Religious practice versus subjective religiosity: Catholics and those with ‘no religion’ in the French 2017 presidential election

2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-181
Author(s):  
Claude Dargent

Since the 1930s, the frequency of mass attendance has been the most widely used indicator of involvement in Catholicism in France. Yet its validity is sometimes debated: to what extent can subjective religiosity constitute an alternative measure? Both indicators seem closely related. However, the social distributions they perform diverge at the margin. And the large sample on which this research is based reveals changes in contemporary Catholicism – particularly with regard to the urban rather than rural character of today’s practitioners. Electoral behaviour is also used in this article as a touchstone for the comparison of the two indicators. Previous research has established the strong link between Catholic religious practice and right-wing – but not far-right – voting. Despite the singularity of the 2017 election, the analysis establishes that this still holds true – and that the combination of these two indicators allows for subtler insight into this link.

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 763-777 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Short

This paper explores how to consider the far right in historical-material and psychoanalytic perspective in the current conjuncture. Since the early post-Second World War interventions in this register, both the social relations of capitalism and psychoanalytic theory have evolved, while the problematic of the far-right had been somewhat marginalized as an object of research. This discussion revisits these broad concerns with attention to developments in the characterization of contemporary character structures and social relations. It examines two psychoanalytic approaches – drawn from Kohut and Lacan – that have been mobilized to examine the dominant character structures of late capitalism to consider their complementarity (and differences) with respect to certain psychological functions – defenses, affect and identification – that may offer insight into the far-right in the contemporary moment.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Sabina Magliocco

This essay introduces a special issue of Nova Religio on magic and politics in the United States in the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election. The articles in this issue address a gap in the literature examining intersections of religion, magic, and politics in contemporary North America. They approach political magic as an essentially religious phenomenon, in that it deals with the spirit world and attempts to motivate human behavior through the use of symbols. Covering a range of practices from the far right to the far left, the articles argue against prevailing scholarly treatments of the use of esoteric technologies as a predominantly right-wing phenomenon, showing how they have also been operationalized by the left in recent history. They showcase the creativity of magic as a form of human cultural expression, and demonstrate how magic coexists with rationality in contemporary western settings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-209
Author(s):  
Leanne C. Serbulo

Abstract With the rise of right-wing populist ideologies and ensuing social polarization, political violence has become more widespread. Between 2017 and 2019, far-right extremists and anti-fascists engaged in more than twenty violent protest clashes in Portland, Oregon, USA. Through a protest event analysis of those clashes supplemented with a case study of the protest wave, this paper explores how the mechanisms of radicalization and de-radicalization operate when two violent protest movements collide and interact with state security forces. The three-way interaction among a movement, counter-movement, and the police can produce unanticipated outcomes. For example, rather than de-escalating the situation, police underbidding resulted in an increase in violence between the two movements. Understanding how the mechanisms of radicalization and de-radicalization function in a movement/counter-movement protest cycle can provide insight into the ways in which a movement’s strategy and their adversaries’ responses to it can increase or decrease levels of violence.


2002 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alistair Cole

The 2002 Elections In France Were A Gripping Drama Unfolding in four acts. Each act has to be understood as part of a whole, as each election was ultimately dependent upon the results of the first round of the presidential election on 21 April. However untypical in the context of Fifth Republican history, the first round of the presidential election strongly inf luenced the peculiar course of the subsequent contests. The outcome of the first election on the 21 April – at which the far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen won through to the second ballot against Jacques Chirac, narrowly distancing the outgoing premier Lionel Jospin – created an electric shock which reverberated around the streets of Paris and other French cities and sparked a civic mobilization without parallel since May '68. The end-result of this exceptional republican mobilization was to secure the easy (initially rather unexpected) re-election of Chirac as president at the second round two weeks later. The election of 5 May was unlike a typical second-round election. Rather than a bipolar contest pitting left and right over a choice of future governmental orientations, it was a plebiscite in favour of democracy (hence Chirac) against the far-right (Le Pen). Chirac was re-elected overwhelmingly as president, supported by at least as many leftwing as right-wing voters. This enforced plebiscite against the extreme right allowed a resurgent Jacques Chirac to claim a renewed presidential authority. At the parliamentary election of 9 and 16 June, the Fifth Republic reverted to a more traditional mode of operation, as a new ‘presidential party’, informally launched just weeks before the elections, obtained a large overall majority of seats to ‘support the President’ in time-honoured Fifth Republican tradition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-324
Author(s):  
FERNANDA TARABAL LOPES ◽  
ALESSANDRA DE SÁ MELLO DA COSTA

Abstract Recent years have witnessed the rise of far right-wing leaders in various parts of the world. Stanley (2019) recognizes the particularities of the different nations where this phenomenon is observed but advocates for generalizing it. The author uses the label “fascism” to refer to a variety of ultranationalism. When analyzing the current Brazilian situation, Souza (2019) also refers to fascism, exploring its irrational origins and particularities in Brazil, noticing the emergence of a neo-fascism. Against this backdrop, there are cases of people leaving their countries due to the increasing violence experienced. This study explores this particular situation, presenting the history of Tiburi’s exile, a philosopher, writer, university professor, and Brazilian politician. Concerning the theoretical discussion of the case, the study recalls, among other contributions, the debate about the centrality of work and its psychological function and how it presents itself as a form of existence and resistance for political exile. The article also discusses solidarity and the ‘public space of word’, a possibility that ceases in the country of origin and is sought in expatriation, primarily through work as a mode of existence and resistance. This study uses life history research, which is a rich possibility of apprehending the social experience and the subject in their practices. It is a method particularly fruitful in the study of phenomena such as migration. It is also essential through this research to register and reflect on work in the context of the recent Brazilian political exile.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 16-45
Author(s):  
Aman Bajwa

