Game Theory as a Tool for Understanding Information Services Outsourcing

1997 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramy Elitzur ◽  
Anthony Wensley

In recent years, game theory has provided valuable insights into many different types of organizational arrangements. In this paper we investigate some of the ways in which game theory can help us to understand the structure and function of information systems outsourcing arrangements. We provide a brief review of two-person non-cooperative game theory. We discuss the basic concepts of dominance and Nash equilibria. In particular we stress the importance of the information structure of two-person games. We then provide a general game-theoretic interpretation of many key aspects of information systems outsourcing arrangements. In particular, we investigate the rationales behind many of the different ways of determining fees and the effects of the transfer of assets between the outsourcing company and the outsourcing vendor. Finally, we discuss how one particular type of non-cooperative two-person game might be useful as a model of information systems outsourcing arrangements. This model, the principal-agent model, has been extensively studied and in the hands of the authors has provided some initial insights into information systems outsourcing arrangements.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Chang Zhang ◽  
Ting-jie Lv ◽  
Chun-hui Yuan ◽  
Yuan-yuan Ren ◽  
Shuo Wang

The motivation of the paper is to find out the influence of demographic characteristic factors on employees’ career promotion in China’s state-owned enterprises and study the relationship between promotion mechanism and enterprise benefits. More than 6,500 pieces of human resource data from China’s state-owned enterprises were studied. Logistic regression is adopted to analyze the correlation between demographic characteristics and promotion. Meanwhile, different data mining methods are used to summarize the characteristics of promotion. On this basis, this study uses the principal-agent model of game theory to analyze the profits of employees and enterprises under different promotion mechanisms and demonstrates the conditions for enterprises to obtain the maximum benefit from the employees’ promotion. The results provide a theoretical reference for the assessment indicator selection of enterprise promotion and help executives better understand the impact of promotion mechanism on enterprises and employees. The application of results can reduce the information asymmetry in promotion incentive, prevent the emergence of adverse selection, and achieve a win-win situation for enterprises and employees.



2021 ◽  
pp. 147-164
Author(s):  
Richard R. W. Brooks

This commentary illuminates key aspects of Shiffrin’s view by appeal to concrete examples and notions from game theory. It underscores the role of law as a means for the public communication of moral commitments by invoking the idea of common knowledge. Our commitments must be known to be shared, that knowledge itself must be known to be shared, and so on ad infinitum. This offers a perspective on the importance of common law from a democratic framework: common law can be seen as a mechanism for generating common knowledge about disputes and their resolution. The commentary invokes another game-theoretic notion, that of the contrast between cheap talk and costly signaling, to illuminate Shiffrin’s discussion of constitutional balancing. Where the interests of speaker and addressee are not aligned, cheap talk lacks credibility, and this is something to which courts need to be sensitive in balancing state and constitutional interests.



2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 1540015 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. S. Raghavan

Mathematical foundations of conflict resolutions are deeply rooted in the theory of cooperative and non-cooperative games. While many elementary models of conflicts are formalized, one often raises the question whether game theory and its mathematically developed tools are applicable to actual legal disputes in practice. We choose an example from union management conflict on hourly wage dispute and how zero sum two person game theory can be used by a judge to bring about the need for realistic compromises between the two parties. We choose another example from the 2000-year old Babylonian Talmud to describe how a certain debt problem was resolved. While they may be unaware of cooperative game theory, their solution methods are fully consistent with the solution concept called the nucleolus of a TU game.



Author(s):  
Andrea Prat

This chapter provides a brief survey of the economic literature on transparency. The conceptual tool used by economists is the principal-agent model, a game-theoretic setting in which transparency corresponds to the ability of the principal to observe what the agent does. Holmström (1979) provides a powerful and general rationale for full transparency. One can argue that the increase in accountability is not sufficient to offset other drawbacks such as the violation of privacy, the direct cost of disclosure, or the revelation of sensitive information. Alternatively, one can attack the link between transparency and accountability: it is not necessarily true that more disclosure makes the agent behave better. Holmström showed that, in a world of complete contracts, the more the principal knows about the agent, the better the agent behaves. Some objections to Holmström – the right to privacy, the direct cost of disclosure, the risk that hostile parties learn sensitive information – are perfectly valid, but they find limited application in politics, corporate governance, and other important areas.



2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 1416
Author(s):  
Riccardo Castagnoli ◽  
Francesca Pala ◽  
Marita Bosticardo ◽  
Amelia Licari ◽  
Ottavia M. Delmonte ◽  
...  

Inborn errors of immunity (IEI) are a group of disorders that are mostly caused by genetic mutations affecting immune host defense and immune regulation. Although IEI present with a wide spectrum of clinical features, in about one third of them various degrees of gastrointestinal (GI) involvement have been described and for some IEI the GI manifestations represent the main and peculiar clinical feature. The microbiome plays critical roles in the education and function of the host’s innate and adaptive immune system, and imbalances in microbiota-immunity interactions can contribute to intestinal pathogenesis. Microbial dysbiosis combined to the impairment of immunosurveillance and immune dysfunction in IEI, may favor mucosal permeability and lead to inflammation. Here we review how immune homeostasis between commensals and the host is established in the gut, and how these mechanisms can be disrupted in the context of primary immunodeficiencies. Additionally, we highlight key aspects of the first studies on gut microbiome in patients affected by IEI and discuss how gut microbiome could be harnessed as a therapeutic approach in these diseases.



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