The Role of Gender Norms in Judicial Decision-Making at the U.S. Supreme Court: The Case of Male and Female Justices

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 494-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane A. Gleason ◽  
Jennifer J. Jones ◽  
Jessica Rae McBean

Although still a minority, the growing number of women on both the Bench and at the Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court has important implications for judicial decision-making and successful advocacy at the Court. Research in judicial behavior generally focuses on vote direction and the presence of female attorneys in a case. We offer a more nuanced account of how gender impacts both attorney success and judicial decision-making by drawing on work in social and political psychology and utilizing quantitative textual analysis to explore the tension between masculine norms of behavior that are valued in the legal profession and feminine norms of behavior that are expected of women, but devalued in the legal profession. Based on the Court’s long-standing disdain for emotional arguments, we examine how the emotional content in 601 party briefs shapes the Court’s majority opinions. Our results indicate that male justices evaluate counsel based on their compliance with traditional gender norms—rewarding male counsel for cool, unemotional arguments and rewarding female counsel for emotionally compelling arguments. However, we find no evidence that gender norms shape the opinions of female justices. Given that the justice system is supposed to be “blind,” our results highlight the durability of gendered expectations and raise questions about the objectivity of judicial decision-making.

Author(s):  
Miguel Á. Benedetti ◽  
M. Jimena Sáenz

Resumen: En las últimas décadas, las audiencias públicas realizadas en foros judiciales han sido señaladas como una de las innovaciones más importantes en las prácticas de los tribunales de altas instancias latinoamericanos. Estas audiencias prometen una renovación en los modos de pensar las tensas relaciones entre el poder judicial –especialmente su facultad de revisión de constitucionalidad– y la democracia a partir de la apertura del espacio judicial al diálogo y la participación de la ciudadanía, de las modalidades de intervención judicial para la protección de derechos, y de los aspectos simbólicos y políticos de herramientas que usualmente se reconocen como meramente procesales. A la luz de esos objetivos de renovación dialógica, pragmática y simbólica de las prácticas judiciales que abrieron las audiencias, este trabajo testea su grado de concreción a través de un estudio de los efectos de las audiencias públicas realizadas por la Corte Suprema de Justicia argentina en sus decisiones desde finales de 2004 hasta el 2017 inclusive.Palabras clave: Corte Suprema, audiencias públicas, participación ciudadana, deliberación, decisión judicialAbstract: The implementation of public hearings in judicial fora in the last decades has been considered from different perspectives one of the most important innovations in the practices of Latin American Courts. They promise a renovation in the ways of accommodating the tension between the role of Courts (especially their function of judicial review) and democracy; in the models of judicial decision making, and they point to the symbolic dimension of procedural rules and practices. This paper presents a study that tests the accomplishment of these promises tracing the impact of public hearings in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Argentina in the period between 2004 and 2017.Keywords: Supreme Court, public hearings, public participation, deliberation, judicial decision making.  


1995 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL S. VAUGHN ◽  
ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN

This article focuses on civil liabilities imposed on prison officials for inmate-by-inmate assault in correctional facilities. After briefly discussing the statistical frequency of inmate-by-inmate assault, the article examines Farmer v. Brennan, a case on inmate-by-inmate assault decided in 1994 by the U.S. Supreme Court. Through an analysis of 96 pre-Farmer cases on inmate assault decided in the U.S. circuit courts of appeals, the article outlines the parameters under which officials might be held liable in post-Farmer litigation. The article concludes that the circumstances and situations under which prison officials are liable will not sufficiently change because the realities of judicial decision making may make it difficult for individual judges to distinguish between pre-Farmer and post-Farmer standards.


Author(s):  
Linda Tvrdíková

If we look at the literature about judicial decision-making and interpretation of law, we can find many texts which are dedicated to legal arguments, logic and legal reasoning – in those texts the rationality, analytical and logical thinking is glorified and an interpretation seems ‘just’ as a logical operation where judges subsume certain facts under general legal norm or norms, those norms are formulated linguistically, so it seems that the whole job of judges is to analyze texts. What we can see more rarely are discussions and texts exploring the role of intuitions, feelings and emotions and their role in judicial decision-making – at least in the Czech Republic. Those of our faculties are seen as the source of bias and distortion. Even if we look to the past, those themes are not so common among legal theorists and philosophers – especially in our tradition where we are still influenced by Hans Kelsen and František Weyr and their normative theory – but we can find exceptions and those are the American legal realists. In this paper, we will show that their observations and insights seem to be right. How can we know it? Because in last decades cognitive scientists have made big progress in the area of decision-making and it seems that we are not so rational as we thought us to be. They have explored that our thinking does not take place only through the deliberative system but, surprisingly, there is also another one system which influences our decisions. This system is automatic, fast, and intuitive – some call this system S1, Seymour Epstein an experiential system. This automatic system is more influential than our deliberative system because it is always heard – we can use Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of an elephant and a rider. S1, the intuitive, experiential system, is an elephant and S2, the deliberative, analytical system is the rider – in legal theory, we have talked about the rider a lot but we do not explore the elephant sufficiently. This paper will try to uncover the nature of the elephant.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea L. Miller

Although the influence of gender ideology on lay decision-making has been established, it is not known to what extent expertise may mitigate gendered biases and improve decision-making quality. In a set of controlled experiments, trial court judges and laypeople evaluated a hypothetical child custody case and a hypothetical employment discrimination case. The role of expertise was tested in two ways: by comparing judges’ and laypeople’s decision-making and by examining relative differences in expertise among judges. Judges were no less influenced by litigant gender and by their own gender ideology than the lay sample. Judges with greater subject-matter expertise were also no less influenced by gender ideology than other judges. In some cases, expertise was associated with greater, not less, bias. The results of this study suggest that expertise does not attenuate gendered biases in legal decision-making.


2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 363-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Riggs Romaine ◽  
Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein ◽  
Elizabeth Hunt ◽  
David DeMatteo

Author(s):  
David Klein

Years of effort by many talented and creative scholars to gauge the influence of law on judicial decision-making have produced payoffs, but the payoffs do not seem commensurate with the work that has gone into producing them. After reviewing some of the most important approaches and findings, this chapter identifies key obstacles to progress and suggests a new strategy for making more headway against them. The strategy begins by recognizing that ultimately the questions driving empirical and theoretical inquiry into law’s influence are often less about law itself than about the propriety of judicial decision-making. The chapter concludes with suggestions for empirical questions to complement more familiar ones about the role of law in judges’ decisions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Bodrožić ◽  
Đorđe Đorđević

From the adoption of the Criminal Code in 2006 until the latest amendments of 2019, the Serbian criminal legislation treated recidivism as an optional aggravating circumstance, which had its specific legal status in comparison with other mitigating and aggravating circumstances. According to the new legal solution, instead of being optional, recidivism has become a mandatory aggravating circumstance, which together with clearly specified conditions for harsher penalties narrows down the possibility of free judicial decision-making when meting out punishment. The paper answers several questions: whether harsher penalties for recidivists are only the result of continuous tightening of repression at a normative level, whether and to what extent the criminal-law framework has been improved, and whether returning to some solutions, which were not normally applied in court practice, can be marked as approriate to achieve the desired degree of crime prevention. Final critical conculusion is that the new legal solution on recidivism appears regressive, given that the court is strictly bound by the law through oblitatory conditions regarding prior and persistent offending, which is in compliance with the general trend of tightening repression at the normative level and reducing the role of the court to the level of administrative application of the norm.


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