XIX. The EU’s policies of security of energy supply towards the Middle East and Caspian Region: Major power politics?

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 757-825 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi P. Amineh ◽  
Wina H. J. Crijns-Graus

euenergy policy objectives are directed at three highly interdependent areas: energy supply security, competitiveness and decarbonization to prevent climate change. In this paper, we focus on the issue of energy supply security. Security of energy supply for the immediate and medium-term future is a necessary condition in the current context of the global political economy for the survival of the Union and its component member states. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, energy policy no longer comes onto the agenda of the European Commission through the backdoor of the common market, environment and competitiveness. The Treaty created a new legal basis for the internal energy market. However, securing external supplies as well as deciding the energy mix, remain matters of national prerogative, though within the constraints of other parts of eu’s legislation in force. Without a common defense policy, the highly import dependent Union and its members face external instability in the energy rich Arab Middle East and North Africa.Concern about energy security has been triggered by declining European energy production as well as the strain on global demand exerted by newly industrializing economies such as China and India and the Middle East, as well as the political instability in this reserve-rich part of the world. This paper explores the following two topics [1] the current situation and past trends in production, supply, demand and trade in energy in the eu, against the background of major changes in the last half decade and [2] threats to the security of the supply of oil and natural gas from import regions.Fossil fuel import dependence in the eu is expected to continue to increase in the coming two decades. As global trends show, and despite new fields in the Caspian region and the Eastern Mediterranean, conventional fossil oil and gas resources remain concentrated in fewer geopolitically unstable regions and countries (i.e. the Middle East and North Africa (mena) and the Caspian Region (cr) including Russia), while global demand for fossil energy is expected to substantially increase also within the energy rich Gulf countries. This combination directly impacts eu energy supply security. It should be noted that the trend towards higher levels of import dependence was not interrupted when the era of low energy prices, between 1980 and 2003, came to an end.Within the eu itself, domestic resistance to the development of unconventional resources is an obstacle to investment in unconventional sources in this part of the high-income world. This should therefore not put at risk investments in either renewables or alternative sources at home or conventional resources mainly in the Arab-Middle East.The situation is exacerbated by the spread of instability in the Arab-Middle Eastern countries. There are three domestic and geopolitical concerns to be taken into consideration:(1) In the Arab-Middle East, threats to eu energy supply security originate in the domestic regime of these countries. Almost all Arab resource-rich countries belong to a type ofpatrimonial, rentier-type of state-society relation. These regimes rely on rents from the exploitation of energy resources and the way in which rents are distributed.Regimes of this type are being challenged. Their economies show uneven economic development, centralized power structures, corruption and poverty at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The discrimination of females is a major obstacle to the development of the service sector. At present, even the monarchies fear the spread of violent conflict.Offshoots of these consequences have proven to cause civil unrest, exemplified by what optimists have called the ‘Arab Spring.’(2) The second concern is the domestic and global impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds (swfs) managed by Arab patrimonial rentier states. swfs have proven to be an asset in both developing and developed economies due to their ability to buffer the ‘Dutch Disease,’ and to encourage industrialization, economic diversification and eventually the development of civil society. In patrimonial states, however, swfs are affected by corruption and the diversion of funds away from long-term socioeconomic development to luxury consumption by political elites. In fact, Arab swfs underpin the persistence of the Arab patrimonial rentier state system.(3) Finally, the post-Cold War, me and cea geopolitical landscape is shifting. The emergence of China and other Asian economies has increased their presence in the Middle East due to a growing need for energy and the expansion of Asian markets. The recent discovery of energy resources in the us has led to speculation that there will be less us presence in the region. There would be a serious risk to eu energy security if emerging Asian economies were to increase their presence in the Middle East as us interests recede.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 485-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Femke Hoogeveen ◽  
Wilbur Perlot

AbstractVast reserves of fossil fuels make the Greater Middle East (GME) region the centre of attention in terms of security of supply considerations of all major energy-consuming countries, most notably of the United States (US), China, India, and of the European Union (EU). Although energy security is on the EU's agenda, the supranational nature of the EU inhibits it to pursue an external energy security policy in the same way as other consuming countries. Its power, mandate, and in many ways preparedness to execute a common foreign policy towards the GME, let alone as specific as a common foreign energy strategy, are limited. This article seeks to answer the questions of what role the EU wants to play in the GME region in relation to objectives of energy security, what role it can play in this respect, and whether the EU's Middle East politics can be regarded as major power politics.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Hurrell

