scholarly journals Addressing Domestic Regulation Affecting Trade in Services in CETA, CPTPP, and USMCA: Revolution or Timid Steps?

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 680-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Ortino ◽  
Emily Lydgate

Abstract The number of international agreements purporting to liberalise trade, mainly focused on reducing protectionist measures through the imposition of general principles, has increased greatly over the last 25 years. More recently, the United States and the European Union (EU) concluded comprehensive agreements covering trade in goods, trade in services, and foreign investment. This article inquires whether, and the extent to which, such agreements represent a departure from previous practice. It focuses on (a) the instruments employed to address domestic regulation affecting trade in services and (b) three specific agreements concluded between 2016 and 2018: the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. While these recent Preferential Trade Agreements put forward novel approaches to regulatory diversity affecting trade in services, it is too early to ascertain whether these will have any ground-breaking impact in terms of services trade liberalisation.

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 92-95
Author(s):  
Kathleen Claussen

These remarks are derived from a forthcoming work considering the future of international trade law. Compared with most features of the international legal system, the regional and bilateral trade law system is in the early stages of its evolution. For example, the United States is a party to fourteen free trade agreements currently in force, all but two of which have entered into force since 2000. The recent proliferation of agreements, particularly bilateral and regional agreements, is not unique to the United States. The European Union recently concluded trade agreement negotiations with Canada, Singapore, and Vietnam to add to its twenty-seven agreements in force and is negotiating approximately ten additional bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the Asia-Pacific Region, the number of regional and bilateral free trade agreements has grown exponentially since the conclusion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area of 1992. At that time, the region counted five such agreements in force. Today, the number totals 140 with another seventy-nine under negotiation or awaiting entry into force. The People's Republic of China is negotiating half a dozen bilateral trade agreements at present to top off the sixteen already in effect. India likewise is engaged in at least ten trade agreement negotiations. The World Trade Organization (WTO) reports 267 agreements of this sort in force among its members as of July 1, 2016.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baldur Thorhallsson

The aim of this paper is to determine Iceland’s foreign policy options in relation to shelter theory. Iceland has been seeking political and economic shelter ever since the United States deserted it in 2006, by closing its military base, and in 2008, by refusing to provide it with assistance following its economic collapse. Iceland has made several new security and defence arrangements with its neighbouring states, applied for membership of the European Union and was the first European country to make a free-trade agreement with China. Moreover, the president of Iceland pressed for closer political and economic ties with Russia. Prominent Icelandic politicians frequently claim that Brexit will create a number of opportunities for Iceland and lead to closer cooperation with Britain. However, Iceland has not yet secured shelter of an extent comparable to what it had enjoyed from the United States. In this paper, we will answer questions such as: What does shelter theory tell us about Iceland’s overseas relations with the US, NATO, the EU, Britain, Russia, China, and the Nordic states? Will Iceland receive more reliable shelter provided by multilateral organizations than by a single shelter provider?


Author(s):  
Jens Ladefoged Mortensen

In a time of trade wars, free trade skepticism, tech rivalry, and multipolar disorder, the European Union (EU) cannot evade its responsibilities the last defender of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet, it raises the question of whether the EU has power to defend the WTO. The EU is a multilateralist-oriented power of global magnitude. Unlike the United States, the EU is openly defending the WTO in the current crisis created by continued refusal to appointment WTO Appellate Body members. Like the United States, the EU is concerned with the illegitimate trade practices of China. Yet, the EU uses diplomatic pressure on China within the rules of the WTO. The EU is actively trying to rescue the rule-based trade system. Yet, it cannot do so alone. It needs support, not just form other WTO members but also from within Europe itself. The current crisis is in part rooted in the inability of the WTO members to update the WTO rulebook. The focus will be on the potential clash between a more assertive EU on sustainability and the absence of updated WTO rules on sustainable trade issues. This may force the EU to confront a deep-rooted policy dilemma. The question is whether the EU should continue to refrain from using its market power to promote sustainable trade in respect of the WTO. As the EU is about to ratify several bilateral trade agreements of commercial, geo-economic, and indeed geo-political importance, such as the EU–Mercosur or EU–Vietnam agreements, the rule-orientation of the EU faces growing domestic opposition as well as external contestation. Furthermore, the EU is modernizing its trade defense weaponry, the antidumping instrument, and has recently declared its intent to impose unilateral climate-related trade policy measures, the carbon-adjustment tariff, in the future. Thus, an incident such as the burning of the Amazon forest may force the EU to take a tougher stance on sustainability at the risk of bringing the EU on a collision course with the WTO itself, its rules, process, and member states. Consequently, the complex setup of the EU as a trade power could make it difficult to ratify WTO-compatible trade agreements in the future.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-64
Author(s):  
Geraldo Vidigal

Abstract The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) features a clause, dubbed ‘anti-China’, which sets out legal consequences in case one of the parties negotiates or enters into a free trade agreement (FTA) with a nonmarket economy (NME). A similarly worded objective appears among the negotiating objectives of the US for FTAs with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom. This article examines the anti-NME clause, arguing that its concrete legal consequences are less relevant than its symbolic effects. The USMCA clause itself is difficult to replicate in bilateral agreements, since it depends on cooperation between the two nonsigning parties. Its operation is nonetheless similar to that of two unilateral remedies available under the law of treaties, permitting a reasonable assessment that the clause, if it follows its original design, will aim to permit termination of bilateral US FTAs in response to the other party entering into an NME FTA. While such a clause would offer little in terms of concrete effects if added to agreements that already permit unilateral withdrawal, its greatest value may not be in its legal effects but in its legitimating and signaling properties, which push USMCA parties to establish a common front in the ‘geoeconomic’ dispute between the United States and China.


