Yugoslavia’s Foreign Policy in Balkan Perspective: Tracking between the Superpowers and Non-Alignment

2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 97-113
Author(s):  
John R. Lampe

From 1960 forward, Yugoslavia based its independent foreign policy on three “special relationships”, balancing its accommodation with the Soviet Union by close relations with the United States and the new Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Paying special attention to the roles of Yugoslavia’s Foreign Ministry and the US State Department as well as President Tito, this article addresses three crucial periods in which the intersection of Yugoslavia’s relations with the US, the USSR and the NAM prompted a decisive turn in its foreign policy. In 1961–63, Tito’s support for the NAM damaged its US relations to Soviet benefit. But in 1967–71, NAM indifference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia turned Tito back toward the US, as advocated by his Foreign Ministry. And in 1976-79, Soviet and Bulgarian efforts to coopt the NAM through Cuba’s Presidency prompted a successful rebuff led by Yugoslavia and appreciated in Washington. After 1979, however, Belgrade’s post Tito reliance on economic relations with the NAM members had unintended and damaging domestic consequences, obstructing the Slovenian and Croatian commitment to West European trade while also dividing Bosnian Muslims from Bosnian Serbs.

2021 ◽  
pp. 80-126
Author(s):  
Derek Chollet

This chapter examines how Eisenhower, H. W. Bush, and Obama reacted when their foreign policy strategies were tested by crises and unexpected events. This chapter revisits Eisenhower’s aid to besieged French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954. It also discusses his handling of two crises in October 1956 over Suez and the Soviet invasion in Hungary, just days before his reelection. It examines how Bush led the United States during the critical period of 1991—with the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union after a failed coup in August 1991. Finally, the chapter also analyzes how Obama approached the Arab Spring, which started in 2011, specifically focusing on his response to conflicts in Libya and Syria.


2018 ◽  
pp. 55-59
Author(s):  
Khatuna Chapichadze

After providing a brief overview of the US policy in the South Caucasus from the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century as there have emerged three new countries in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the article mainly focuses on relatively less active engagement from the side of the United States into the affairs of the South Caucasus since the presidency of Barack Obama maintained if not untypically deepened even more under Donald Trump currently as well. These trends are explained through the prism of the general standpoints of the latest American administrations promoting the idea of less or non-interference of the superpower in other countries’, regions’ or continents’ notably domestic matters. There are discussed major implications of such, i.e. the less active US foreign policy observed among others, also in the South Caucasus lately, although in the case of this region clearly primarily with less desirable effects as it appears in fact, taking into account on the other hand however quite diverse needs and interests of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The article critically analyses the consequences the US recent withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, as well as its re-imposition of economic sanctions against Iran might have for the South Caucasian countries, addresses the factor of latest uncertainty over the NATO member Turkey, covers the Russian problem, and raises one of the crucial issues whether the current US President Donald Trump has more actual decisive power than the Congress, also in terms of foreign policy implementation, or not.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-337
Author(s):  
Jacob Abadi

This article analyzes the course of US–Yemeni relations from the 1940s to the present and aims to explain the reasons for the twists and turns in bilateral relations. It argues that the US government never developed a unique “Yemen policy” and that its attitude toward that country was determined largely by its ties with Saudi Arabia. Yemen began to loom large in US foreign policy in the early 1960s when Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser intervened on behalf of the Republicans who staged a coup against the Royal imamate regime, which relied on Saudi support. The article shows that President John Kennedy looked favorably on the new Republican regime in Yemen despite the robust relations that existed between the United Statesand Saudi Arabia. In addition, it argues that despite the war in Yemen, which lasted from 1962 to 1970 and caused instability in this region, this country did not loom large in US foreign policy. This was largely due to the British presence in south Yemen and especially in the port of Aden, which lasted until 1967. The article shows how the British withdrawal from Aden increased Yemen’s value in the eyes of US policymakers, but even then, no effort was made to fashion a unique policy toward this country. In addition, the article demonstrates how Washington’s attitude changed in 1969 when the country was divided into North Yemen, which tended to regard the Soviet Union as its protector and South Yemen, which continued to rely on US aid. And lastly, the article traces US–Yemeni relations from 1990, when the country reunited, until the present. It demonstrates how the bilateral relations were affected by the superpowers’ rivalry during the Cold War, the fight against terrorism, and disagreement between the Republican and the Democratic parties in the United States.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 87-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Bromley

