Italy’s Compliance With ICJ Decisions vs. Constitutional Guarantees: does the “Counter-limits” Doctrine matter?

2013 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fulvio Maria Palombino

One of the most common obstacles to the domestic enforcement of international decisions is represented by the presence of a constitutional impediment. Indeed, most national constitutions, though open to international law, can prevent the implementation of an international decision, insofar as the latter conflicts with the basic principles of the constitutional order. This article argues that in such cases it is necessary to preserve a space where the State continues to retain full sovereignty and whose protection acts as an unbreakable “counter-limit” to the limitations deriving from the international legal order (“counter-limits” doctrine). Yet recent judicial and legislative practice in Italy concerning the implementation of the ICJ decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State seem to overlook the need to preserve this “space”. As a consequence, certain fundamental constitutional guarantees, such as the right of access to justice, the rule of res judicata and the principle of non-retroactivity of the law, have inescapably ended up being compromised.

2012 ◽  
pp. 310-326
Author(s):  
Mazzeschi Riccardo Pisillo

The ICJ judgment concerning jurisdictional immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) is disappointing both for its general approach and for its legal grounds. It shows a traditional, positivistic, conservative and state-centered conception of international law and does not offer any opening towards a progressive development of such law. Moreover some legal arguments of the Court are not convincing. In particular, the Court does not deepen the main issue of the dispute, that is, the possible conflict between the customary norm on foreign State immunity and the customary norms on prohibitions of war crimes and of crimes against humanity by all States, which belong to ius cogens. But the Court avoids dealing with the problem of ius cogens, by simply stating that there is no conflict between the former and the latter norms, because "the two sets of rules address different matters". This argument is quite formalistic and is not convincing, because the procedural character of the rule on immunity does not prevent the judge from dealing with the merits of the dispute, by establishing the nature of the State conduct and the possible existence of an exception to immunity. In any case, the argument of the Court could have been overcome by maintaining that: 1) contemporary international law provides for two customary rules giving the individual victim a right of access to justice and a right to obtain reparation when he suffered war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by a State; 2) these rules do not have, usually, a peremptory character, but they become peremptory when they are absolutely the only means to redress the breach of a ius cogens rule, such as the prohibition of war crimes and of crimes against humanity; 3) in such a case, there is a true conflict between the instrumental and peremptory rules on access to justice and reparation and the rule on State immunity; 4) this conflict cannot be avoided by saying that the two sets of rules address different matters; 5) the conflict should be solved through the predominance of the rules on access to justice and reparation over the rule on State immunity, because customary norms of ius cogens prevail over simple customary norms. Perhaps the International Court of Justice was not ready to accept these arguments, which aim at strengthening the role of human rights, of the individual and of ius cogens in contemporary international law. But the Court could, at least, have dealt more closely with them and paid some attention to the progressive development of international law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-23
Author(s):  
Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi

In its judgment No. 238/2014 the Italian Constitutional Court, whilst appearing to show respect for the ICJ’s 2012 judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, makes notable criticisms of that judgment and insists on its own role in the progressive development of international law in the field of State immunity. In particular, the main legal argument of the Constitutional Court, based on the fundamental and inviolable character of the right of access to justice in constitutional law, can also be used, although modified to some extent, in international law. The Court’s argument can also resolve the possible conflict between the international norm of State immunity, on the one hand, and the international norms on fundamental human rights and access to justice, on the other. The present contribution seeks to demonstrate that: (a) the right of access to justice and the connected right to reparation for violations of fundamental human rights are established by two customary international norms; (b) there is a potential conflict between these norms and the norm of State immunity; (c) this conflict becomes real and concrete when the limits on access to justice and reparation laid down by immunity are unjustified in accordance with the rule of “equivalent protection”; and (d) the solution to that conflict derives from the normative superiority of the customary norms on access to justice and reparation (being peremptory in nature when functionally linked to the violation of fundamental human rights) over the norm of State immunity. The judgment of the Constitutional Court, utilizing legal reasoning that can also translate to the level of international law, demonstrates that osmosis may occur between the arguments used in constitutional and international law, and that today there is growing interaction between the domestic and international legal orders and their common values. The law of human rights, placed at the very center of the Constitutional Court’s judgment, is the field in which this community of values emerges most clearly.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-93
Author(s):  
Gustav Muller

