Civil Liability Against Prison Officials for Inmate-On-Inmate Assault: Where are We and Where Have We Been?

1995 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL S. VAUGHN ◽  
ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN

This article focuses on civil liabilities imposed on prison officials for inmate-by-inmate assault in correctional facilities. After briefly discussing the statistical frequency of inmate-by-inmate assault, the article examines Farmer v. Brennan, a case on inmate-by-inmate assault decided in 1994 by the U.S. Supreme Court. Through an analysis of 96 pre-Farmer cases on inmate assault decided in the U.S. circuit courts of appeals, the article outlines the parameters under which officials might be held liable in post-Farmer litigation. The article concludes that the circumstances and situations under which prison officials are liable will not sufficiently change because the realities of judicial decision making may make it difficult for individual judges to distinguish between pre-Farmer and post-Farmer standards.

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 494-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane A. Gleason ◽  
Jennifer J. Jones ◽  
Jessica Rae McBean

Although still a minority, the growing number of women on both the Bench and at the Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court has important implications for judicial decision-making and successful advocacy at the Court. Research in judicial behavior generally focuses on vote direction and the presence of female attorneys in a case. We offer a more nuanced account of how gender impacts both attorney success and judicial decision-making by drawing on work in social and political psychology and utilizing quantitative textual analysis to explore the tension between masculine norms of behavior that are valued in the legal profession and feminine norms of behavior that are expected of women, but devalued in the legal profession. Based on the Court’s long-standing disdain for emotional arguments, we examine how the emotional content in 601 party briefs shapes the Court’s majority opinions. Our results indicate that male justices evaluate counsel based on their compliance with traditional gender norms—rewarding male counsel for cool, unemotional arguments and rewarding female counsel for emotionally compelling arguments. However, we find no evidence that gender norms shape the opinions of female justices. Given that the justice system is supposed to be “blind,” our results highlight the durability of gendered expectations and raise questions about the objectivity of judicial decision-making.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Lempert ◽  
Alyse Camacho

Abstract This article contributes to the literature addressing family influences on elite political behavior. By empirically assessing the influence of sibling gender on judicial decision-making, we are able to present evidence on the mechanism by which child, sibling and other relatives’ gender may influence elite political behavior. We build on a published dataset by mining various archival sources to compile data on the gender of judges’ siblings. We find no evidence that male judges’ votes on so-called “women’s issues” (employment discrimination based on gender or pregnancy, reproductive rights/abortion, and Title IX) are affected by whether they have a sister, and we are able to rule out large effects of a sibling’s gender on male and female judges’ votes. Our results imply that the relationship between family member gender and elite political behavior is driven by the desire to avoid costs of discrimination, rather than learning from family members.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 422-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R Gray

Abstract State supreme court justices are often the final arbiters of cases in their jurisdictions. Yet, in states that grant governors the power to selectively reappoint supreme court justices, justices’ independence is limited. These governors are able to monitor justices’ decisions and are empowered to remove justices whose jurisprudence conflicts with the governor’s preferences. This power gives governors substantial influence over judicial decision-making by justices eligible for another term on the bench. I test this proposition on an exhaustive set of state supreme court criminal appeals from 1995 to 2010, and show that votes by justices who need to be reappointed covary with executive preferences, and more than votes by justices ineligible for reappointment. These effects are stable across time within a justice’s term so long as the serving governor may one day be their reappointer. I also show that these shifting individual votes lead to changes in outcomes for defendants.


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