SHOULD POLITICAL LIBERALS BE COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATIVES? PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE FAITH-BASED INITIATIVE

2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Liberal Politics ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Faith Based ◽  
The Past ◽  
Liberal Approach ◽  
Political Liberal

It is easy and popular these days to be a political liberal. Compared to ‘ethical liberals’, who justify the use of state power by way of one or another conception of people's true moral nature, ‘political liberals’ seek a less controversial foundation for liberal politics. Pioneered within the past twenty years by John Rawls and Charles Larmore, the ‘political liberal’ approach seeks to justify the coercive power of the state by reference to general political ideas about persons and society. Since it abandons the debates about personal moral value that have historically dogged liberal theory, political liberalism offers itself as a more latitudinarian, indeed a more liberal, form of liberalism. Being a political liberal is not the only way to be a good liberal, but this approach has become prevalent enough that I shall focus upon it here.

La Idea de “Razón Publica” (y su Revisión) en el Último Rawls

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Public Good ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Political Philosopher

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.

scholarly journals O Construtivismo Político: Uma Teoria Pública da Razão Prática/Political Constructivism: a public theory of practical reason

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Everton Puhl Maciel
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Intuitionism ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Face ◽  
Political Constructivism ◽  
The Universe

RESUMO: Esse trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o construtivismo político da Terceira Conferência da obra Liberalismo Político, de John Rawls. Especificamente, vamos tentar compreender como, limitando o universo de construção aos parâmetros estabelecidos pelo discurso político, podemos estender o alcance dos princípios acordados na posição original para uma comunidade muito mais ampla frente às doutrinas morais abrangentes. Demonstraremos o construtivismo político coerentista não em oposição ao intuicionismo moral utilitarista nem ao construtivismo moral kantiano, mas como capaz de absorver modelos com esse grau de razoabilidade. Isso será disposto através de uma justificação pública tanto do conteúdo quanto da forma do modelo adotado. Assim, o consenso sobreposto apresentado por Rawls é responsável direto pelo resultado democrático que esperamos de uma sociedade onde a publicidade ocupa espaço enquanto fato e possui um valor aceito como legítimo. Nosso método de trabalho envolve uma leitura analítica do texto e de comentadores pertinentes ao assunto proposto.ABSTRACT: This study aims to objective analyze the political constructivism of the Third Conference of the work Political Liberalism, by John Rawls. Specifically, we understand how limiting the universe of construction to the parameters by the political discourse, we can extend the reach of the principles agreed in the original position to a much larger universe in the face of comprehensive moral doctrines. We demonstrate what political constructivism no consistent as opposed to utilitarian moral intuitionism or the Kantian moral constructivism, but as capable of absorbing models with this degree of reasonableness. This will be provided through a public justification of both the content and form of the model adopted. Thus, the overlapping consensus presented by Rawls is directly responsible for the democratic results we expect from a society where democracy takes up space as a fact and has a value accepted as legitimate. KEYWORDS: Constructivism; justification; liberalism.

Philosophical foundations for Indigenous economic and political rights

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (11) ◽  
pp. 1264-1276
Author(s):  
Paul Robert Patton
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Indigenous Rights ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Normative Foundations ◽  
Conceptual Work

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine some influential accounts of the basis for Indigenous rights, consider their strengths and weaknesses, and ascertain whether and in what degree they support effective self-government and self-determination for Indigenous people. Design/methodology/approach The paper begins with a brief discussion of the emergence of specifically Indigenous rights, the significance of self-determination as a means of improving the economic and social conditions of communities, and the problem such rights pose for late 20th versions of egalitarian liberalism. It then examines the liberal culturalist argument for minority rights developed by Will Kymlicka, before turning to James Tully’s elaboration of the historical approach to the justification of Indigenous rights that draws on the tradition of treaty relations in North American colonialism. Finally, it outlines a third approach based on the political liberalism of John Rawls. Findings The conditions of legitimate government set out in Rawls’ political liberalism are a better way to provide normative foundations for Indigenous rights in contemporary postcolonial democracies. Research limitations/implications The discussion of Indigenous rights is confined to those countries established by colonization with largely British political institutions and populations. The arguments for Indigenous rights are confined to those advanced within the liberal tradition of political thought. Originality/value Some of the criticisms of the liberal culturalist argument and of Tully’s approach are original. The case for Indigenous rights based in the legitimacy requirements of political liberalism is original and based on conceptual work by the author.

Classical Liberalism and Rawlsian Revisionism

1977 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 95-119
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Rapaport
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
17Th Century ◽  
Systematic Revision ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Past ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Right ◽  
Competitive Economy

A certain view of Anglo-American liberal political theory has been commonplace for a couple of generations. It is said that the philosophical foundations of contractarian liberalism lie in the 17th century, chiefly in the formulations given to it by Hobbes and Locke. But for two distinct reasons these 17th century formulations fail to provide an adequate basis for contemporary political theory. First, the development of our political and economic institutions in the past two or three hundred years has made it impossible to accept a theory which assumes a minimal, laissez-faire state and a highly competitive economy. Second, the individualist psychological and moral assumptions of the theory are highly dubious if not clearly false.In A Theory of justice John Rawls attempts to provide the systematic revision which liberalism so clearly needs. The revisionist intent of Rawls’ work has not received the attention it deserves, except by critics of the right who deny that such revision is needed.

scholarly journals Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism

Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
RYAN LONG
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Novel Reading ◽  
Luck Egalitarians

Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive. A surprising consequence is that many responsibility-based objections to luck egalitarianism turn out to be objections to Rawls’ political liberalism as well.

scholarly journals Is Marriage Incompatible with Political Liberalism?

