un security council note dated 19 october 1950 from the representative of the united states of america addressed to the secretarygeneral october 19 1950 unclassified

Significance Russia on June 28 rejected as “lies” similar allegations by the United States, United Kingdom and France at the UN Security Council. The exchanges come against the backdrop of rising diplomatic tensions between Russia and France in CAR. Impacts Touadera’s ongoing offensive against rebel forces threatens to deliver a fatal blow to the peace deal he struck with them in 2019. Expanding Russian control over key mining sites could be a persistent source of frictions absent sophisticated local arrangements. Human rights concerns will deter some African leaders from engaging with Russia, but not all.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rashid I. Khalidi

This essay argues that what has been going on in Palestine for a century has been mischaracterized. Advancing a different perspective, it illuminates the history of the last hundred years as the Palestinians have experienced it. In doing so, it explores key historical documents, including the Balfour Declaration, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and UN Security Council Resolution 242, none of which included the Palestinians in key decisions impacting their lives and very survival. What amounts to a hundred years of war against the Palestinians, the essay contends, should be seen in comparative perspective as one of the last major colonial conflicts of the modern era, with the United States and Europe serving as the metropole, and their extension, Israel, operating as a semi-independent settler colony. An important feature of this long war has been the Palestinians' continuing resistance, against heavy odds, to colonial subjugation. Stigmatizing such resistance as “terrorism” has successfully occluded the real history of the past hundred years in Palestine.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-48
Author(s):  
Richard Falk

This essay examines the consequences of the near-canonical status acquired over the years by UN Security Council Resolution 242. After tracing the evolution of the vision of peace seen to flow from 242, the essay explores the various ways in which the resolution has been read. In particular, the interpretation of Israel (backed by the United States) is examined, along with the balance of power factor. The essay concludes by suggesting that clinging to 242 as ““canonical”” inhibits clear-sighted thinking on new approaches that take cognizance of the greatly altered circumstances.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 335-349
Author(s):  
David Bosco

Less has changed in US diplomacy at the United Nations than many observers expected when the Obama administration took office in January 2009. In the UN Security Council, the United States has pursued a generally steady course that in many respects builds on the accomplishments of the Bush administration. Unexpectedly, the Security Council’s pace of work diminished considerably during the first few years of the new administration. The most significant change is the atmospherics of US diplomacy, not its substance: the Obama administration has participated in processes that the Bush administration shunned and has toned down US criticism of the United Nations’ perceived shortcomings.


Significance The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China are the body’s five permanent members. India wants to join that group. Impacts India-China border tensions could surge in early 2021, worsening bilateral relations. Delhi will deepen security ties with Washington and its other partners in the ‘Quad’ grouping, Tokyo and Canberra. India will push for more stringent selection of UN peacekeepers.


2020 ◽  
pp. 54-99
Author(s):  
Francine R. Frankel

India’s suspicion of US motives set in during the first India-Pakistan war over Kashmir in 1950, after the Hindu maharaja of Muslim majority Kashmir acceded to India. Great Britain, considering that Kashmir should join Muslim-majority Pakistan and that India-Pakistan cooperation was essential to Commonwealth defense, feared India could exercise its legal right to self-defense after tribesmen aided by Pakistan invaded across the northern border. Foreign Office records reveal how the British acted behind the scenes in the UN Security Council to block a discussion of India’s request to remove the tribesmen from Azad Kashmir as the condition for holding a plebiscite. The United States, influenced by the British, appeared to Nehru as the power behind the hostility toward India, while seeking a Cold War bastion in Kashmir.


Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Scott

For some months now and with special intensity in the past few weeks, a battle over legal process – what may or may not the United States do militarily in Iraq without new authorization from the UN Security Council, and at what stage and under what conditions should a Council resolution give such authorization? – has simultaneously become a battle over what words in a resolution will be sufficient to count as implicit authorization. The current diplomatic discourse around a new Iraq resolution is focussing on one or more “hidden triggers” in the draft text presented by the US on October 21.


2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 218-219

Ambassador Rice made the following statement to the UN Security Council in effort to explain how the United States could veto a draft resolution (see Doc. A4 above) reaffirming the illegality of Israeli settlements that had been carefully crafted to use wording from previous U.S. official statements on the subject under consideration. The text was taken from the United States Mission to the United Nations Web site at usun.state.gov. For background on the resolution and the U.S. veto, see Graham Usher's “Letter from the UN” in this issue


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bing Bing Jia

The fallout from the 2010 Kampala Review Conference for the United States has been explained by Harold Koh and Todd Buchwald, who were officially involved in the negotiations at the conference. The concerns they enumerate serve to implicate, inter alia, two issues of broad importance for the international community: the definition of the crime of aggression, and the clear divide between the positions of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the rest of the Kampala participants with respect to the Councils role in implementing the Rome Statute’s new provisions on the crime of aggression. This Note, which focuses on those two issues, is partly a response to some of their criticisms and partly an independent assessment of the consequences of the Review Conference. It also evaluates the Kampala amendments to the Rome Statute’in particular, Articles 8 bis, 15 bis, and 15 ter—from the perspective of customary law and considers their impact on the role assigned to the Council under the UN Charter.


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