Tit-for-tat in trade policies: nothing but a fest for vested interests?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARBARA DLUHOSCH
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
Trade Integration ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Policy Regimes ◽  
Vested Interests ◽  
Tit For Tat

AbstractTit-for-tat (TFT) in trade policies is a common practice. It is even enshrined in Article 22.4 of the WTO's dispute settlement process within multilateral trade integration. As such, it is a well-recognized means for promoting cooperation and for enforcing compliance with a common set of rules or institutions. However, there is equally widespread concern that a strategy of TFT degenerates into a prisoner's dilemma, in particular because of special interests ill-using it as a springboard for advancing protectionist measures and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This paper provides a novel evolutionary perspective on TFT in trade policy regimes in that it tracks the role of special interests by parameterizing their leverage on strategies. Doing so, it provides new insights on the political economy of TFT in international institutions. Accordingly, the set of parameters for which a prisoner's dilemma emerges shrinks rather than widens, even with powerful domestic interest groups sharing a stake in protection.

scholarly journals Oxytocin and vasopressin modulation of prisoner’s dilemma strategies

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (8) ◽  
pp. 891-900
Author(s):  
Maria Leonor Neto ◽  
Marília Antunes ◽  
Manuel Lopes ◽  
Duarte Ferreira ◽  
James Rilling ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interactive Effects ◽  
Double Blind ◽  
Partner Type ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Partner Types ◽  
Social Decision Making

Background: The neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin have been repeatedly implicated in social decision making by enhancing social salience and, generally, cooperation. The iterated and sequential version of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is a social dilemma paradigm eliciting strategies of cooperation versus competition. Aims: We aimed to characterise the role of PD players’ sex, game partner type (computer vs. human) and oxytocin or vasopressin inhalation on the player’s strategy preference. Methods: Participants (153 men; 151 women) were randomised to intranasal 24 IU oxytocin, 20 IU vasopressin or placebo, double-blind, and played the PD. We examined main and interactive effects of sex, drug and partner type on strategy preference. Results: We found a pervasive preference for a tit-for-tat strategy (i.e. general sensitivity to the partner’s choices) over unconditional cooperation, particularly when against a human rather than a computer partner. Oxytocin doubled this sensitivity in women (i.e. the preference for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation strategies) when playing against computers, which suggests a tendency to anthropomorphise them, and doubled women’s unconditional cooperation preference when playing against humans. Vasopressin doubled sensitivity to the partner’s previous choices (i.e. for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation) across sexes and partner types. Conclusions: These findings suggest that women may be more sensitive to oxytocin’s social effects of anthropomorphism of non-humans and of unconditional cooperation with humans, which may be consistent with evolutionary pressures for maternal care, and that vasopressin, irrespective of sex and partner type, may be generally sensitising humans to others’ behaviour.

scholarly journals Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Axel Buchner ◽  
Raoul Bell
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

AbstractTo determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels (“I cooperate” and “I cheat”) in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels (“A” and “B”) in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants’ cooperation was enforced by their partners’ moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

Comparison of GRIT versus GRIT/TIT-FOR-TAT

1995 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-322
Author(s):  
Brian Betz
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Communication Analysis ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Tit For Tat

120 subjects played a six-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game in which a simulated other employed either GRIT or GRIT/Tit-For-Tat with varying levels of communication. Analysis indicated that the addition of Tit-For-Tat to GRIT offers no advantages over the standard GRIT strategy.

scholarly journals Learning by pigeons playing against tit-for-tat in an operant prisoner’s dilemma

2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Sanabria ◽  
Howard Rachlin ◽  
Forest Baker
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Tit For Tat

scholarly journals Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma among mobile agents performing 2D random walk

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
Jurica Hižak
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Agents ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Mixed Population ◽  
Expected Number ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Detailed Derivation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Better Than

When Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma takes place on a two-dimensional plane among mobile agents, the course of the game slightly differs from that one in a well-mixed population. In this paper we present a detailed derivation of the expected number of encounters required for Tit-for-tat strategy to get even with Always-Defect strategy in a Brownian-like population. It will be shown that in such an environment Tit-for-Tat can perform better than in a well-mixed population.

scholarly journals PERAN WTO DALAM MEMBANGUN PENEGAKAN HUKUM INTERNASIONAL TERHADAP PROTEKSIONISME (STUDI KASUS: SENGKETA DAGANG ROKOK KRETEK INDONESIA)

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Farahdiba Rahma Bachtiar
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mutual Understanding ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
Trade Dispute ◽  
Domestic Trade ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World

Indonesia’s objection to the United States (US) over a clove ban in 2010 was one of the most difficult trade dispute cases that Indonesia has ever submitted. The dispute between both countries in the clove cigarettes negotiations was actually completed in 2014 after the two countries agreed on mutual understanding (MoU) related to cigarettes. Indonesia's victory over the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) by the World Trade Organization (WTO) shows the enforcement of international law in intervening in a country's domestic policies.Although it took great deal of time, Indonesia's victory over US becomes a lesson learned. This victory proves the role of the WTO in resolving trade dispute cases and refutes the notion of a superpower in particular the US being immune to the international law. US domestic trade policies that impose a ban on clove cigarettes have deviated from WTO rules and have harmed Indonesia as a producer

scholarly journals The interplay of emotion expressions and strategy in promoting cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Celso M. de Melo ◽  
Kazunori Terada
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Emotional Expressions ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Competitive Strategies ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract The iterated prisoner’s dilemma has been used to study human cooperation for decades. The recent discovery of extortion and generous strategies renewed interest on the role of strategy in shaping behavior in this dilemma. But what if players could perceive each other’s emotional expressions? Despite increasing evidence that emotion signals influence decision making, the effects of emotion in this dilemma have been mostly neglected. Here we show that emotion expressions moderate the effect of generous strategies, increasing or reducing cooperation according to the intention communicated by the signal; in contrast, expressions by extortionists had no effect on participants’ behavior, revealing a limitation of highly competitive strategies. We provide evidence that these effects are mediated mostly by inferences about other’s intentions made from strategy and emotion. These findings provide insight into the value, as well as the limits, of behavioral strategies and emotion signals for cooperation.

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