Presidents and Generals: Systems of Government and the Selection of Defense Ministers

2020 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1990036
Author(s):  
Octavio Amorim Neto ◽  
Pedro Accorsi
Keyword(s):  
Selection Criteria ◽  
Defense Policy ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
National Data ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Cross National

Defense ministers are among the most central players in democracies’ civil–military relations. This article aims to identify the determinants of the selection criteria of defense ministers in democracies and semi-democracies. More specifically, it attempts to measure the effects of systems of government on decisions to appoint civilians or military officers to head the defense ministry. We argue that some characteristics of presidentialized regimes lead to the appointment of military defense ministers. This is a novel contribution, one that connects the literature on civil–military relations and that on systems of government. To assess our hypothesis and its mechanisms, we use comprehensive cross-national data in 1975–2015. Our tests indicate a robust association between presidentialized systems of government and the appointment of military ministers. We also show that military defense ministers are associated with some relevant outcomes. These findings have important implications for the study of civil–military relations, defense policy, and democracy.

Civil–Military Relations and Civil War Recurrence: Security Forces in Postwar Politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 1307-1334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis-Alexandre Berg
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
National Data ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Cross National

Does restructuring security forces reduce the risk of civil war recurrence? Prior research has examined effects of military integration in alleviating commitment problems, but the evidence has been inconclusive. Other aspects of civil–military relations have received less attention. This article examines the effects of civil–military relations in the context of postwar struggles to consolidate authority. It outlines three pathways through which security forces contribute to renewed civil war: by excluding rival factions and facilitating insurgent mobilization, by exploiting control over resources to challenge the regime, or by escalating incipient insurgency through repression. Analysis of original, cross-national data on postwar civil–military relations shows that reducing the potential for exclusion and exploitation through diverse officer appointments and robust civilian oversight lowers the risk of civil war. These findings emphasize the distributive effects of restructuring security forces and highlight the value of examining political contests around state institutions to understand why civil wars restart.

Civilian Coup Advocacy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew Holland Kinney
Keyword(s):  
Single Case ◽  
Small Body ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Motivating Factors ◽  
Economic Decline ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Societal Factors ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Coups D'etat

Available scholarship on civil–military relations, and coup politics in particular, tends to treat military coups d’état as originating purely within the minds of military officers; that is, the overwhelming bulk of scholarship assumes that the idea to seize power stems from officer cliques. To the extent that societal factors (e.g., polarization, economic decline, party factionalism) explain coups, they merely account for why officers decide to seize power. Most research that discusses civilian support for coups does so within single case studies—almost entirely drawn from the Middle East and North Africa. Building on a vibrant wave of studies that disaggregates civil–military institutions, a small body of recent research has begun to systematically and comprehensively consider the theoretical and empirical importance of civilian involvement in military coups. This perspective deemphasizes the military’s possession of weapons and instead focuses on ideational sources of power. Civilians have more power and resources to offer military plotters than existing scholarship has given them credit for. Civilian elites and publics can legitimate coups, organize them, manipulate information on behalf of the plotters, and finance coups for their own economic interests. In short, to fully understand coups, one must seek as much knowledge as possible about their formation, including where the idea for each plot originated. Such detailed analysis of coup plots will give researchers a clearer picture about the motivating factors behind coups.

Editorial

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Daniele Checci ◽  
Janet Gornick
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Data Center ◽  
Research Community ◽  
Final Outcome ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
National Data ◽  
Blind Review ◽  
The University ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Cross National

The articles included in this special issue of the Journal of Income Distribution are a selection of papers originally presented at the first LIS-LWS Users Conference, hosted by LIS, the cross-national data center in Luxembourg. The conference took place at the University of Luxembourg in Belval, Luxembourg, on April 27- 28, 2017. The submitted papers underwent a process of blind review, and this collection of five articles is the final outcome. Taken as a whole, these articles constitute an interesting overview of the ways in which the research community uses the LIS-LWS Databases, which provide researchers access to microdata on income and wealth, respectively.

scholarly journals Educating the Professional Military

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 476-497
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Military Education ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Professional Military Education ◽  
Education Benefits ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Education In India ◽  
Objective Control ◽  
Military Relations

This article analyzes the ways in which civil–military relations shape professional military education (PME). Its main argument is that military education benefits from a civil–military partnership. In doing so, the article examines the role of civil–military relations in shaping PME in India. While describing the evolution of military education in India, it analyzes its weaknesses and argues that this is primarily due to its model of civil–military relations, with a limited role for civilians. Theoretically, this argument challenges Samuel Huntington’s notion of “objective control”—which envisaged a strict separation between the civil and military domains. Conceptually, this article argues for a greater dialogue on military education among civilians, both policy makers and academics, and military officers and not to leave it to the military’s domain—as is currently the practice in most countries.