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 302-326
Author(s):  
Alison Toop
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The State ◽  
Differential Treatment ◽  
Political Institution ◽  
The Political ◽  
Current Structure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Liberal

This paper examines three arguments that claim marriage, as a political institution, is incompatible with political liberalism. These arguments are drawn from Elizabeth Brake 1 and Clare Chambers. 2 My purpose here is to determine which, if any, of the arguments show marriage to be incompatible with political liberalism. The “Neutrality Argument” claims that the political institution of marriage violates the political liberal principle of neutrality. I claim that no such violation occurs. The “Unjustified Discrimination Argument” alleges that marriage involves the state in unjustified discrimination. I suggest there are grounds for the differential treatment identified. The “Public Reason Argument” argues that marriage, as it is currently structured, violates the political liberal principle of public reason. I claim that its current structure can be justified by appeal to public reasons. I therefore conclude that none of these arguments successfully demonstrate that marriage is incompatible with political liberalism.

Political Reasonableness and Nature’s Otherness

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hailwood
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Natural World ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ecological Justice ◽  
Political Liberal

AbstractThis paper restates my argument that certain forms of liberalism can and should accept a non-instrumental perspective on the natural world. This perspective is unpacked in terms of ‘respect for nature’s otherness’. Liberalism is represented by Rawlsian political liberalism. I claim there are important congruencies between respect for nature’s otherness and the ‘reasonableness’ involved in political liberalism, such that the latter should incorporate the former. Following a suggestion of B. Baxter I reconsider these congruencies with particular emphasis on the roles of toleration and integrity. I also explain further why I think it arbitrary, rather than logically inconsistent, of the political liberal to exclude respect for nature’s otherness from her conception of the political. Finally I argue that insofar as liberalism embraces ecological justice on the basis of the considerability of non-human interests, it cannot consistently exclude respect for nature’s otherness.

Rorty as Virtue Liberal

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 400-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. Curtis
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Liberal Politics ◽  
Ethical Pluralism ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Modus Vivendi ◽  
Liberal Citizenship ◽  
Political Liberal

Virtue liberalism holds that the success of liberal politics and society depends on the citizenry possessing a set of liberal virtues, including traits like open-mindedness, toleration, and individual autonomy. Virtue liberalism is thus an ethically demanding conception of liberalism that is at odds with conceptions, like Rawlsian political liberalism and modus vivendi liberalism, that attempt to minimize liberalism’s ethical impact in order to accommodate a greater range of ethical pluralism. Although he claims to be a Rawlsian political liberal, Richard Rorty’s pragmatic liberalism is best understood as a version of virtue liberalism that, in particular, recommends a controversial civic virtue of irony for good liberal citizenship. Indeed, Rorty ultimately joins Dewey in conceiving of liberal democracy as a “way of life,” rather than merely a set of political relations that have a minimal effect on our characters or on the shape of our private commitments and projects.

scholarly journals Securitization and the Political: contributions from Hannah Arendt

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Motta ◽  
Cauê Pimentel
Keyword(s):  
Hannah Arendt ◽  
Carl Schmitt ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Scientist ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
The Past ◽  
Copenhagen School ◽  
Definition Of

In the past few years, many scholars keen to the Copenhagen School (CS) turned to the works of the German political scientist Carl Schmitt in order to strengthen the philosophical foundations of the theory, especially the disputed concept of exception. Schmitt is a singular and important contribution to the debate, however his definition of the political makes securitization concept more conservative and a more unilateral event as politics would only be explicit in the exception spectrum. Our idea in this brief paper is to present a contribution to this discussion coming from a less considered perspective: the works and writings of Hannah Arendt. We will examine how her ideas towards politics and the exception can shed a light on the same issues that Schmitt seems to blur even further. We believe that bringing Hannah Arendt to the debate offers a different understanding of the foundational problems of the securitization concept and enhances the normative appeal of the theory towards a broader and more sophisticated base, opening new paths for research and discussion under the framework of the Copenhagen School.

Politics and the Public in Rawls' Political Liberalism

1995 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Frazer ◽  
Nicola Lacey
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Recent Statement ◽  
Susan Moller Okin ◽  
Do So

This paper is a critical discussion of a number of related themes in John Rawls' Political Liberalism. First, it considers whether Rawls' recent statement of his position proceeds from an adequate methodology for political theory. In particular, it questions whether Rawls has succeeded in accommodating both universalist, analytic and particularist, interpretive aspects of the political theoretical enterprise. Second, it engages in critical analysis of the conceptions of the political and the public which lie at the core of Rawls' theory. In this part of the paper, an important though not exclusive focus will be certain questions raised by Susan Moller Okin and other feminist critics of Rawls about the internal consistency of his conception of justice. It is argued that Political Liberalism neither addresses these questions explicitly nor, contrary to Okin's view, provides implicit conceptual tools which could allow a sympathetic interpreter of Rawls to do so. The direction of the argument will suggest certain preconditions for the development of a more substantively and methodologically adequate approach to political theory.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document