The Laws of War in Outer Space: Some Legal Implications for Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello of the Militarisation and Weaponisation of Outer Space

2010 ◽  
pp. 69-87
Author(s):  
Okimoto Keichiro

This chapter discusses the relationship between jus ad bellum (international law regulating the resort to force) and jus in bello (law of armed conflict). It examines state practice, international decisions, and expert opinions to determine how the relationship has been addressed in practice. The chapter considers the question of whether jus in bello applies equally to the unlawful and lawful parties to an armed conflict before turning to the legal implications of the cumulative requirements of the law of self-defence and international humanitarian law (IHL) imposed on a use of force in self-defence. Finally, it considers the legal implications of the concurrent application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and IHL with respect to use authorized under Chapter VII.


2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (893) ◽  
pp. 67-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jelena Pejic

AbstractThe use of “drones” has grown exponentially over the past decade, giving rise to a host of legal and other issues. Internationally, it is the utilization of armed drones by States for the extraterritorial targeting of persons that has generated significant debate. This article attempts to outline some aspects of the relevant legal framework, with a focus on the international law applicable to drone strikes in situations of armed conflict. It briefly addresses thejus ad bellumand then centres on thejus in bello, addressing, in turn, questions related to when there is an armed conflict, what the rules on targeting are, who may be targeted and where persons may be targeted.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan B. Hollis ◽  
Jens David Ohlin

AbstractThis essay explores the ethical and legal implications of prioritizing the militarization of cyberspace as part of a roundtable on “Competing Visions for Cyberspace.” Our essay uses an ideal type—a world that accepts warfighting as the prime directive for the construction and use of cyberspace—and examines the ethical and legal consequences that follow for (i) who will have authority to regulate cyberspace; (ii) what vehicles they will most likely use to do so; and (iii) what the rules of behavior for states and stakeholders will be. We envision a world where states would take on a greater role in governance but remain constrained by law, includingjus ad bellumandjus in bellocriteria, but also sovereignty, nonintervention, and self-determination. We ask if the net result would mean states causing less harm than they do in kinetic conflicts. Ultimately, our essay takes no position on whether cyberspace should be a militarized domain (let alone one where warfighting is the prime directive). Rather, our goal is to situate a warfighting cyber domain within the reality of a pluralist cyberspace, where ethical imperatives compete or coalesce to support specific governance mechanisms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (911) ◽  
pp. 715-735
Author(s):  
James W. Houlihan

AbstractThis article is concerned with an Irish law dating from 697 AD, called Lex Innocentium or the Law of the Innocents. It is also known as Cáin Adomnáin, being named after Adomnán (d. 704), ninth Abbot of Iona, who was responsible for its drafting and promulgation. The law was designed to offer legislative protection to women, children, clerics and other non-arms-bearing people, primarily, though not exclusively, in times of conflict. Today, the laws of war fall into two categories: those attempting to regulate when it is lawful or just to go to war, now called jus ad bellum, and those attempting to limit the awful effects of war by stipulating how it should be properly conducted (for instance, in providing for non-combatant immunity), now called jus in bello. By proscribing the killing and injuring of non-arms-bearing people, Lex Innocentium is an in bello law, and by virtue of its being the first known such law, Adomnán, its author, is the father of Western jus in bello.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Luban

AbstractThis essay examines the similarities, but even more the dissimilarities, between (nonrevisionist) just war theory and the laws of war. The similarities are obvious: both just war theory and the laws of war distinguish jus ad bellum from jus in bello, and incorporate the principles of distinction, proportionality, and necessity. The dissimilarities derive from the special character of law. Law needs binary, yes-no standards for drawing lines, for example between armed conflict and lesser forms of violence. Laws come in packages (regimes), so that changing only one law is not always practicable. And legal propositions, unlike philosophical propositions, are often detachable from their reasons and applied in unexpected and unwelcome ways. This is especially important in the stresses of battle, when rules of warfare must be usable “off the shelf” by middle- or lower-ranked personnel with no opportunity for bespoke deliberation. The essay provides contemporary illustrations of these differences.


2008 ◽  
Vol 90 (872) ◽  
pp. 931-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Roberts

AbstractThe ‘equal application’ principle is that in international armed conflicts, the laws of war apply equally to all who are entitled to participate directly in hostilities, irrespective of the justice of their causes. The principle, which depends on maintaining separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, faces serious challenges in contemporary armed conflicts and discourses. Some variations of the principle may be inevitable. However, it has a firm basis in treaties and in historical experience. It is the strongest practical basis that exists, or is likely to exist, for maintaining certain elements of moderation in war. The rival proposition – that the rights and obligations of combatants under the laws of war should apply in a fundamentally unequal manner, depending on which side is deemed to be the more justified – is unsound in conception, impossible to implement effectively and dangerous in its effects.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe

Proportionality is a condition provided under both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Based on a particular interpretation of state practice and international case law, recent legal literature argues that the two notions of proportionality are interrelated in that proportionality under jus in bello is included in the assessment of proportionality under jus ad bellum. This article seeks to refute such a position and, more generally, to clarify the relationship between the two notions of proportionality.The main argument of the article is in line with the traditional position regarding the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It is argued that, although sharing common features and being somewhat interconnected, the notions of proportionality provided under these two separate branches of international law remain independent of each other, mainly because of what is referred to in this article as the ‘general versus particular’ dichotomy, which characterises their relations. Proportionality under jus ad bellum is to be measured against the military operation as a whole, whereas proportionality under jus in bello is to be assessed against individual military attacks launched in the framework of this operation.This article nonetheless emphasises the risk of overlap between the assessments of the two notions of proportionality when the use of force involves only one or a few military operations. Indeed, in such situations, the ‘general versus particular’ dichotomy, which normally enables one to make a distinct assessment between the two notions of proportionality, is no longer applicable since it becomes impossible to distinguish between the military operation as a whole and the individual military attacks undertaken during this operation.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document