Safeguarding the Republic? The South African Police Service, Legitimacy and the Tribulations of Policing a Violent Democracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-108
Author(s):  
Guy Lamb

Since 1994 the South African Police Service (SAPS) has undertaken various efforts to build legitimacy in South Africa. Extensive community policing resources have been made available, and a hybrid community-oriented programme (sector policing) has been pursued. Nevertheless, public opinion data has shown that there are low levels of public trust in the police. Using Goldsmith’s framework of trust-diminishing police behaviours, this article suggests that indifference, a lack of professionalism, incompetence and corruption on the part of the police, particularly in high-crime areas, have eroded public trust in the SAPS. Furthermore, in an effort to maintain order, reduce crime and assert the authority of the state, the police have adopted militaristic strategies and practices, which have contributed to numerous cases of excessive use of force, which has consequently weakened police legitimacy in South Africa

Author(s):  
Sibusiso Masuku

South Africa’s high levels of violent crime have a significant effect on people’s lives. A review of the trends and risk factors associated with violent crime begs the question about who should be leading the effort to prevent violence? The South African Police Service currently has this responsibility – but is this appropriate? And which other departments should be playing a greater role?


Author(s):  
David Bruce

This article is concerned with the process of en masse recruitment implemented within the South African Police Service since 2002. As a result of this process the personnel strength of the SAPS has increased dramatically from 120 549 in 2002 to 199 345 in 2012, an increase of over 65%. A large proportion of SAPS personnel are now people who have joined since 1994 and particularly since 2002. En masse recruitment has in part addressed the legacy of apartheid by promoting racial and gender representativeness in the SAPS. In so doing it has facilitated entry into the civil service by a significant number of black, and particularly African,South Africans, thus contributing to ‘class formation’. At the same time the process does not ensure political non-partisanship on the part of the SAPS. It also has not necessarily contributed to ‘better policing’ in South Africa. While it may have increased the potential that the SAPS will enjoy legitimacy, this cannot be achieved by recruitment alone.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-89
Author(s):  
M Montesh

When South Africa’s first democratically elected president was inaugurated on 10 May 1994, South Africans were anxious to see who would be leading the police service. Nelson Mandela followed his heart without bowing to political pressure and appointed seasoned police official Commissioner George Fivaz. Although the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 was silent on the powers of the President to appoint the national commissioners, this appointment was made in terms of section 214(1) of that Act. At the time George Fivaz’s term expired, Mandela was also bowing out of the political limelight. When Thabo Mbeki assumed the presidency in 1999, he appointed Jackie Selebi, a former Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadre, who came from the Department of Foreign Affairs without any policing experience. This appointment was made in terms of section 207 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, read with section 7(1)(a) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. Section 8(1) of the South African Police Service Act stipulates that ‘if the National Commissioner has lost the confidence of the Cabinet, the President may establish a board of inquiry to inquire into the circumstances that led to the loss of confidence, compile a report and make recommendations.’ After serving his first term, reports of Selebi’s involvement in the criminal underworld began to emerge. As a result of these reports, the then Directorate of Special Operations (the Scorpions) investigated Selebi’s involvement in corrupt activities. In 2007, Selebi was charged inter alia with two counts of corruption; in 2010, he was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Surprisingly, on 2 August 2009, President Jacob Zuma appointed General Bheki Cele, who also came from an MK background without any policing experience, as the third National Police Commissioner. Within a year, reports of Cele’s involvement in illegal lease deals began to emerge and the office of the Public Protector was called in to investigate the allegations. As a result of its findings of improper conduct and maladministration, he was suspended in 2011 and a commission of inquiry was established in terms of section 8(1) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 to find out whether the Commissioner was fit to hold office. General Cele was fired for maladministration and corruption and was replaced by General Riah Phiyega, who also did not have any policingexperience. A few months after her taking office, the Marikana incident occurred and all the blame for it has been directed at the National Commissioner, although the commission has not yet finalised its mandate. In view of the above-mentioned incidents, it is clear that there is a problem with the way in which the National Commissioner is appointed. This article seeks to unravel the powers of the president in appointing the National Police Commissioner and discuss the cases of the two former incumbents who bowed out of office in disgrace without completing their terms of office. It also includes a comparative study with countries such as Kenya, Northern Ireland, Uganda, Canada and selected countries from the Caribbean islands. As a way forward, a new model for appointing and dismissing the National Commissioner for South Africa is proposed.


