Corporate governance factors as predictors of earnings management

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-92
Author(s):  
Pratibha Wasan ◽  
Kalyani Mulchandani
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Developed Markets ◽  
Indian Context ◽  
High Incidence ◽  
Firm Attributes

Unlike developed markets, emerging markets like India have greater imperfections, have information asymmetry, and are particularly different in terms of accounting transparency, corruption, and corporate governance (CG). Also, concentrated ownership structure of Indian firms is more conducive for opportunistic earnings management (EM). There has been high incidence of financial frauds and EM in India particularly through related party transactions. The CG regulations were revised and enhanced in the year 2014 but increasing cases of financial frauds and CG violations indicate insufficiency of CG laws in the country. Linking CG to financial information in a context where investor protection laws are still evolving is important. The contributions of the present study are: first, it assesses earnings quality (EQ) as a key outcome of EM to confirm, in the Indian context, one of the two opposing perspectives of EM, namely opportunistic and informational. Second, it creates empirical evidence on those firm attributes and CG mechanisms which can predict EQ for investors in India. Third, it provides inputs on the effectiveness of the revised regulations in controlling EM, and finally, it puts forward theoretical rationale for EM and CG practices in India.

Motivations for Classification Shifting: A Systematic Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Nisreen Mohammed Almaleeh
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Review ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Special Items ◽  
Governance Environment ◽  
Classification Shifting ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks

The purpose of the current paper is to highlight the motivations that may encourage managements of firms to shift core expenses to special items in order to inflate core or operating earnings i.e. to practice classification shifting, which would have an effect on the decisions of financial statements' users. This was done through conducting a systematic review on the available literature about classification shifting. The most obvious findings to emerge from this study is that management may engage in classification shifting for the reason that it is less costly than other earnings management methods, the firm being in current or potential state of financial distress, the desire of the management of the firm to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, the ownership structure of the firm having some characteristics that encourage management to engage in such a practice, the firm performing in a weak corporate governance environment, or due to the fact that classification shifting is tough to be detected by external monitors compared to other earnings management methods.

Political connections, ownership structure and quality of governance

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 358-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saidatou Dicko
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Compensation Structure ◽  
Theoretical Contribution ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Quality Of Governance

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to ask the following question: is there a link between being politically connected, the quality of governance and the company’s ownership structure? Design/methodology/approach The author then examined Canadian companies from the S&P/TSX index for the year 2015. Findings Political connectedness is significantly associated with lower quality of governance in relation to shareholders’ rights; ownership concentration is associated with lower quality of governance in relation to the overall governance, board of directors, shareholders’ rights and compensation structure indices; ownership structure does not mediate the relationship between political connections and quality of governance; and number of political connections through the executive is associated with less risky governance practices in relation to compensation structure; in other words, when members of the executive are politically connected, the firm adopts better compensation practices. Research limitations/implications The time limitation is the main weakness of this study and probably the cause of observed mitigated results. Practical implications The author hope that the results will inform regulators on the need not only to further regulate the business-politics relationship, but also to consider the specific traits of concentrated ownership companies and the most critical aspects of corporate governance in politically connected firms, such as shareholders’ rights, particularly those of minority shareholders. For example, an intriguing case to investigate in the Canadian context would be Pierre Karl Péladeau’s foray into Quebec politics and the controversy ignited by his political bid in light of his position as majority shareholder (75 percent) in communications giant Quebecor Inc. Social implications In fact, the results shown that concentrated ownership firms have lower governance quality than non-concentrated ones. Furthermore, in a concentrated ownership context, the minority shareholders’ rights could be threatened. In this sense, the results also shown that shareholders’ rights seem to be the most critical governance issue for the politically connected Canadian firms. These results are therefore the indication that Canadian financial market regulators must take action about politically connected and concentrated ownership firms in order to further protect minority shareholders’ rights. Originality/value This study makes a double theoretical contribution by enriching the literature on corporate governance and by providing one of the first investigations into the direct and comprehensive relationships between political connections, governance and ownership structure.

The impact of corporate governance and ownership structure reforms on earnings quality in China

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu_Dong Ji ◽  
Kamran Ahmed ◽  
Wei Lu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and ownership structures on earnings quality in China both prior and subsequent to two important corporate reforms: the code of corporate governance (CCG) in 2002 and the split share structure reform (SSR) in 2005. Design/methodology/approach – This study utilises informativeness of earnings (earnings response coefficient), conditional accounting conservatism and managerial discretionary accruals to assess earnings quality using 12,267 firm-year observations over 11 years from 2000 to 2010. Further, two dummy variables for measuring the changes of CCG and SSR are employed to estimate the effects of CCG and SSR reforms on earnings quality via OLS regression. Findings – This study finds that the promulgation of the CCG in 2002 has had a positive impact, but the SSR reform in 2005 has had little effect on listed firms’ earnings quality in China. These results hold good after controlling for a number of ownership, governance and other variables and estimating models with multiple measures of earnings’ quality. Research limitations/implications – Future research could focus on how western style corporate governance mechanisms have been constrained by the old management systems and governmental dominated ownership structures in Chinese listed firms. The conclusion is that simply coping Western corporate governance model is not suitable for every country. Practical implications – The results will assist Chinese regulators in improving reporting quality, ownership structure and governance mechanisms in China. The results will help international investors better understand quality of financial information in China. Originality/value – This is the first to our knowledge that addresses the effects of major governance and ownership reforms together on accounting earnings quality and, thus, makes a significant contribution on understanding the effect of regulatory reforms on improving earnings quality. In doing so, it also indirectly assesses the effectiveness of western-style corporate governance mechanisms introduced in China.

