scholarly journals No Right to Be Wrong: What Americans Think about Civil-Military Relations

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Ronald R. Krebs ◽  
Robert Ralston ◽  
Aaron Rapport

An influential model of democratic civil-military relations insists that civilian politicians and officials, accountable to the public, have “the right to be wrong” about the use of force: they, not senior military officers, decide when force will be used and set military strategy. While polls have routinely asked about Americans’ trust in the military, they have rarely probed deeply into Americans’ views of civil-military relations. We report and analyze the results of a June 2019 survey that yields two important, and troubling, findings. First, Americans do not accept the basic premises of democratic civil-military relations. They are extraordinarily deferential to the military’s judgment regarding when to use military force, and they are comfortable with high-ranking officers intervening in public debates over policy. Second, in this polarized age, Americans’ views of civil-military relations are not immune to partisanship. Consequently, with their man in the Oval Office in June 2019, Republicans—who, as political conservatives, might be expected to be more deferential to the military—were actually less so. And Democrats, similarly putting ideology aside, wanted the military to act as a check on a president they abhorred. The stakes are high: democracy is weakened when civilians relinquish their “right to be wrong.”

2011 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 87-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Feaver

President George W. Bush's Iraq surge decision in late 2006 is an interesting case for civil-military relations theory, in particular, the debate between professional supremacists and civilian supremacists over how much to defer to the military on decisions during war. The professional supremacists argue that the primary problem for civil-military relations during war is ensuring the military an adequate voice and keeping civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging matters. Civilian supremacists, in contrast, argue that the primary problem is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction. A close reading of the available evidence—both in published accounts and in new, not-for-attribution interviews with the key players—shows that the surge decision vindicates neither camp. If President Bush had followed the professional supremacists, there would have been no surge because his key military commanders were recommending against that option. If Bush had followed the civilian supremacists to the letter, however, there might have been a revolt of the generals, causing the domestic political props under the surge to collapse. Instead, Bush's hybrid approach worked better than either ideal type would have.


2019 ◽  
Vol IV (IV) ◽  
pp. 195-201
Author(s):  
Amna Zulfiqar ◽  
Zahid Yousaf

Civil-military relations in Pakistan are always in search of common ground. Historically, military forces and civilian leadership in Pakistan struggle to find the right balance and the civilian leadership has hardly commanded the gun. This study is intended to analyze that how the two selected daily English newspapers of Pakistan, i.e. Dawn and The News covered the major developments in civil-military relations, particularly during the regime of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif, followed by the most sensitive event i.e., Zarb-e-Azb. The study employed the method of discourse analysis and has used the theoretical notion of agenda-setting and framing. The results of the study revealed that the slant, style, themes, and discourses used in the news stories of both the newspapers almost remained the same, appreciating the military institutions positively. Whereas condemning the civilian leadership for their lack of concern towards implementing the already approved Nation Action Plan.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Kohn

Arguments in favor of the topmost senior officers exercising “principled resignation” in opposition to policies, decisions, or orders that they find immoral, unethical, or disastrous for the country weaken the military profession and endanger American national security. A member of the Joint Chiefs, a combatant commander, or a topmost war commander who “resigns” would be injecting themselves improperly into a policy role, opposing civilian authority, and undermining civilian control of the military. The act would be politicizing for the military and likely fail to change what the officer opposes. Most importantly, their act of personal conscience would poison civil–military relations long into the future; civilian trust in military subordinates not to undermine support for policies and decisions with the public and other political leaders would decline. Even more than today, they would choose their senior military leaders for compatibility and agreement above other traits.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2110227
Author(s):  
Zachary Zwald ◽  
Jeffrey D. Berejikian

The presumed “gap” in fundamental foreign policy beliefs between what Huntington (1957) described as “liberal society” and the “conservative military mind” lies at the core of research on civil–military relations. However, we still know surprisingly little about the precise nature of differences between the two groups’ core foreign policy orientations. This study presents the first empirically grounded evaluation of the public–military gap. We deployed a unique survey to directly compare the views of 470 active-duty US military officers against a representative sample of the American public. Our study included beliefs concerning the appropriate role of military force and of US engagement in global affairs, the likely direction of US national security in the coming decade, and the causes and costs of future military conflicts. While we confirm aspects of Huntington’s dichotomy, we also observe critical differences between the two groups that diverge from the traditional conceptualization of a “civil–military gap.”


Author(s):  
Heidi Urben ◽  
James Golby

After nearly two decades of war, public confidence in the US military remains high, even though our wars remain inconclusive. There is no shortage of public discourse on the perceived failures of civilians overseeing these wars. Yet this chapter asks: Is the uniformed military increasingly resistant to civilian oversight? Are members of the military making it tougher for political leaders to do their jobs? High public confidence in the military is neither the best measure of the health of civil-military relations nor the same thing as the military’s being trustworthy. This chapter argues that military leaders will best serve the public by focusing on ways they can exhibit appropriate behavior in their dealings with the public and civilian leaders. The trust required for healthy civil-military relations and effective civilian oversight is a two-way street, and those in uniform must recognize their responsibility for introspection, self-policing, and holding themselves to account. This chapter assesses what it might take for the armed forces to “screw up” their relationship with the American people, discussing five potential pitfalls that members of the profession of arms must avoid in order to be worthy of the public’s trust.