2020 ◽  
Vol 99 (6) ◽  
pp. 129-141
Author(s):  
Alexey Portanskiy ◽  

The article focuses on the positions of Britain and the EU in the process of a post-Brexit trade agreement. The key disagreements between the parties that almost led to the failure of the deal are described. The final agreement reached on December 24, 2020 ‒ a week before the end of the transition period ‒ is analyzed. The agreement formally allowed London and Brussels to declare the achievement of their main goals. At the same time, the agreement did not solve all the problems between the parties. The efforts of the United Kingdom to conclude trade agreements with the United States and some other partners after Brexit are also considered. London's initial reliance on President Donald Trump's promises to conclude the most favorable agreement after Brexit did not materialize, and serious disagreements arose between the parties that could not be resolved quickly. The economic benefits of Brexit are not obvious in the near future.


Publications ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Mauro G. Carta ◽  
Matthias C. Angermeyer ◽  
Silvano Tagliagambe

The purpose is to verify trends of scientific production from 2010 to 2020, considering the best universities of the United States, China, the European Union (EU), and private companies. The top 30 universities in 2020 in China, the EU, and the US and private companies were selected from the SCImago institutions ranking (SIR). The positions in 2020, 2015, and 2010 in SIR and three sub-indicators were analyzed by means of non-parametric statistics, taking into consideration the effect of time and group on rankings. American and European Union universities have lost positions to Chinese universities and even more to private companies, which have improved. In 2020, private companies have surpassed all other groups considering Innovation as a sub-indicator. The loss of leadership of European and partly American universities mainly concerns research linked to the production of patents. This can lead to future risks of monopoly that may elude public control and cause a possible loss of importance of research not linked to innovation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilaria Espa ◽  
Kateryna Holzer

Abstract In the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the European Union (EU) has taken the lead in promoting the inclusion of a specific chapter on energy trade and investment in order to enhance energy security and promote renewable energy. Irrespective of the success of the TTIP negotiations, the EU proposal can contribute to developing multilateral rules on energy trade and investment. This is especially important given the increased number of energy disputes filed by the EU and the United States against other leading energy market players, including the BRICS. This article provides a normative analysis of the new rules proposed by the EU and reflects on potential responses of BRICS energy regulators. It argues that, while these rules are unlikely to immediately affect BRICS energy practices, they may eventually be ‘imported’ in BRICS domestic jurisdictions in order to promote renewable energy and attract investment in energy infrastructure.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willem Maas

Abstract This article surveys some general lessons to be drawn from the tension between the promise of citizenship to deliver equality and the particularistic drive to maintain diversity. Democratic states tend to guarantee free movement within their territory to all citizens, as a core right of citizenship. Similarly, the European Union guarantees (as the core right of EU citizenship) the right to live and the right to work anywhere within EU territory to EU citizens and members of their families. Such rights reflect the project of equality and undifferentiated individual rights for all who have the status of citizen. But they are not uncontested. Within the EU, several member states propose to reintroduce border controls and to restrict access for EU citizens who claim social assistance. Similar tensions and attempts to discourage freedom of movement also exist in other political systems, and the article gives examples from the United States and Canada. Within democratic states, particularly federal ones and others where decentralized jurisdictions are responsible for social welfare provision, it thus appears that some citizens can be more equal than others. Principles such as benefit portability, prohibition of residence requirements for access to programs or rights, and mutual recognition of qualifications and credentials facilitate the free flow of people within states and reflect the attempt to eliminate internal borders. Within the growing field of migration studies, most research focuses on international migration, movement between states, involving international borders. But migration across jurisdictional boundaries within states is at least as important as international migration. Within the European Union, free movement often means changing residence across jurisdictional boundaries within a political system with a common citizenship, even though EU citizenship is not traditional national citizenship. The EU is thus a good test of the tension between the equality promised by common citizenship and the diversity institutionalized by borders.


Author(s):  
Roberto Dominguez ◽  
Joshua Weissman LaFrance

The history of the European Union (EU) is closely associated with the development of the United States. As the process of European integration has produced institutions and gained a collective international presence, the United States has been a close observer, partner, and often critic of the policies and actions of the EU and its member states. A steady progression of events delineates this path: the Marshall Plan, origins of European integration, the Cold War, the post–Cold War, 9/11 and its effects on the international system, the Great Recession, and the deterioration of global democracy. All throughout, the EU and the United States have both cooperated and collided with one another, in line with the combination of three main factors: (a) the evolution of the EU as an independent, international actor; (b) American strategies for engagement with Europe and then with the EU; and (c) the adaptive capacity and cohesion of the overall transatlantic relationship. The EU–U.S. relationship is significant not only for the influential role of the EU in world affairs but also because, as opposed to China or Russia, the transatlantic area hosts one of the most solid relationships around the world. Crises surely have been, and will be, a frequent aspect of the intense interdependences on both sides of the Atlantic; however, the level of contestation and conflict is relatively low, particularly as compared with other areas that smoothly allow the flow of goods, services, people, and ideas. Taken altogether, then, the transatlantic relationship possesses a strong foundation: it is integral, resilient, and enduring over a history of diplomatic disagreements and conflicts. The primary question remains just how this steady stream and confluence of shared challenges ultimately will fare in face of evolving crises and systemic disruptors. In any case, the answer is determined by the enduring nature, and foreign policy choices, of the primary actors on each side of the Atlantic.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document