The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian D. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Culture ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Soviet State ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations

This article uses competing theories of civil-military relations to explain why the Soviet military failed to act in a decisive manner to prevent the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The norms and beliefs held by Soviet military officers—that is, the military's organizational culture—were crucial in shaping officers' behavior. The article tests this explanation against other approaches to civil-military relations and finds that the organizational culture framework is by far the most convincing. The article gives particular attention to the behavior of the Soviet armed forces during the attempted coup d'état in August 1991 and the events leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet state at the end of 1991.

Policy and System in Defense: The Australian Case

1963 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-261
Author(s):  
B. B. Schaffer
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Defense Policy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Australian Case ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
And Control

Defense policy and civil-military relations are now well established fields for political science. They raise problems that are important and exciting in their own right and as dramatic instances of general institutional problems of policy-making and control. Comparative and particular aspects of this field should be appreciated. What are the special characteristics of the Australian type of situation?

scholarly journals No Right to Be Wrong: What Americans Think about Civil-Military Relations

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Ronald R. Krebs ◽  
Robert Ralston ◽  
Aaron Rapport
Keyword(s):  
Use Of Force ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
The Public ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Public Debates ◽  
First Americans ◽  
The Right ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

An influential model of democratic civil-military relations insists that civilian politicians and officials, accountable to the public, have “the right to be wrong” about the use of force: they, not senior military officers, decide when force will be used and set military strategy. While polls have routinely asked about Americans’ trust in the military, they have rarely probed deeply into Americans’ views of civil-military relations. We report and analyze the results of a June 2019 survey that yields two important, and troubling, findings. First, Americans do not accept the basic premises of democratic civil-military relations. They are extraordinarily deferential to the military’s judgment regarding when to use military force, and they are comfortable with high-ranking officers intervening in public debates over policy. Second, in this polarized age, Americans’ views of civil-military relations are not immune to partisanship. Consequently, with their man in the Oval Office in June 2019, Republicans—who, as political conservatives, might be expected to be more deferential to the military—were actually less so. And Democrats, similarly putting ideology aside, wanted the military to act as a check on a president they abhorred. The stakes are high: democracy is weakened when civilians relinquish their “right to be wrong.”

scholarly journals EL PLANEAMIENTO ESTRATÉGICO MILITAR EN ARGENTINA (2003-2013): REFLEXIONES EN TORNO AL GOBIERNO POLÍTICO DE LA DEFENSA

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Anzelini ◽  
Iván Poczynok
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Defense Policy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
First Time ◽  
Core Problem

The national defense policy of Argentina has experienced advances and regressions since the democratic return in 1983. This result has been connected to the dynamics that civil-military relations have inherited from the dictatorial period. The necessity to subordinate the Armed Forces dominated the defense agenda during most part of the democratic period, constituting the core problem of this jurisdiction.The democratic governments implemented various initiatives that underpinned the civil control of the Armed Forces and that also caused, from a normative point of view, what has been characterised as a “basic consensus”. These measures restricted the autonomy of the men in uniform, whether through the demilitarization of civil functions or through the specific delimitation of the martial responsibilities.The habilitation of the spaces required for the exercise of the political administration of the jurisdiction did not necessarily implied, however, that civilians have fully developed this task. The performance of the democratic authorities in the area of defense had its ups-and-downs. At times, these deficiencies were associated to the very restraints of the domestic political conjuncture; at others, they resulted from the planning of the specific agenda of the sector, though.This paper studies the performances of the Ministry of Defense demarches during 2003-2013. The analysis focuses on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the sector; punctually, on the relative responsibilities of the military strategic planning. In this frame, the demarches of ministers José Pampuro (2003-05), Nilda Garré (2005-10) and Arturo Puricelli (2010-13) are resorted to.The temporal cutout of the study object assumes that a battery of unprecedented measures were implemented. For the first time since the return of democracy, for example, an effective debate on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the defense policy was addressed. Nevertheless, for reasons that are object of analysis during this article, the empowerment process of the political conduction survived along with ambiguities and retrogressions that, during the same period, made the absence of solid consensus regarding the results of the sectorial agenda evident.

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