scholarly journals Oxytocin and vasopressin modulation of prisoner’s dilemma strategies

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (8) ◽  
pp. 891-900
Author(s):  
Maria Leonor Neto ◽  
Marília Antunes ◽  
Manuel Lopes ◽  
Duarte Ferreira ◽  
James Rilling ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interactive Effects ◽  
Double Blind ◽  
Partner Type ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Partner Types ◽  
Social Decision Making

Background: The neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin have been repeatedly implicated in social decision making by enhancing social salience and, generally, cooperation. The iterated and sequential version of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is a social dilemma paradigm eliciting strategies of cooperation versus competition. Aims: We aimed to characterise the role of PD players’ sex, game partner type (computer vs. human) and oxytocin or vasopressin inhalation on the player’s strategy preference. Methods: Participants (153 men; 151 women) were randomised to intranasal 24 IU oxytocin, 20 IU vasopressin or placebo, double-blind, and played the PD. We examined main and interactive effects of sex, drug and partner type on strategy preference. Results: We found a pervasive preference for a tit-for-tat strategy (i.e. general sensitivity to the partner’s choices) over unconditional cooperation, particularly when against a human rather than a computer partner. Oxytocin doubled this sensitivity in women (i.e. the preference for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation strategies) when playing against computers, which suggests a tendency to anthropomorphise them, and doubled women’s unconditional cooperation preference when playing against humans. Vasopressin doubled sensitivity to the partner’s previous choices (i.e. for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation) across sexes and partner types. Conclusions: These findings suggest that women may be more sensitive to oxytocin’s social effects of anthropomorphism of non-humans and of unconditional cooperation with humans, which may be consistent with evolutionary pressures for maternal care, and that vasopressin, irrespective of sex and partner type, may be generally sensitising humans to others’ behaviour.

Tit-for-tat in trade policies: nothing but a fest for vested interests?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARBARA DLUHOSCH
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
Trade Integration ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Policy Regimes ◽  
Vested Interests ◽  
Tit For Tat

AbstractTit-for-tat (TFT) in trade policies is a common practice. It is even enshrined in Article 22.4 of the WTO's dispute settlement process within multilateral trade integration. As such, it is a well-recognized means for promoting cooperation and for enforcing compliance with a common set of rules or institutions. However, there is equally widespread concern that a strategy of TFT degenerates into a prisoner's dilemma, in particular because of special interests ill-using it as a springboard for advancing protectionist measures and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This paper provides a novel evolutionary perspective on TFT in trade policy regimes in that it tracks the role of special interests by parameterizing their leverage on strategies. Doing so, it provides new insights on the political economy of TFT in international institutions. Accordingly, the set of parameters for which a prisoner's dilemma emerges shrinks rather than widens, even with powerful domestic interest groups sharing a stake in protection.

Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Seyhun Saral
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Initial Move ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Strategy Types

Conditional cooperation has been a common explanation for the observed cooperation, and its decline in social dilemma experiments. Numerous studies showed that most of the experimental subjects can be categorized into three types: conditional cooperators, self-maximizers and hump-shaped (triangle) cooperators. In this study, I investigate conditional strategy types and their role on the emergence of cooperation and their evolutionary success. For this purpose, I use an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The agents are characterized by their initial move and their conditional responses to each level of cooperation. By using simulations, I estimate the likelihood of cooperation for different probability of continuations.I show that, when the continuation probability is sufficiently large, high levels cooperation is achieved. In this case, the most successful strategies are those who employ an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation, followed by perfect conditional cooperators. In intermediate levels of continuation probabilities, however, hump-shaped contributor types are the ones that are most likely to thrive, followed by imperfect conditional cooperators. Those agents cooperate in a medium level of cooperation within themselves and each other. The results explain the existence of hump-shaped type of cooperators with a purely payoff-based reasoning, as opposed to previous attempts to explain this strategy with psychological mechanisms.

scholarly journals Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Axel Buchner ◽  
Raoul Bell
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

AbstractTo determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels (“I cooperate” and “I cheat”) in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels (“A” and “B”) in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants’ cooperation was enforced by their partners’ moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

Comparison of GRIT versus GRIT/TIT-FOR-TAT

1995 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-322
Author(s):  
Brian Betz
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Communication Analysis ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Tit For Tat

120 subjects played a six-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game in which a simulated other employed either GRIT or GRIT/Tit-For-Tat with varying levels of communication. Analysis indicated that the addition of Tit-For-Tat to GRIT offers no advantages over the standard GRIT strategy.

scholarly journals Learning by pigeons playing against tit-for-tat in an operant prisoner’s dilemma

2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Sanabria ◽  
Howard Rachlin ◽  
Forest Baker
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Tit For Tat

Competitiveness and Conflict Behavior in Simulation of A Social Dilemma

2000 ◽  
Vol 86 (3_part_2) ◽  
pp. 1219-1225 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Houston ◽  
Judy Kinnie ◽  
Bernice Lupo ◽  
Christeine Terry ◽  
Sandy S. Ho
Keyword(s):  
Adult Students ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Cues ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Competitiveness Index

This experiment examined the competitive behavior in a seven-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game of 108 adult students (68 women, 40 men) classified as high, average, or low in competitiveness based on their scores on the Competitiveness Index. Participants were then presented one of three preprogrammed response conditions representing (1) Competitive, (2) De-escalating, or (3) Noncompetitive conflict behavior from a simulated opponent. Participants high in competitiveness engaged in more competitive behavior and reported higher satisfaction with the task than those low in competitiveness. As expected, the Competitive conditions elicited more competitive behavior than Noncompetitive conditions. The results suggest-competitive individuals may be particularly susceptible to social cues that trigger competitive behavior.

scholarly journals Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma among mobile agents performing 2D random walk

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
Jurica Hižak
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Agents ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Mixed Population ◽  
Expected Number ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Detailed Derivation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Better Than

When Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma takes place on a two-dimensional plane among mobile agents, the course of the game slightly differs from that one in a well-mixed population. In this paper we present a detailed derivation of the expected number of encounters required for Tit-for-tat strategy to get even with Always-Defect strategy in a Brownian-like population. It will be shown that in such an environment Tit-for-Tat can perform better than in a well-mixed population.

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