The Microeconomics of Choice under Risk and Uncertainty: Where Are We?

2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
WDA Bryant
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Choice Situation ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Business Decision ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
The Face

Financial decision-making is not straightforward, in part, because such decisions generally involve comparing financial assets the payoffs from which are subject to risk and uncertainty. Given that situation, two questions naturally arise: How do economic agents go about the business of making choices in the face of risk and uncertainty? And, how should economic agents make choices in the face of risk and uncertainty? This paper concentrates on the first of these questions and discusses some of the main attempts made by economic theory to understand how economic agents go about the business decision-making under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Theoretical possibilities considered in the context of decisions under conditions of risk include: Expected value maximization, Expected utility maximization, Rank dependent utility maximization, Prospect theory, and the Topology of fear approach to decision-making in the face of catastrophic risk. This paper also considers empirical tests of these theoretical possibilities and some of the anomalies and responses thrown up by those tests such as: Allais Paradox, Discovered Preference Hypothesis, and the choice behaviour of CEOs when faced with risk. The paper concludes with a brief excursion into choice under uncertainty where, unlike in risky choice situation, the existence of objective probabilities over states of the world cannot be relied on. In that context, the author briefly canvases the Subjective Expected Utility approach — which is unable in general to account for ambiguity aversion — Choquet utility, Wald's Multiple Priors, and the Case Based approach This paper highlights the fact that the rich and fascinating field of decision-making under risk and uncertainty is characterized by a constant interplay between theoretical conjecture, empirical testing, and theoretical refinement. Such interplay is mirrored by this paper and contributions in the Colloquium Section of this Issue, where the thoughts of practitioners and academics interact.

scholarly journals Reasoning about social preferences with uncertain beliefs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
isaac davis ◽  
Ryan W. Carlson ◽  
Yarrow Dunham ◽  
Julian Jara-Ettinger
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Judgments ◽  
Social Agents ◽  
Preference Reasoning ◽  
The Face ◽  
Expected Utility Maximization ◽  
Social Uncertainty

We propose a computational model of social preference judgments that accounts for the degree of an agents’ uncertainty about the preferences of others. Underlying this model is the principle that, in the face of social uncertainty, people interpret social agents’ behavior under an assumption of expected utility maximization. We evaluate our model in two experiments which each test a different kind of social preference reasoning: predicting social choices given information about social preferences, and inferring social preferences after observing social choices. The results support our model and highlight how un- certainty influences our social judgments.

Specialist versus Generalist Decision Making

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin W. Schulz
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Vast Array ◽  
Expected Utility Maximization

A number of scholars argue that human and animal decision making, at least to the extent that it is driven by representational mental states, should be seen to be the result of the application of a vast array of highly specialized decision rules. By contrast, other scholars argue that we should see human and animal representational decision making as the result of the application of a handful general principles—such as expected utility maximization—to a number of specific instances. This chapter shows that, using the results of chapters 5 and 6, it becomes possible to move this dispute forwards: the account of the evolution of conative representational decision making defended in chapter 6 together with the account of the evolution of cognitive representational decision making defended in chapter 5, makes clear that both sides of this dispute contain important insights, and that it is possible to put this entire dispute on a clearer and more precise foundation. Specifically, I show that differentially general decision rules are differentially adaptive in different circumstances: certain particular circumstances favor specialized decision making, and certain other circumstances favor more generalist decision making.

Decision Making Under Uncertainty and Risks in the Face of Rapidly Advancing Technologies

2019 ◽  
pp. 38-56
Author(s):  
Vicente González-Prida Díaz ◽  
Jesus Pedro Zamora Bonilla ◽  
Pablo Viveros Gunckel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Perception ◽  
Industry 4.0 ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Research Directions ◽  
The Face ◽  
Future Research Directions ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
Reduction Of Uncertainty

This chapter aims to consider the effects of the new concept Industry 4.0 on decision making, particularly on the reduction of uncertainty and the risk associated with any choice between alternatives. For this purpose, this chapter begins by dealing with the concepts of risk and uncertainty and their epistemological evolution. After observing certain trends and recent studies in this regard, the authors address a more philosophical perception of risk, mainly on aspects related to engineering and social perception. The concept of human reliability will also be reviewed and how it can be improved with the application of emerging technologies, considering some methodological proposals to improve the decision making. After that, some of the possible future research directions will be briefly discussed. Finally, the chapter concludes by highlighting key aspects of the chapter as a context for other chapters in the book.

scholarly journals INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY ON AMBIGUITY AVERSION

2009 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Bonanno ◽  
Martin van Hees ◽  
Christian List ◽  
Bertil Tungodden
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Descriptive Theory ◽  
Sure Thing Principle ◽  
New Literature ◽  
Theoretical Side