1996 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-182
Author(s):  
Peter D. Feaver

Who décidés and what do they gct to décidé?1 This is the central normative question in civil-military relations theory, and disagrccment over the correct answer is behind much of what passes for the currcnt ‘crisis’ in American civil-military relations. So far. the American answer appears to havc solved tire problem that prcoccupies most comparative civil-military relations theorists: how to keep the military from taking over the governmcnt. Yct American history is rife with civil-military conflict because the American answer Icaves unresolved the other problem inhérent in the civil-military relationship: finding the proper division of labor belween civilian and military institutions, cspccially on use of force decisions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-61
Author(s):  
Sandor Fabian

How do U.S. International Military Education and Training programs affect the recipient states` behavior in militarized interstate disputes? While the relationship between U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer and MID involvement has been studied extensively in international relations literature the effects of U.S. IMET programs on the same phenomena has been largely ignored. This study intends to fill some of this gap. This paper proposes that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, civil-military relations, and the cost of war. These military personnel advise their political masters against the use of military force during international disputes leading to a decreased probability of both MID initiation and escalation. To test this argument the analysis employs a merged dataset from the Correlates of War Projects and the most prominent U.S. IMET and coups data. Using logistic regression analysis this study finds that more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it initiates MIDs. The analysis also finds that countries that receive U.S. IMET support are less likely to escalate ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility.


2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Risa Brooks

The U.S. military's prevailing norms of professionalism exhibit three paradoxes that render the organization poorly suited to meet contemporary challenges to its nonpartisan ethic, and that undermine its relations with civilian leaders. These norms, based on Samuel Huntington's objective civilian control model, argue that the military should operate in a sphere separate from the civilian domain of policymaking and decisions about the use of force. The first paradox is that Huntingtonian norms, though intended to prevent partisan and political behavior by military personnel, can also enable these activities. Second, the norms promote civilian leaders’ authority in decisionmaking related to the use of force, yet undermine their practical control and oversight of military activity. Third, they contribute to the military's operational and tactical effectiveness, while corroding the United States’ strategic effectiveness in armed conflict. These tensions in Huntington's norms matter today because of intensifying partisanship in society and in the military, the embrace by civilian leaders of objective control and their concomitant delegation of authority in armed conflict to the military, and growing questions about the causes of the inconclusive outcomes of the United States’ recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is time to develop a new framework for military professionalism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia M. Shields

This Armed Forces & Society symposium on the ethics of senior officer resignation in the United States includes a collection of four papers, each looking at principled resignation in different ways. Two authors, Dubik and Snider, believe principled resignation of senior military officers is sometimes justified, especially in wartime, where their inherent morals clash with their professional demands; these senior officer’s ability to resign in protest distinguishes their service to this nation between stewards and servants. Conversely, Feaver and Kohn believe principled resignation is almost never justified as this action weakens the military profession and ultimately threatens national security. Further, the disastrous effects increase the ever present friction and mistrust in the civil-military process. Each author answers the question in the context of current American civil military relations and it is their hope that this symposium will lead to further discussions, research, and policies regarding the ethics surrounding the issue.


Author(s):  
Iakiv Serhiiovych Halaniuk

The article highlights the author’s approach to improving coopera- tion mechanisms of the State Border Service of Ukraine with public organiza- tions and population. There has been analyzed public control as a means their cooperation and priorities of improving the cooperation, particularly, forms and methods of organizing citizens’ feedback, introduction of the assessment pro- cedure of the efficiency of the SBSU and population and public organization. There have been stated conceptual pillars of the public control development in the SBSU, developed by the author, including public control forms and resource provision. There has been considered a mechanism algorithm of the public par- ticipation in the development of the border administration through submitting petitions or proposals concerning a legally enforceable enactment draft (or the legally enforceable enactment currently in force). There has been represented a mechanism model of discussing legally enforceable enactments and public peti- tions, developed by the author. It is noted that one of the mechanisms of interac- tion of the SBSU with the public is effective public control, which becomes an in- tegral part of ensuring national security and political stability. The conditions of permanence of Ukraine's threats in the border area, and in certain areas and their exacerbation, along with further reforms of the institutes of Ukrainian statehood, cause the problem of establishing and implementing public control in the border area as an important and urgent one.It is proved that public control is intended to determine the correctness of the military-force policy in the border area, the validity of the scale and optimality of the forms of activity of the border guards. In accordance with all this, in the subject area of public control should be: political decisions on issues of border security, including international agreements; the expediency and validity of government programs for the provision and reform of the border authorities of Ukraine, assess- ment of the effectiveness of these programs and the procedure for making changes to them.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document