Author(s):  
Vinesh Basdeo

An important part of crime investigation is the obtaining of evidence through the search and seizure of persons and things. The South African Constitution[1] recognises that state authorities should not be permitted untrammelled access to search and seize. It is a necessary incident to democracy that citizens must be protected from unjustified intrusions of privacy and property by agents of the state. Otherwise, arbitrary state actions could severely affect the personal freedom and associated fundamental rights that are intended to be a predominant feature of democratic society. In this article I consider whether or not certain provisions contained in the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (hereafter the Criminal Procedure Act and the South African Police Service Act respectively) are in conflict with the Constitution. The provisions deal with search and seizure. I will also turn to the laws of foreign jurisdictions, specifically of the United States and Canada, for guidance and comparison. At the outset it should be pointed out that this article does not argue for the abolition of the search and seizure provisions contained in the Criminal Procedure Act and the South African Police Service Act. It is acknowledged albeit reluctantly, that there may still be a need for some of them. It is the investigative and enforcement measures provided for by these provisions, rather than the objectives, which are in issue here. It is submitted that there are search and seizure provisions contained in the Criminal Procedure Act and the South African Police Service Act, which are inconsistent with the spirit, purport and object of the Constitution.[1]          Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.


Author(s):  
Trevor Budhram ◽  
Nicolaas Geldenhuys

The South African Police Service (SAPS) is finding it increasingly difficult to protect victims from the scourge of commercial crime which threatens the economy, corrodes scarce and valuable resources, and inhibits growth and development. Official statistics from the SAPS show that the annual detection rate in respect of reported fraud cases was 35.77% in 2014/15 and 34.08% in 2015/16. Although the detection rate for serious commercial crime for 2014/15 is reported as 94.8% and 96.75% for 2015/16, it is likely that these figures are inaccurate and in reality are much lower. This article provides an overview of the incidence of commercial crime, assesses the detection rate reported by the SAPS and seeks to determine whether they are losing the fight against these crimes.


Author(s):  
Moses Montesh

In 1999 a new directorate of the National Prosecuting Authority was launched to ‘complement and, in some respects, supplement the efforts of existing law enforcement agencies in fighting national priority crimes’.Over the following seven years the Directorate of Special Operations, nicknamed the ‘Scorpions’, gained public favour; however, they were accused of, amongst other things, exceeding their jurisdiction by performing functions that fell outside their mandate. During the African National Congress conference of 2007, delegates took a decision that the Scorpions should be disbanded. In 2008, Parliament passed the South African Police Service Amendment Bill that replaced the Scorpions with the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, located within the South African Police Service. In 2010 this move was challenged in Hugh Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others [CCT 48/10]. The key question in this case was whether the national legislation that created the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, known as the Hawks (DPCI), and disbanded the Scorpions, was  constitutionally valid. In March 2011 the Constitutional Court ruled that the legislation establishing the Hawks was unconstitutional and ‘invalid to the extent that it fails to secure an adequate degree of independence for the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation.’ The Court gave the government 18 months to rectify the situation. This article provides an overview of the decisions that led to the formation and closure of the Scorpions, and the formation of the Hawks.


Author(s):  
David Bruce

The South African Police Service is often a target of criticism, more often than not stemming from heightened public emotions regarding the high levels of crime in South Africa. Using the concept of democratic policing as its basis, a recent assessment attempts to evaluate the SAPS against a set of 39 measures. Providing an organisation-wide view of the SAPS, the assessment highlights both positive and negative aspects of the  SAPS, and provides a detailed set of recommendations. The assessment is intended to support democratic oversight of the police by directing attention towards the main issues that should be addressed by oversight bodies.


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