Broad comparisons of international relations across time—of the prospects for peace and of the possibilities for a new ethics for a connected world—typically focus on two dimensions: economic globalization and integration on the one hand, and the character of major interstate relations on the other. One of the most striking features of the pre-1914 world was precisely the coincidence of intensified globalization with a dramatic deterioration in major power relations, the downfall of concert-style approaches to international order, and the descent into total war and ideological confrontation—what T. S. Eliot termed “the panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history.” Today's optimists stress the degree to which globalization appears much more firmly institutionalized than it was a hundred years ago, the rather striking success of global economic governance in responding to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (compared to, say, the Great Depression), and the longer-term trend within international society to move away from major-power war. Pessimists are less sure. They worry that we have had to re-learn just how unstable global capitalism can be, both in terms of the wrenching societal changes produced by economic success and of the political strains produced by slowdown and recession. And they point to the abiding or resurgent power of nationalism in all of the core countries in the system, the return of balance-of-power thinking (above all in Asia), and the renewed salience of major power politics.


2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (01) ◽  
pp. 39-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangxiang Jin

There are two prevailing arguments among international observers about China’s role in the Middle East. One is that China has been a “security free-rider;” the other is that China is fundamentally a business-seeker. Yet neither of the two is well-grounded. If viewed comprehensively rather than in terms of military engagement alone, China’s contribution to stability and security of the region is enormous, and its role in the Middle East can be described as a combination of a major economic partner, a low-profile mediator and a modest but important provider of security public goods. As China has proposed various new concepts and initiatives as guidelines of its foreign policy, its future policy toward the Middle East can be best understood through its increasing efforts to promote the “Belt and Road” initiative, to develop a new-type major-power relationship, and to uphold justice and pursue shared interests with all related countries. With ever more Chinese engagement in the region, China’s Middle East policy is expected to be delivered in a more comprehensive way. However, China is not likely to seek dominant presence in the region in the foreseeable future.


1971 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-496
Author(s):  
Jacques Benjamin

The fate of the minority in a bi-communal state cannot easily be studied using contemporary theories of integration. This article employs a certain number of variables, regrouped under the concepts of institutional constraints and cultural constraints, which allow for measurement of the strength of the minority. Four countries are studied, all in process of development: Cameroon and Mauritius in Africa, and Cyprus and Lebanon in the Middle East. From the point of view of institutional constraints, the following variables are considered relevant: the statutory “ethnic” composition of the legislative assembly, the type of executive (presidential or responsible cabinet), and the type of protective veto power which rests with the minority. Finally, the state of inter-community relations prior to independence, the presence or absence of a major Power protecting the minority community, and the philosophy of the régime as understood by the country's leaders serve as indicators of cultural constraint.


2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 597-619
Author(s):  
Hany Besada ◽  
Justine Salam

China is in dire need of energy resources to sustain its economic growth. In recent years, China has been turning more to Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East, as well as Sudan in North Africa, as trading partners to secure its energy supply. This article explores China’s energy strategy in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region through case studies of China’s energy diplomacy with Saudi Arabia and Iran. It argues that China’s energy strategy is very much driven by the “Beijing Consensus” that features respect for others’ sovereignty, emphasis on sustainability, equality, and quality-of-life, as well as incremental change to past institutions and practices. China has applied an equity ownership strategy to gain more control over oil flows as a shield against price fluctuations and to reduce the possibility of supply interruption; however, civil unrest and conflicts in the MENA region threaten to disrupt China’s energy supply channels, which implies that China should work harder for regional peace in order to achieve sustainable energy supply.


Author(s):  
Marinko Bobić

Major powers have immense resources at their disposal, while minor powers are assumed to avoid wars and power politics due to structural and material constraints. This provokes the question why do some minor powers nonetheless decide to militarily engage their vastly stronger opponents, particularly major powers? Inspired by several theoretical insights, this book proposes a more complex framework of minor powers in interstate asymmetric conflict. It analyses five conditions highlighted by previous studies: domestic crisis, foreign support, window of opportunity, anomalous beliefs, and regime stability. The theoretical framework works well with a mixed-methods approach, a medium-N research design (Qualitative Comparative Analysis), and three case studies: Iraq (1990), Moldova (1992), and Serbia (1999). The book finds that by looking through the lenses of multiple theories, one can observe a more nuanced relationship how different conditions interact in impacting minor powers’ decisions. Ultimately, minor powers militarily engage major powers when facing a more important domestic crisis and when they also believe that they have a window of opportunity or support from another major power in order to constrain major powers’ capability and resolve. Looking at the current conflict in Syria, there are important policy implications given the observation that minor powers do and will continue to challenge major powers in the future.


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