The Trauma of 9/11: 2001–2002

2019 ◽  
pp. 85-104
Author(s):  
John L. Helgerson

John Helgerson’s tenure began just six weeks before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The terrorist threat had been the subject of major analyses produced during John Gannon’s tenure; it became the overwhelming priority after 9/11. Helgerson describes the early responses as well as the longer-term analyses of the evolving terrorist threat and the new landscape of counterterrorist cooperation with traditional allies and former adversaries alike. The US intervention in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime gave way to a new focus on Iraq. The ostensible rationale for the invasion of Iraq was a controversial national intelligence estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although the NIE was published in the interval between Helgerson’s tenure and his successor’s, the chapter assesses the estimate and the decision to go to war in Iraq through the analysis of National Intelligence Officer Paul Pillar, who straddled both tenures.

Author(s):  
Adeed Dawisha

This chapter discusses political developments in Iraq following the US and UK's military campaign in 2003. The publicly stated reason for the invasion of Iraq was Saddam's possession of weapons of mass destruction and his links with international Islamist terrorists. However, is probably more likely that from the very beginning the Bush Administration, or more precisely influential elements within it, made the removal of Saddam Husayn a central plank of the administration's policy. Whatever the reasons for the invasion, the United States found itself on April 9, 2003 the hegemonic power in Iraq, faced with the responsibilities of governance. And indeed until June 28, 2004, when sovereignty was transferred to the Iraqis, the United States (with some input by the British) ruled Iraq directly through a mostly American administration in Baghdad called the Coalition Provisional Authority.


2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 53-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDERS STRINDBERG

Syria's sharp criticism of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 opened a particularly tense phase in Syrian-American relations, culminating in the May 2004 imposition of U.S. economic sanctions under the Syria Accountability Act. While accusing Damascus of being on the ““wrong side”” in the wars against terror and Iraq, Washington has raised a number of other issues, including Syria's military presence in Lebanon, its support for Hizballah and various Palestinian factions, its alleged ““interference”” in Iraq, and its possible possession of weapons of mass destruction. This report, based on numerous interviews with government officials, analysts, opposition figures, and ordinary citizens, examines Syria's reactions to these allegations, gradual changes in Syrian political culture, and various domestic developments.


2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 155-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir Krivoy ◽  
Ido Layish ◽  
Eran Rotman ◽  
Avi Goldberg ◽  
Yoav Yehezkelli

AbstractSince the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack, terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction or other industrial chemicals present worldwide security and health concerns. On-scene medical triage and treatment in such events is crucial to save as many lives as possible and minimize the deleterious effects of the toxic agent involved. Since there are many chemicals that can be used as potential terrorist weapons, the medical challenge for the emergency medical services (EMS) is a combination of: (1) recognizing that a chemical terrorist attack (non-conventional) has occurred; and (2) identifying the toxic agent followed by proper antidotal treatment. The latter must be done as quickly as possible, preferably on-scene. The most valuable decision at this stage should be whether the agent is organophosphate (OP) or not OP, based on clinical findings observed by pre-trained, first responders. This decision is crucial, since only OP intoxication has readily available, rapidly acting, onscene, specific agents such as atropine and one of the oximes, preferably administered using autoinjectors. Due to the lack of a specific antidote, exposure to other agents (such as industrial chemicals, e.g., chlorine, bromide, or ammonia) should be treated on-scene symptomatically with non-specific measures, such as decontamination and supportive treatment. This paper proposes an algorithm as a cognitive framework for the medical teams on-scene. This algorithm should be part of the medical team's training for preparedness for chemical terrorist attacks, and the team should be trained to use it in drills. Implementing this path of thinking should improve the medical outcome of such an event.


2019 ◽  
pp. 105-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Hutchings

Robert Hutchings arrived as chairman just a month before the US invasion of Iraq, a move that he privately felt was a major mistake, for reasons that proved all too accurate. Once combat operations gave way to a heavy-handed US occupation regime, the analysis the NIC provided—that the anti-American insurgency was intensifying, and that this was because of the occupation itself—was badly received by policymakers. Such can be the consequences of telling truth to power. Moreover, when no WMD were found in Iraq, criticism mounted, some of it justified but some pure scapegoating. The perceived “intelligence failures” of 9/11 and Iraqi WMD crystallized in pressure toward major reforms to US intelligence. Nonetheless, during this period the NIC did seminal work in reassessing the nature of the terrorist threat and in producing the pathbreaking report, Mapping the Global Future, the newest iteration of the Global Trends series.


Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gi-Wook Shin ◽  
Rennie J. Moon

Kim Jong Un continued to consolidate his power through personnel changes, and North Korean society saw increasing consumerism, along with signs of growing inequality. The economy did well through early 2017 but the subsequent effects of sanctions remained uncertain. North Korea conducted its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and its sixth nuclear test, triggering heated debate in the US and elsewhere about how to respond. Kim clearly is not going to give up working on weapons of mass destruction.


Author(s):  
Matt Carlson

This chapter looks at how two newspapers used unnamed sources in reports leading up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. When Iraq's weapons of mass destruction failed to materialize, critics on the left and from within journalism chastised the New York Times and Washington Post for overly credulous, unnamed source-laden investigative reporting appearing on their front pages in the buildup to the war. The newspapers responded by revisiting their unnamed sourcing practices, but not until more than a year after the invasion. These self-assessments generated attention around two problems negatively impacting prewar coverage: the calculated press management strategies of the Bush administration, and the willingness of the competing newspapers to reproduce official statements anonymously. The complex problems marking the journalist-unnamed source exchange come to light through these efforts to attach blame both to the sources and the journalists.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-50
Author(s):  
barbara koenen

Muse is a personal investigation into the historical and contemporary correlations between pomegranates and hand grenades by the author, an artist based in the Midwest. The essay begins with her reminiscences of witnessing a red-stained feast of the “exotic” pomegranate that was hosted by a friend of Armenian descent; then it chronicles the fruit’s historical associations as a fertility and religious symbol in many cultures since ancient times and its cultivation, beginning in the Fertile Crescent and extending across Asia and into Europe and North America. Upon her realization that hand grenades are named after pomegranates, the author describes physical comparisons between the bomb and the fruit, provides a brief history of grenades and grenadiers, and then muses on the contemporaneous marketing campaigns for the War on Terror that paved the way for the 2003 United States invasion into Iraq, and for POM Wonderful beverages that “defy death” as an “Antioxidant Superpower™.” As the hyperbolic claims of both marketing campaigns were later debunked—Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction and pomegranate juice does not cure cancer—the essay concludes by noting a recent, modest investment by the US government into the cultivation and exporting of pomegranates in Afghanistan as a hopeful sign.


Author(s):  
Andrea Carati

The paper delves into the Afghanistan crisis in a regional perspective. It frames the regional and international influences in the country emphasizing the interdependence between global and regional interferences. It argues that regional actors tend to gain more freedom of action in Afghan affairs when global actors – empires or superpowers – disengage from the country. Conversely, when global powers are intervening (as during the Great Game, the Soviet occupation or the US intervention since 2001), regional actors lose their sway. Accordingly, the paper investigates the recent crisis in Afghanistan identifying three phases starting from the US mission launched in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks: the G.W. Bush approach to the military campaign in Afghanistan (2001-8); the Af-Pak Strategy implemented by the Obama administration (2009-14); the years of international withdrawal (2015-19). For each period, the analysis underlines the activism of regional actors in Afghanistan and how it becomes prominent when the global power tends to disengage.


2020 ◽  
pp. 427-450
Author(s):  
Huw Dylan ◽  
David V. Gioe ◽  
Michael S. Goodman

This chapter focuses on ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, the Iraq War, and one of the key justifications, the claim that Saddam was developing weapons of mass destruction and had to be stopped. Intelligence was crucial to this judgement; but it was wrong. This chapter examines why. It focuses on the challenge of analysis, particularly against mysterious and deceptive targets. How was the CIA to determine that Saddam Hussein had nothing to hide when his actions indicated otherwise? Document: Misreading Intentions: Iraq’s Reaction to Inspections Created Picture of Deception Iraq WMD Retrospective Series.


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