Information disorder has become an increasing concern in the wake of the 2016 US presidential election. With the state of the COVID-19 pandemic rapidly evolving in all facets, the vaccination debate has become increasingly polarized and subjected to a form of politics based around identity markers such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, and ideology. At the forefront of this is the COVID-19 anti-vaccination movement that has gained mainstream attention, leading to conflict with pro-vaccinationists. This has paved the way for exploitation by subversive elements such as, foreign state-backed disinformation campaigns, alternative news outlets, and right-wing influencers who spread false and misleading information, or disinformation, on COVID-19 in order to promote polarization of the vaccine debate through identity politics. Disinformation spread sows confusion and disorder, leading to the erosion of social cohesion as well as the potential for real-world conflict and violence. As a result, the article below will generate further understanding of the modern-day spread of disinformation, the strategies and tactics utilized by state and non-state actors, the effects of its exposure, and the social-psychological processes involved in its spread and resonance. Furthermore, in countering this phenomenon, this article recommends a collaborative framework involving emphasis on critical media literacy skills, citizen participation, and development of counter-offensive capabilities towards state-backed information operations.


Significance Andre Ventura, leader of the far-right Chega (Enough) party, finished third in Portugal’s presidential election in January with 12% of the vote. Most polls now suggest that it is the third most popular party in Portugal. Chega’s core identity centres around its anti-establishment views, as well as hostility towards minority groups, in particular the Roma community. Impacts Local elections in October will be a stronger barometer of Chega’s appeal in Portugal than the presidential election. If Chega continues to expand its support, Portugal’s other right-wing parties could adopt some of its views and rhetoric. Chega founder Ventura’s association with Benfica football club could damage his appeal in the north, where arch-rival Porto dominates. Like other far-right parties, Chega could transition from advocating neoliberalism to more popular economic positions over time.


2019 ◽  
pp. 104-127
Author(s):  
Arie W. Kruglanski ◽  
David Webber ◽  
Daniel Koehler

Chapter 6 examines what motivated the interviewees to join extreme right-wing groups and organizations. Analyses revealed that the most common soon-to-be-extremist was someone who was socially frustrated, although there were no consistent culprits responsible for their distress. It turns out that individuals joined the extreme milieu because they viewed it as place where they could find significance and acceptance—where they could be seen as idealistic revolutionaries and belong to a group that gave them purpose. Analyses further revealed the social network component of radicalization, in that the vast majority of those interviewed were introduced to Far Right organizations through various social connections. Specific analysis is applied to understand how the social aspect of radicalization occurred and the role of the hate music scene in facilitating this process. Connections are drawn to previous work with both Far Right and other extremists that addressed those processes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Davis ◽  
Joe Straubhaar

When examining the decline of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores and the ascension of the right-wing extremist Jair Bolsanaro of the far-right Partido Liberal Social to the 2018 presidency, political scientists David Samuels and Cesar Zucco have argued that this shift is best understood not through positive characteristics of Bolsonaro’s candidacy but through antipetismo [‘anti-PT-ism’], an intensely personal resentment of the Partido dos Trabalhadores. We assert that popular right-wing Facebook groups and networks formed around the communication network WhatsApp-fueled antipetismo by channeling anger originating in the 2013 nationwide protests away from a variety of social, political, and issues and toward a villainous depiction of Partido dos Trabalhadores leaders and valorization of anti-Partido dos Trabalhadores activists like Bolsanaro, as well as some focus on his own conservative, nationalist agenda. To interrogate this assertion, we propose two specific lines of research. The first is a qualitative textual analysis of the social media accounts of two of the most active anti-Partido dos Trabalhadores groups: Vem Pra Rua and O Movimento Brasil Livre. Through close reading of the materials distributed on these sites, we will illustrate how they channeled general unrest into a specifically partisan attack. The next line of research and case will be an examination of the role of mainstream news networks (namely TV Record) and WhatsApp by those campaigning for recently elected president Bolsonaro for a continued negative campaign against left candidates, specifically the Partido dos Trabalhadores, using fake news items like the supposed ‘gay kit’ that was being circulated in schools by the Partido dos Trabalhadores and others on the left to persuade children to become gay. When possible, we will analyze examples of the materials that were circulated that have emerged in the press coverage and will examine the processes that were used to target and persuade people to forward the materials created for the campaign.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 375-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Jutel

This article examines the centrality of affective media production to contemporary American populism with a case study of the right-wing broadcaster Glenn Beck. The rise of far-right media and Donald Trump in social media spaces demonstrates the convergence of the economic and political logic of affect. In soliciting the affective and collaborative labour of users, affective media necessarily deploys discourses of social transformation, autonomy and critical knowingness. Beck’s show exemplifies this logic with Beck functioning as a leader of the Tea Party movement who perform ‘free labour’ for Fox News and Beck’s own media empire, while experiencing this as a form of revolutionary education. Where this audience movement speaks to the political ontology of affective media is in the return of a fetishistic ‘symbolic efficiency’. In foreshadowing Trump, Beck articulates an antagonistic division of the social with a populist community of jouissance and individuation both threatened and constituted by the rapacious enemy.


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