Realism and great power subversion

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-481
Author(s):  
William C Wohlforth

I present a realist theory of subversion among great powers, an understudied phenomenon in the burgeoning literature on subversive statecraft. I show that a simple, rational cost-benefit calculus accounts for comparatively low-levels of subversion among non-belligerent great powers, much higher levels among belligerent great powers, and more frequent, violent and larger-scale subversion against weaker targets. Brief case studies of mid-twentieth century subversion featuring the Soviet Union and the United States illustrate the theory and provide preliminary support. Theory and evidence show that the conditions that are conducive to highly consequential subversion among great powers are quite limited and reversible. This gives rise to skepticism concerning claims that today’s strategic environment has fundamentally transformed the nature of great power rivalry so as to accord a newly central place to subversion.

Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

Chapters 2 and 3 helped confirm that rising states support declining great powers when decliners can help rising states against other great power threats. In contrast, Chapters 4 and 5 assess the logic of rising state predation by examining the United States’ response to the Soviet Union’s decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. Chapter 4 first provides an overview of the Soviet Union’s waning relative position and discusses U.S. efforts to monitor the trend. Next, it reviews existing research on the course of U.S. strategy and relates this work to alternative accounts of rising state policy. The bulk of the chapter then uses extensive archival research to evaluate the factors central to predation theory and predict U.S. strategy given the argument. These predictions are analyzed in Chapter 5.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaheen F. Dil

The July 17, 1973 coup serves as a case study of the nature and extent of great-power interest and involvement in Afghanistan. The dynamics of American, Soviet, and Chinese interaction are multifaceted and volatile, and imply that no one great power had outright control. Thus, this treatment concerns influence rather than control, and multilateral interaction rather than unilateral or bilateral action. The differing interests of the great powers in Afghanistan are outlined. Next, the possibility of great-power involvement in the coup is examined. Finally, the impact of the coup upon Afghanistan's relations with the three great powers is considered. Available material suggests that neither the United States nor the People's Republic of China had sufficient interest or influence to instigate the coup. Nor is there any concrete evidence that the Soviet Union played a significant role, although it did have the opportunity, influence, and interests to do so.


1973 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 155-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trygve Mathisen

In the following article an attempt has been made to identify factors affecting the implementation of expansionist and imperialist policies, and consequently it sheds light on the problem why some weaker states become the sphere of influence of greater powers while other small states are less exposed to such influence. Domestic motive forces which may prompt a great power to embark on policies of expansion are only briefly dealt with. On the basis of historical considerations a tentative conclusion is made concerning some factors affecting sphere of influence relationships. These factors are applied to the contemporary situation in an attempt to identify what areas are likely to remain exposed to strong great power influence, and to suggest in what directions the great powers are likely to expand their influence. It is assumed that the United States has reached at least a temporary climax with regard to the intensity and extension of its political influence. The Soviet Union and China, and most probably also Japan, are considered more capable of expanding their influence in the immediate future. It is, therefore, assumed that parts of Asia and Africa will remain areas of great power rivalry, but the present role of the great powers will reveal considerable changes, particularly in Southeast Asia.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua S. Goldstein ◽  
John R. Freeman

International relations theorists disagree about whether great power behaviors reflect bureaucratic routine or reciprocity. Recently, some have suggested that these behaviors result from great powers' rational expectations rather than from simple routine or reciprocity. The debate is flawed in several respects. The quasi-experimental studies of great power behavior suffer from specification and measurement errors. Furthermore, most studies of great power behavior focus exclusively on the superpowers, without adequately appreciating China's role in world politics. We present an improved analysis that recognizes the potential effects of Chinese behavior and ameliorates the methodological flaws in existing work. The results indicate that the behaviors of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China are a relatively stable mix of bureaucratic routine and reciprocity. The results also indicate complex, asymmetrical connections among U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Chinese, and Soviet-Chinese relations, consistent with the notion of a strategic triangle.


Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein

While Hitler’s Germany in the 1930’s has received abundant attention, this chapter begins earlier in the interwar period. Throughout the 1920’s, Europe’s great powers debated how to manage a defeated Germany that had the latent power potential to again become a great power. This chapter traces how Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union addressed this challenge. It argues that all three of these European powers preferred to cooperate with Germany in the short-term rather than paying the high cost of competing with Germany when it had uncertain long-term intentions. This explanation based on time horizons is superior to alternative explanations based on either buckpassing or engagement.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Alexander Cooley ◽  
Daniel Nexon

Analysts have pronounced the end of American leadership since at least the 1970s. In the 1980s, some confidently proclaimed that the United States was in decline and Japan was on the rise. But in 1989, Moscow allowed its satellite regimes in Eastern Europe to collapse; in 1991 the Soviet Union fell apart under the pressure of nationalist movements. The resulting American “unipolar moment” was marked by three critical factors: the lack of any great powers both willing and able to challenge US hegemony; the existence of a “patronage monopoly” centered around the United States and its liberal democratic allies; and the development of a transnational civil society composed of liberal nongovernment organizations, international institutions, and activist networks. However, great powers and regional players now challenge US power; Washington has lost its patronage monopoly; and illiberal transnational movements are on the offensive against a retreating liberal international civil society.


2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 1423-1441
Author(s):  
Dong Jung Kim

Abstract Economic containment has garnered repeated attention in the discourse about the United States' response to China. Yet, the attributes of economic containment as a distinct strategy of Great Power competition remain unclear. Moreover, the conditions under which a leading power can employ economic containment against a challenging power remain theoretically unelaborated. This article first suggests that economic containment refers to the use of economic policies to weaken the targeted state's material capacity to start military aggression, rather than to influence the competitor's behaviour over a specific issue. Then, this article suggests that economic containment becomes a viable option when the leading power has the ability to inflict more losses on the challenging power through economic restrictions, and this ability is largely determined by the availability of alternative economic partners. When the leading power cannot effectively inflict more losses on the challenging power due to the presence of alternative economic partners, it is better off avoiding economic containment. The author substantiates these arguments through case-studies of the United States' responses to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The article concludes by examining the nature of the United States' recent economic restrictions against China.


1954 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans J. Morgenthau

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has prevented the United Nations from becoming the international government of the great powers which the Charter intended it to be. That conflict has paralyzed the Security Council as an agency of international government. In the few instances when it has been able to act as an agency of international government, it has been able to do so either, as in the beginning of the Korean War, by the accidental and temporary absence of the Soviet Union or, as on the Indonesian issue, by a fortuitous and exceptional coincidence of interests.


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