Alternative Fora or Means for Third Party Dispute Settlement to Accommodate Community Interest

2021 ◽  
pp. 603-606
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Community Interest

Identifying Community Interests in International Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rüdiger Wolfrum
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Community ◽  
Available P ◽  
General Question ◽  
Global Commons ◽  
Settlement Systems ◽  
Community Interest ◽  
National Jurisdiction ◽  
Advisory Opinions

This chapter explores the general question of how to establish that the regulation of a certain matter constitutes a matter of community-wide concern, which is the necessary step for the recognition of community obligation. The hypothesis is that such a qualification must, first, be well founded factually and, secondly, accepted as such in a legal or political legitimizing process. On this basis, the chapter suggests that the governance of spaces beyond national jurisdiction constitutes a community interest and has to be guided by the interests of the international community. Exploring this question with respect to key common spaces and particular issues, the chapter notes the difficulty of most of the dispute settlement systems, which, being bilateral, are not fully adequate to address questions related to the management of global commons as well as for the protection of the environment. To avoid this difficulty, the chapter suggests greater reliance on advisory opinions where available.

Preventing War and Providing the Peace?

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 144-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan Shannon
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Conflict Management ◽  
Causal Relationship ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Claims Data ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Trust Building ◽  
Territorial Claims ◽  
Bilateral Negotiations

I explore whether international organizations (IOs) promote peaceful conflict management. Using territorial claims data, I find that organizations with interventionist capabilities encourage disputing members to attempt peaceful conflict resolution. Then, to more fully uncover the causal relationship between IOs and conflict management, I investigate the influence of IOs on bilateral dispute settlement separately from third party settlement.The analyses reveal that institutions do not promote bilateral negotiations between members, indicating that the socialization and trust-building capabilities of IOs are limited. However, institutions foster multilateral talks, demonstrating that IOs broker bargaining with third party diplomatic intervention.

scholarly journals International Law and dispute settlement mechanism

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Ricardo Caichiolo
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
21St Century ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Peaceful Settlement ◽  
Feasible Solutions ◽  
Settlement Of Disputes ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The DSM, or Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in the absence of a judicial body, is the closest representation of a supreme court or judicial institution in a regional bloc or other international organisation. The search for a peaceful settlement of disputes in the international arena had led to the development of the DSM during the 20th and into the 21st century. The DSM acts as an impartial third party, wherein it intervenes in any international conflict to offer feasible solutions for both sides.O MSC, ou Mecanismo de Solução de Controvérsias, na ausência de um órgão judicial, é a representação mais próxima de uma Corte Suprema ou de instituição judiciária em um bloco regionl ou em organização internacional diversa. A busca por um meio pacífico de solução de disputas no meio internacional levou à criação do MSC ao longo dos séculos XX e XXI. O MSC age como um terceiro imparcial, na medida em que ele intervém em conflitos internacionais com o intuito de ofertar soluções possíveis para as partes envolvidas.

Introduction

2007 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chester Brown
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Homogeneous Body ◽  
Short Introduction ◽  
International Courts ◽  
International Dispute ◽  
History Of ◽  
International Adjudication

This chapter gives a short introduction to the history of international dispute settlement by third-party adjudication. It notes that there is a gap in the existing literature, being an examination of procedure and remedies before different international courts, and an answer to the question of whether the same procedural rules obtain, and the same remedies are available, before different international judicial bodies. It presents the book's central thesis — that international courts often adopt common approaches to questions of procedure and remedies, which leads to increasing commonality in the case law of international courts. It then explains that the term ‘common law of international adjudication’ refers to the emergence of an increasingly homogeneous body of rules applied by international courts and tribunals relating to procedure and remedies. It then defines the terms ‘procedure’ and ‘remedies’. It also covers certain selected aspects of international adjudication, and reviews the jurisprudence of certain selected international courts and tribunals.

Excessive Costs and Recoverability of Costs Awards in Investment Arbitration

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 251-299
Author(s):  
Gabriel Bottini ◽  
Catharine Titi ◽  
Facundo Pérez Aznar ◽  
Julien Chaisse ◽  
Marko Jovanovic ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Potential Contribution ◽  
Investment Arbitration ◽  
Party Funding ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In the era of the backlash against investor-State dispute settlement, the costs of proceedings have been a prime object of criticism. This article examines the problem of excessive costs and insufficient recoverability of costs awards. Firstly, it examines the issue of excessive costs in relation to both party costs (fees and expenses of counsel, experts, and witnesses) and tribunal costs (fees and expenses of arbitrators and arbitral institutions). Secondly, it discusses the impact of the length of proceedings on costs. Thirdly, it discusses the contribution of third-party funding to excessive costs. Finally, it analyses the issue of insufficient recoverability of costs awards and the availability of mechanisms to secure prompt payment of costs awards where there are insufficient resources or an unwillingness to pay. In examining each of these concerns, this article assesses the potential contribution of four different models for reform of investment arbitration.

Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation

2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 471-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark S. Copelovitch ◽  
Tonya L. Putnam
Keyword(s):  
Rational Design ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Institutional Context ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negotiated Agreements ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Design Theories ◽  
Time Limitations ◽  
Variable Problem

AbstractThis research note highlights an important element missing from rational design theories of international agreements: “institutional context”—the presence or absence of existing and prior agreements between prospective partners in “new” cooperation. If, as rational design theorists argue, agreement design is deliberate, strategic, and directed toward enhancing contracting parties' ability to credibly commit to future cooperation, then prior design “successes” should influence the terms of additional cooperation. We test for this omitted variable problem in three agreement design outcomes:ex antelimitations on agreement duration, exit clauses, and dispute-settlement provisions. Through an augmentation and reanalysis of data from a key study in the rational design literature—Barbara Koremenos's “Contracting Around International Uncertainty”—we show institutional context is positively correlated with inclusion ofex antetime limitations in negotiated agreements and negatively correlated with the inclusion of exit clauses and third-party dispute-settlement provisions. Institutional context also mediates and conditions the effects of the explanatory variable at the heart of existing rational design theories—uncertainty about the future distribution of gains from cooperation. Our findings show that the collective appeal of particular design features varies not only with the nature of underlying strategic problems, but also with degrees of shared institutional context.

Inter-State Dispute Settlement in the Field of Human Rights

1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 87-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. H. Kooijmans
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Third Party ◽  
European Convention ◽  
State Party ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Rights Issues ◽  
Of Greece ◽  
Inter State

Inter-state disputes on human rights issues have been a far from exceptional phenomenon. During the Cold War the human rights question deeply divided the countries belonging to the Western and the communist blocs. Relations between developed and developing countries quite often have been heavily strained by controversies on human rights. But even within a group of countries belonging to an alliance or a homogeneous regional organization, human rights issues from time to time have been the cause of serious difficulties; e.g., the human rights record of Greece and Portugal within NATO and that of Greece and Turkey within the Council of Europe. Hardly ever have such disputes been subjected to third party dispute settlement machinery, even if such machinery was available. Most human rights treaties have a so-called procedure for state complaints, although in most cases acceptance of such a procedure is optional for the state parties. Only under two treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, it is mandatory for any state party against which a complaint by another state party is made, to submit itself to such a procedure. In most cases the procedures are of a fact-finding and mediatory character.Again, only under two (regional) treaties, the European and the American Convention on Human Rights, the initiating of such a procedure may lead to a binding decision.

scholarly journals TUG OF WAR: EVALUATIVE VERSUS FACILITATIVE MEDIATOR

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diksha Munjal
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Essential Elements ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Facilitative Role ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Third Party Facilitation

Mediation can be defined as a process where a neutral third party seeks to facilitate communication between the disputing parties to help them arrive at an amicable solution of their disputes culminating in a win-win situation for the parties. Though ‘... there is no single limiting definition of mediation, in part because mediators function in accordance with different philosophies and in statistically different ways’, the most commonly accepted definitions of mediation incorporate two essential elements: ‘(1) third-party facilitation of dispute settlement, and (2) lack of third-party power to determine the resolution of the dispute.’ The central focus of mediation is based on the principle of parties’ self-determination. To further this basic principle, the role of a mediator must be well defined. Looking at mediation from a historical perspective, mediation was confined to the facilitative role of a neutral third party. Gradually, however, there came a sharp divide amongst the existing mediators as regards the scope of intervention by a mediator in the mediation proceedings. At one end of the broad spectrum of a mediator’s role, lies his or her active role as an evaluator and at the other, that as a facilitator of communication between the parties. These two positions are, however, in contrast with each other and hence, the debate as to the most suitable role of a mediator’s intervention in the process. In part II(a) of the present paper I attempt to portray the distinction between mediators and decision-makers. Because of the emergence of evaluative forms in mediation. In part II(b) I sketch the differences between the approaches taken by the facilitative and the evaluative mediators. In part III I try to indicate the dangers posed when mediators strive to put on the evaluative cloak and finally and in part IV I sum up the paper with an appropriate conclusion.

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