Portugal is no longer immune from the far right

Significance Andre Ventura, leader of the far-right Chega (Enough) party, finished third in Portugal’s presidential election in January with 12% of the vote. Most polls now suggest that it is the third most popular party in Portugal. Chega’s core identity centres around its anti-establishment views, as well as hostility towards minority groups, in particular the Roma community. Impacts Local elections in October will be a stronger barometer of Chega’s appeal in Portugal than the presidential election. If Chega continues to expand its support, Portugal’s other right-wing parties could adopt some of its views and rhetoric. Chega founder Ventura’s association with Benfica football club could damage his appeal in the north, where arch-rival Porto dominates. Like other far-right parties, Chega could transition from advocating neoliberalism to more popular economic positions over time.

Significance It was expected that the reshuffle would reflect a policy pivot towards social and environmental priorities in the wake of COVID-19 and as a response to the outcome of local elections this year. Instead, personnel change was very modest and underpinned Macron’s focus on managing the current crisis and consolidating right-wing support ahead of the April 2022 presidential election. Impacts Polls suggest the far-right National Rally is failing to take advantage of the COVID-19 crisis. Recent surges in COVID-19 cases suggest France’s economic recovery will be slower than expected. Rising COVID-19 cases across Europe will increase pressure on the EU to acclerate the rollout of its recovery fund.


2019 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-82
Author(s):  
Sabine Lehner

Right wing and far right parties have recently succeeded in many elections worldwide. The Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), one of the most successful right-wing populist parties of Europe, has lately also enjoyed great popularity in regional and national elections. Norbert Hofer, the FPÖ-candidate, even made it to the run-offs of the presidential election in 2016. This paper draws on a discourse-analytical approach and investigates the discursive strategies implemented by the FPÖ during two election campaigns (the 2015 local elections in Vienna and the 2016 presidential elections). Based on various discursive events of both campaigns (speeches, posters, TV-discussions etc.), this contribution examines if recent right-wing populist rhetoric corresponds to well-known patterns or if there have been some shifts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Sabina Magliocco

This essay introduces a special issue of Nova Religio on magic and politics in the United States in the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election. The articles in this issue address a gap in the literature examining intersections of religion, magic, and politics in contemporary North America. They approach political magic as an essentially religious phenomenon, in that it deals with the spirit world and attempts to motivate human behavior through the use of symbols. Covering a range of practices from the far right to the far left, the articles argue against prevailing scholarly treatments of the use of esoteric technologies as a predominantly right-wing phenomenon, showing how they have also been operationalized by the left in recent history. They showcase the creativity of magic as a form of human cultural expression, and demonstrate how magic coexists with rationality in contemporary western settings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 205630512092663
Author(s):  
Vanessa Ceia

That Twitter is a major form of political mobilization and influence has been well documented. But what is the role of linked media—references to newspapers, photos, videos, and other external sources via URLs—in political Twitter messaging? How are linked references employed as campaign tools and rhetorical devices in messages published by political parties on Twitter? Is there a quantifiable relationship between a party’s ideology and linked media in tweets? With the spread of fake news, threats to a free press, and questioning of the legitimacy of political messaging on the rise globally, the sources on which parties draw to convince voters of their online messaging deserve critical attention. To explore the above questions, this article examines uses of linked media in tweets generated by the official accounts of Spain’s top five political parties during, in the lead-up, and in the immediate aftermath of the Spanish General Elections held on April 28, 2019. Grounded in a corpus of 10,038 tweets collected between March 1 and May 15, 2019, this study quantifies, compares, and critiques how linked media are integrated and remixed into tweets published by the left-leaning Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party (@PSOE), right-wing Popular Party (@populares), left-wing Podemos (@ahorapodemos), neoliberal Citizens (@CiudadanosCs), and far-right Vox (@vox_es) parties. Evidence reveals that each party links to media from somewhat homophilic groups of news outlets, journalists, and public figures, an analysis of which can shed light on how parties construct their digital self-representations, ideological networks of information, and attempt to sway voters.