In this article an attempt is made to put forward a convincing case for giving substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing and looks towards relevant international law elaborations on the meaning of this right as contained in the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It does so while being aware of the Constitutional Court’s prior rejection of an international law-based minimum core interpretation of the right and opting, instead, for the so-called model of reasonableness breview. Given that the court has so expressly taken and stuck to this stance, it is argued in the article that an international law-based substantive interpretation of the right is possible – given that South Africa has recently ratified the ICESCR – and that it is preferable given the shortfalls of the model of reasonableness review. The article further highlights what difference the preferred reading of section 26(1) would make as to how courts ‘interpret’ reasonableness, that is, how courts review compliance with section 26 at present if ‘adequate’ housing is understood as having security of tenure and access to basic municipal services; is affordable, habitable and accessible; is located in close proximity to social facilities; and is culturally adequate.


Author(s):  
Chiedza Simbo

Despite the recent enactment of the Zimbabwean Constitution which provides for the right to basic education, complaints, reminiscent of a failed basic education system, have marred the education system in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding glaring violations of the right to basic education by the government, no person has taken the government to court for failure to comply with its section 75(1)(a) constitutional obligations, and neither has the government conceded any failures or wrongdoings. Two ultimate questions arise: Does the state know what compliance with section 75(1)(a) entails? And do the citizens know the scope and content of their rights as provided for by section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe? Whilst it is progressive that the Education Act of Zimbabwe as amended in 2020 has addressed some aspects relating to section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution, it has still not provided an international law compliant scope and content of the right to basic education neither have any clarifications been provided by the courts. Using an international law approach, this article suggests what the scope and content of section 75(1)(a) might be.


Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.


Author(s):  
Philippa Webb

The last 50 years have seen significant changes in the law of immunity. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, over the past 15 years in particular, played an influential role in the law applicable to this ‘moving target’. This chapter examines three approaches of the ECtHR to the identification of general international law: (i) the ECtHR looking to the International Court of Justice; (ii) the ECtHR looking to national practice; and (iii) the ECtHR looking to the work of the International Law Commission and the provisional application of treaties. Although the ECtHR strives to locate itself within general international law, it necessarily approaches the immunities of States, officials, and international organizations through the lens of Article 6 ECHR and whether the immunity in question constitutes a legitimate and proportionate restriction on the right of access to court. This has, at times, taken the Court down a different path to other judicial bodies and we can identify the emergence of a ‘European approach’ to the role of immunity in employment disputes.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 400-406
Author(s):  
Riccardo Pavoni

With Judgment No. 238/2014, the Italian Constitutional Court (hereinafter Court) quashed the Italian legislation setting out the obligation to comply with the sections of the 2012 decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening) (Jurisdictional Immunities or Germany v. Italy) that uphold the rule of sovereign immunity with respect to compensation claims in Italian courts based on grave breaches of human rights, including—in the first place—the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Court found the legislation to be incompatible with Articles 2 and 24 of the Italian Constitution, which secure the protection of inviolable human rights and the right of access to justice (operative paras. 1, 2).


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 279
Author(s):  
Fazlollah Foroughi ◽  
Zahra Dastan

Due to quantitative expansion and evolution in committing the crime at the international level, the scope of criminal proceedings has been widened significantly. Tolerance and forgiveness towards crimes that happen at international level not only is a double oppression on the victims, but also provide a fertile context for others to commit crimes more daringly. Thus, it is essential that international criminals are held accountable to the law and competent institution, and the realization of this issue leads to the victim satisfaction in international law. Not only in international law, but also in domestic law, show respect and protection of human rights is effective only when there is an effective justice system to guarantee the rights. Although some international crimes practically occur by the government or at least high-ranking government officials, the Statute of the International Criminal Court has reiterated this point that they only have jurisdiction over the crimes committed by natural persons rather than legal entities, which one good example is governments, and although the real victims of these crimes have been human beings, in the case of action and referring the case to the competent international courts, these are the states (rather than the victims) that actually have the right of access to the authorities and not beneficiaries .Thus, at the first step, we should see whether the Court has jurisdiction over the crime committed by the government and whether people can file an action independently in the International Criminal Court or not? When people, rather than governments, are beneficiaries in some international crimes, why only the government and not the people is the plaintiff? And what is the right of the victim in such category of crimes? Accordingly, the current research seeks to examine these rights and restrictions, and relevant limitations.


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