unison to maintain the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the “Whole China”; second, both sides of the Taiwan Strait share constitutionally guaranteed equal relations, and normal relations across the Strait will develop on the basis of this constitutional equality; and third, both sides decide to establish communities in areas of common agreement in order to promote mutually cooperative relations.

scholarly journals Political liberalism and religious claims

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Stoeckl
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Actors ◽  
Blind Spots

This article gives an overview of 4 important lacunae in political liberalism and identifies, in a preliminary fashion, some trends in the literature that can come in for support in filling these blind spots, which prevent political liberalism from a correct assessment of the diverse nature of religious claims. Political liberalism operates with implicit assumptions about religious actors being either ‘liberal’ or ‘fundamentalist’ and ignores a third, in-between group, namely traditionalist religious actors and their claims. After having explained what makes traditionalist religious actors different from liberal and fundamentalist religious actors, the author develops 4 areas in which political liberalism should be pushed further theoretically in order to correctly theorize the challenge which traditional religious actors pose to liberal democracy. These 4 areas (blind spots) are: (1) the context of translation; (2) the politics of exemptions; (3) the multivocality of theology; and (4) the transnational nature of norm-contestation.

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