The paradigm for modelling decision-making under uncertainty has undoubtedly been the theory of Expected Utility, which was first developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and later extended by Savage (1954) to the case of subjective uncertainty. The inadequacy of the theory of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) as a descriptive theory was soon pointed out in experiments, most famously by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). The observed departures from SEU noticed by Allais and Ellsberg became known as “paradoxes”. The Ellsberg paradox gave rise, several years later, to a new literature on decision-making under ambiguity. The theoretical side of this literature was pioneered by Schmeidler (1989). This literature views the departures from SEU in situations similar to those discussed by Ellsberg as rational responses to ambiguity. The rationality is “recovered” by relaxing Savage's Sure-Thing principle and adding an ambiguity-aversion postulate. Thus the ambiguity-aversion literature takes a normative point of view and does consider Ellsberg-type choices as behavioural “anomalies”.

scholarly journals ECONOMICS OF RANDOMNESS: BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-14
Author(s):  
Alexander Krasilnikov
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Uncertainty Analysis ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Probabilistic Methods ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
History Of

The paper discusses evolution of the concept of risk in economics. History of probabilistic methods and approaches to risk and uncertainty analysis is considered. Expected utility theory, behavioral approaches, heuristic models and methods of neuroeconomics are analyzed. Author investigates stability of neoclassical program related to risk analysis and suggests further directions of development.

Effect of cognitive distortions caused by errors in information processing on decision-making by economic agents

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-138
Author(s):  
Mikhail V. GRECHKO ◽  
Larisa A. KOBINA
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Cognitive Distortions ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Survey Techniques ◽  
The Face ◽  
Probability Information

Subject. This article examines the issues related to the cognitive potential of behavioral and institutional economics and irrationality in decision-making. Objectives. The article aims to develop an application toolkit to investigate the mechanism of cognitive biases influence on decision-making by economic agents. Methods. For the study, we used the prospect theory and expert survey techniques. Results. Based on the cognitive potential of interdisciplinary decision theory, the article proves that most economic agents in the face of incomplete information prefer individual information, rather than a priori probability information. Conclusions. The results of the study can be useful to create a tool to manage consumer choice.

From Chicago to Paris

2018 ◽  
pp. 177-192
Author(s):  
Ivan Moscati
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Economic Model ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
Cardinal Utility ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
The Face

Chapter 11 studies the second phase of the debate on expected utility theory (EUT), which commenced in May 1950, when Paul Samuelson, Leonard J. Savage, Jacob Marschak, Milton Friedman, and William Baumol initiated an intense exchange of letters. These economists argued about the exact assumptions underlying EUT, quarreled over whether these assumptions are compelling requisites for rational behavior under risk, and debated the nature of the cardinal utility function u featured in EUT. This correspondence modified the views of all five economists and transformed Samuelson into a supporter of EUT. In a prominent conference in Paris in May 1952, Friedman, Savage, Marschak, and Samuelson advocated EUT in the face of attacks from Maurice Allais and other opponents of the theory. The Paris conference and the publication of an Econometrica symposium on EUT in October 1952 marked the emergence of EUT as the mainstream economic model of decision-making under risk.

Deontological Decision Theory and the Grounds of Subjective Permissibility

2019 ◽  
pp. 204-222
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty

If we had perfect information, then we could say, for any given objectively permissible act, what makes it objectively permissible. But when we have imperfect information, when we must decide under risk and uncertainty, what then makes an act subjectively permissible or impermissible? There are two salient possibilities. The first is the “verdicts” approach. It grounds judgments of subjective permissibility in probabilistically discounted judgments of objective permissibility. The principle “minimize expected objective wrongness” takes this approach. The second is the “reasons” approach. It grounds subjective permissibility in probabilistically discounted objective reasons. “Maximize expected utility” is one example. Chapter 10 considers whether the verdicts approach or the reasons approach to grounding judgments of subjective permissibility is better suited for deontological decision-making with imperfect information. Perhaps surprisingly, the reasons approach comes out on top.

Ambiguity Aversion Phenomenon and Rational Choice Theory

2011 ◽  
pp. 16-34
Author(s):  
I. Pavlov
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Ambiguity Aversion ◽  
Individual Behaviour ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Individual

The paper analyzes ambiguity aversion that is one of the main anomalies characteristic for the individual behaviour of economic agents making choice in the face of uncertainty. It shows that this phenomenon plays a major role in the contemporary rational choice theory and hence is widely discussed both by economic theorists and experimental economists. The article further elaborates on the nature of this phenomenon and considers its main causes.

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