Significance The government consists largely of newcomers and politicians with dubious links to the far right. It embarks upon a five-year reform programme for Austria which is thin on detail but could lead to radical changes. Impacts A tougher stance on migrants and asylum seekers could foster a wider reluctance in some EU states to accept refugees. Major constitutional changes are unlikely as the government would need the support of the SPOe or the small Neos party. Any extreme right-wing tendencies will concern Brussels and Israel, which will keep a close eye on the government. Austria will be an unpredictable ally, sometimes siding with Macron and at other times favouring alliances with Eastern European countries. The SPOe’s loss of office could lead to changes in personnel and programmatic position.


Significance Kurz has said he wants a coalition agreement by the end of the month -- probably with the far-right populist Freedom Party (FPOe). Impacts Austria is likely to push for EU reforms on migration, border controls and social welfare benefits. The SPOe is struggling to find a niche in the party system and could face a long spell in opposition. The FPOe's rise to a potential government role will attract unwanted international attention. The political elite could be rejuvenated as younger Kurz supporters are promoted to top jobs in ministries and parliament.


Significance The meeting, which will be the third in the process so far, has been delayed due to disagreements among ethnic minority groups, including ethnic minority armed groups (EMAGs). Myanmar’s next general election is due in 2020, when State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) will be seeking to retain control of the civilian portion of government. Impacts While ongoing violence may dissuade Western investors, China and India will see opportunity rather than risk in Myanmar. China will encourage EMAGs to negotiate peace. Myanmar military personnel will face US sanctions over attacks on Rohingya Muslims.


Subject Local and municipal election results. Significance The largely united opposition made a major breakthrough in local elections on October 13, taking Budapest and other cities and towns and eroding Prime Minister Viktor Orban's Fidesz party’s predominant position since 2006. A sex scandal plus changes within the opposition have apparently lost Fidesz the middle class, further emphasising the already stark divide between cities and the countryside. Impacts Orban’s weaker position will dent the confidence of the global right-wing populist movement, of which he is a figurehead. Domestic capital associated with the Orban government is at risk as investors price in a potential loss of government support. The decline in political stability may at least momentarily moderate investor confidence in Hungary.


2002 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alistair Cole

The 2002 Elections In France Were A Gripping Drama Unfolding in four acts. Each act has to be understood as part of a whole, as each election was ultimately dependent upon the results of the first round of the presidential election on 21 April. However untypical in the context of Fifth Republican history, the first round of the presidential election strongly inf luenced the peculiar course of the subsequent contests. The outcome of the first election on the 21 April – at which the far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen won through to the second ballot against Jacques Chirac, narrowly distancing the outgoing premier Lionel Jospin – created an electric shock which reverberated around the streets of Paris and other French cities and sparked a civic mobilization without parallel since May '68. The end-result of this exceptional republican mobilization was to secure the easy (initially rather unexpected) re-election of Chirac as president at the second round two weeks later. The election of 5 May was unlike a typical second-round election. Rather than a bipolar contest pitting left and right over a choice of future governmental orientations, it was a plebiscite in favour of democracy (hence Chirac) against the far-right (Le Pen). Chirac was re-elected overwhelmingly as president, supported by at least as many leftwing as right-wing voters. This enforced plebiscite against the extreme right allowed a resurgent Jacques Chirac to claim a renewed presidential authority. At the parliamentary election of 9 and 16 June, the Fifth Republic reverted to a more traditional mode of operation, as a new ‘presidential party’, informally launched just weeks before the elections, obtained a large overall majority of seats to ‘support the President’ in time-honoured Fifth Republican tradition.


Subject Profile of Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Significance The new leader of New Democracy (ND), 48-year-old Kyriakos Mitsotakis, has already given his party's shadow government another reshuffle, setting up a tougher stance than his predecessor towards the Syriza-Independent Greeks (Anel) coalition government. Mitsotakis sees delays in implementing the third bailout package as destructive for the private sector and criticises Syriza's propensity to hobble any administrative or regulatory authority it does not control and to fill public institutions with political appointees and relatives of cabinet ministers. Impacts ND's political profile, tainted by years of unpopular austerity measures and openings to the far-right, will become more centrist. Mitsotakis's rise to head ND will strengthen the hand of Greece's creditors as he offers a reliable alternative to Syriza-Anel. Other opposition parties may feel pressure to distance themselves from the government lest supporters defect to ND.


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