AbstractDuring the Cold War, United States (US) policies towards the Middle East and towards Afghanistan and Pakistan were largely unrelated. India's non-alignment and relations with the Soviet Union were reasons for close US-Pakistani relations, but the Chinese success in the war with India in 1962 also highlighted the importance to the West of India's position. 1979 marked a major turning point in US foreign policy towards the Middle East and Central Eurasia (CEA) because of the two events which were to shape so much of politics and geopolitics in those regions as well as in the wider international system: namely, the Iranian revolution in February and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December. Taken together, these developments posed a major challenge to US strategy towards the Soviet Union, to the wider Middle East and to relations with China, Pakistan, and India. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan during 1988/89, the US lost interest in Afghanistan and followed the policies of Pakistan for most of the 1990s. Then came 9/11 and President Musharraf took the historic decision to break with the Taliban. In March 2003, the US began its second war against Iraq. Whatever the rationale for the conflict, the outcome has been to turn the future of Iraq into a key fault-line of geopolitics in the Greater Middle East. Now, with the instability following the collapse of the Soviet Empire in CEA, the defeat of the Taliban and the ongoing future of Iraq, the US faces what the Department of Defense describes as an "arc of instability" running from the Middle East through CEA to Northeast Asia. This is the region that lies at the centre of planning for the "long war" announced in the Pentagon's 2006 quadrennial review.


1985 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge I. Domínguez

Should the United States go to war with Cuba? If not, what should be the policy of the US government toward Cuba? What should be Cuban policies toward the United States and the Soviet Union? Should Cuba increase or decrease its worldwide commitments and should it emphasize formal or informal foreign policy instruments? These have been the central questions affecting US-Cuban relations during the past quarter century. This essay endeavors to address some of the aspects they raise for US-Cuban relations for the remainder of the decade.


Author(s):  
Bipin K. Tiwary ◽  
Anubhav Roy

Having fought its third war and staring at food shortages, independent India needed to get its act together both militarily and economically by the mid-1960s. With the United States revoking its military assistance and delaying its food aid despite New Delhi’s devaluation of the rupee, India’s newly elected Indira Gandhi government turned to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1966 with the aim of balancing the United States internally through a rearmament campaign and externally through a formal alliance with Moscow. The US formation of a triumvirate with Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood only bolstered its intent. Yet India consciously limited the extent of both its balancing strategies and allowed adequate space to simultaneously adopt the contradictory sustenance of its complex interdependence with the United States economically. Did this contrasting choice of strategies constitute India’s recourse to hedging after 1966 until 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh by militarily defeating a US-aligned Pakistan? Utilising a historical-evaluative study of archival data and the contents of a few Bollywood films from the period, this paper seeks to address the question by empirically establishing the extents of India’s balancing of, and complex interdependence with, the United States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Lasha Tchantouridze

The two-decade-long U.S.-led military mission in Afghanistan ended in August 2021 after a chaotic departure of the NATO troops. Power in Kabul transferred back to the Taliban, the political force the United States and its allies tried to defeat. In its failure to achieve a lasting change, the Western mission in Afghanistan is similar to that of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. These two missions in Afghanistan had many things in common, specifically their unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts. However, both managed to achieve limited success in their attempts to impose their style of governance on Afghanistan as well. The current study compares and contrasts some of the crucial aspects of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Soviet and Western forces during their respective missions, such as special forces actions, propaganda activities, and dealing with crucial social issues. Interestingly, when the Soviets withdrew in 1988, they left Afghanistan worse off, but the US-backed opposition forces subsequently made the situation even worse. On the other hand, the Western mission left the country better off in 2021, and violence subsided when power in the country was captured by the Taliban, which the United States has opposed.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-156
Author(s):  
Mediel Hove

This article evaluates the emergence of the new Cold War using the Syrian and Ukraine conflicts, among others. Incompatible interests between the United States (US) and Russia, short of open conflict, increased after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This article argues that the struggle for dominance between the two superpowers, both in speeches and deed, to a greater degree resembles what the world once witnessed before the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. It asserts that despite the US’ unfettered power, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is now being checked by Russia in a Cold War fashion.


2019 ◽  
pp. 82-133
Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson ◽  
Alexei Shevchenko

This chapter argues that both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) pursued social competition with the Western states while at the same time seeking recognition from the states they were trying to subvert. Stalin sought to increase the power and prestige of the Soviet state through coerced industrialization, and Khrushchev made an effort to “catch up and surpass” the West in economic production. The PRC sought to improve its status by allying with the Soviet Union, but the Chinese chafed under their status as “younger brothers” to their senior ally, and eventually Mao challenged the Soviets for leadership of the international communist movement. In the 1970s, China took advantage of the US need to balance Soviet military power by putting aside communist ideology to become a tacit ally of the United States, part of a “strategic triangle.”


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