scholarly journals Earnings management, corporate governance, and ownership structure of Philippine initial public offerings

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Angelo O. Burdeos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Public Offerings

Prior studies examined the effect of corporate governance variables on discretionary current accrual, the most widely used measurement of earnings management. The principal-agent conflict implies that the size of the board, the percent of independent directors, CEO duality, and auditor prestige limit discretionary current accruals (DCA). This paper extends past studies by examining the effect of ownership structure on discretionary current accruals. The study determines the level of income-increasing earnings management of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Philippines and the factors that explain it. Particularly, the paper examines the effect of ownership concentration and largest shareholder ownership on discretionary current accruals. The study uses a final sample of 105 IPO firms in Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) from 2008 to 2018. Employing the modified Jones’s (1991) model to measure discretionary current accrual and multiple regression analysis, the study finds -4.19% discretionary current accrual on the average. It also reveals that the 2002 Philippine Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG) is ineffective in curbing earnings management. In addition, there is an insignificant relationship between the size of the board, CEO duality, ownership concentration, largest shareholder ownership and auditor prestige, and earnings management. Furthermore, the paper finds a significant relationship between the percent of independent directors, industry sector, return on assets (ROA) and cash flow from operations and earnings management.

scholarly journals Corporate Disclosure, Ownership Structure And Earnings Management: The Case Of French-Listed Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 1493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Lakhal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Management Measures ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance devices on earnings management for French-listed firms. Particularly, it examines the relationship between corporate disclosure practices, ownership structure features and earnings management by French managers. Results show that the relationship between earnings management measures and disclosure scores is negative suggesting that less transparent firms are likely to engage in earnings management practices. The findings also show that families, institutional investors and multiple large shareholders negatively influence earnings management, and hence, act as good corporate governance devices to limit managerial discretion. This paper shed light on the monitoring role of corporate disclosures and ownership structure in the French context where minority shareholders interests are less protected than in common law countries.

scholarly journals Compliance with Corporate Governance Best Practice. The Perspective of Ownership Structure

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-26
Author(s):  
Maria Aluchna ◽  
Emilia Tomczyk
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Best Practice ◽  
Transition Economy ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Compliance Policy

The article examines compliance with corporate governance best practice in the post transition economy addressing the heterogeneity of interests of different shareholders. On the basis of the agency theory, we suggest that in the concentrated ownership environment the principal-principal conflict results in lower compliance with the corporate governance code. More specifically, since compliance with best practice requires introducing independent directors and in that sense shifts control from shareholders to the board, we hypothesize that companies characterized by concentrated ownership and the dominant position of the founder/individual investor are reluctant to comply with board governance best practice. To evaluate our hypotheses, we explore compliance with board governance best practice with respect to the presence of independent directors, formation of an audit committee and other specialized board committees (remuneration, risk, strategy). We test the link between the compliance with the code and the ownership structure. Our analysis supports the principal-principalconflict argument and shows that companies with concentrated ownership and founder control do not comply with the board governance best practice. We believe this article contributes to the existing literature twofold. Firstly, we identify the patterns of corporate governance best practice implementation in the post socialist, post transition, emerging economy and depict the dynamics of the compliance with the code guidelines. Secondly, we show that the principal-principal conflict addresses the compliance policy of listed companies and results in various approaches to corporate governance conformity.

scholarly journals A study on Taiwanese corporate social responsibility and ownership structures

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 111-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shihwei Wu ◽  
Fengyi Lin ◽  
Chiaming Wu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Professional Managers ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Relationship

This study develops several models to examine the relationship between the corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the ownership structure of Taiwanese firms. Our results suggest that firms which are controlled by professional managers, government-owned, or collectively-owned would like to undertake serious efforts to integrate the CSR into various aspects of their companies. Due to Asia firm’s culture, family firms might be more reluctant to put efforts on CSR activities. We also report that there is a positive relationship between (a) the CSR and financial performance and (b) the CSR and earnings quality. This study suggests that the ownership structures are found to have effects on the CSR and the CSR could also decrease the information asymmetry between managers and investors.

scholarly journals The determinents of accruals based earnings management :case of listed Moroccan companies

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Sanae Hoummani ◽  
Said Radi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
The Other ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
Negative Relation ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Effective Role

This article aims to identify the determinants of accruals based earning's management in Moroccan listed companies. On one hand, it examines the relation between discretionary accruals as the measure of earning's management and what literature documents as incentives to this practice, in particular, politico-contractual motivations, the avoidance of losses and earnings decreases and growth opportunities. On the other hand, it investigates whether corporate governance mechanisms may constrain management's opportunistic behaviors. The empirical results provide evidence that managers manipulate earnings in the presence of losses and, that growing firms is more likely to engage in earning's management. In terms of constraining factors, our findings indicate a negative relation between discretionary accruals and both institutional and concentrated ownership. Thus, we suggest that these shareholders play an effective role on monitoring managers.

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