scholarly journals Transaction Costs in Planning Literature: A Systematic Review

2021 ◽  
pp. 088541222110620
Author(s):  
Sina Shahab
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Review ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Theory ◽  
Planning Systems

“Transaction costs,” as a well-established theory in New Institutional Economics, has been used to explain and analyze various planning matters for about 30 years since its introduction to planning literature. However, there is no study on how planning-related studies have utilized the theory. This paper conducts a systematic review that aims to develop a better understanding of how transaction-cost theory is used in planning literature. The review shows that while potential contributions and implications of transaction costs have been conceptually discussed in planning literature, the empirical studies have remained limited, particularly concerning the magnitude of such costs in planning systems.

scholarly journals Illuminating the formal–informal dichotomy in land development on the basis of transaction cost theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan Darabi ◽  
Danon Jalali
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Land Development ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Institutional Framework ◽  
Transaction Cost Theory ◽  
Financial Return ◽  
Partial Ownership ◽  
Informal Development

Transaction cost theory is largely used to investigate the formal domain of land and housing. In the informal domain, however, this perspective has been employed largely as a supplement in addressing the other fundamental notion in new institutional economics—property rights—despite the possibility that informality in land development can emerge regardless of the informality or formality of such rights. To cover this gap, this study developed a theoretical framework based on transaction cost theory to explain the formal–informal dichotomy in land development. The proposed framework maintains that land development depends on engaging in transactions that involve total or partial ownership of a combination of capital and land through lease and/or sale contracts, which enable landowners to earn from the new rental prices produced by the increase in land prices. Landowners are afforded two avenues from which to reduce transaction costs, namely, formal and informal institutional frameworks, each defining and enforcing restrictive rules on agents’ actions. These avenues, however, are simultaneously a source of new transaction costs that can affect the expected financial return of land development. Landowners therefore tend to choose the institutional framework that entails lower transaction costs but enables higher gains. Thus, the higher transaction costs associated with a formal institutional framework are the primary deterrents to the selection of this structure. In turn, informal land development continues to expand, regardless of the existence of formal prohibitive measures. We investigated the formal–informal dichotomy in the rural land development process in Tehran Province, Iran. The results indicated that transaction costs cause inefficiency in formal institutions, thereby driving the perpetuation of informal development.

scholarly journals THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN THE LIGHT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS. THE SPECIFICITY OF AGRICULTURAL CONTRACTS

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 97-104
Author(s):  
Marzena Lemanowicz
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Agricultural Sector ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Contract Signing

The article reviews Polish and foreign economic literature regarding new institutional economics (NIE) and various research approaches used in the framework of NIE. Particular attention was paid to the economic theory of contracts and the transaction costs, as the limitation of transaction costs is indeed the main stimulus for contract signing. Special attention was given to agricultural contracts and their specificity. The article discusses different theories applied in the analysis of contracts, characterizes contracts according to different criteria, and draws attention to the importance of transaction costs in the theory of contracts. In addition, factors which contribute to these costs have been identified, indicating the necessity of adapting the principles of transaction cost economics to the needs of the agricultural sector.

The New Institutional Economics-Main Theories

e-Finanse ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Emilia Obińska-Wajda
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Organization Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Short Review ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
Political Sciences ◽  
Property Rights Theory

AbstractThe aim of this article is to show that the New Institutional Economics is an interdisciplinary stream combining economics, law, organization theory, political sciences, sociology, and anthropology. The main theories which are part of the New Institutional Economics are: Agency Theory, Property Rights Theory and Transaction Costs Theory. The basic assumptions of these theories are mentioned in this paper. This article is an introduction to the New Institutional Economics and its main theories. For this purpose, it presents a brief guide for those who are interested in the New Institutional Economics. Finally, the article is accompanied by a short review of examples of empirical studies connected with these theories.

Governing the Environment: the Intitutional Economics Approach

2009 ◽  
pp. 61-86
Author(s):  
Arild Vatn
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Specific Area ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Neoclassical Economics ◽  
Institutional Perspective ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Plural Rationalities ◽  
Jel Classifications

- Analyzing environmental governance implies foremost to analyze institutional structures and their implications. In doing so, the present paper utilizes insights primarily from the tradition of classical institutional economics. The paper is divided in three. In the first part I describe the main features of the classical position and compare it briefly with that of neoclassical economics and the tradition of new institutional economics. In the second part I clarify what is considered the main aspects of governance as seen from an institutional perspective. In part three I move to the more specific area of environmental governance. The concept of resource regimes is defined. Moreover I analyze how different regimes influence which environmental problems appear and how they can be treated. I discuss how institutions influence the formation and articulation of knowledge and values, how they form and protect interests, how they influence the level of transaction costs and hence the possibilities for coordination, and finally how they form the motivations underlying human choices in concrete contexts. Given that all these variables are shown to be endogenous to the institutional system, the use of comparative analysis in the assessment of various governance options is emphasized.Keywords: classical institutional economics, interdependence, resource regimes, value articulation, interest protection, transaction costs, plural rationalities.JEL classifications: B52; Q50; D02; D70.

scholarly journals Gender and Transaction Costs in Use of Zero Grazing Net for Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis Control in Stall Feeding Systems in Kenya

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Jared Isaboke Mose
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Survey Design ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Tsetse Fly ◽  
Cross Sectional Survey ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Zero Grazing

Trypanosomiasis is a widespread constraint in livestock production, mixed farming and human health in Africa. Several technologies have been developed to ameliorate the effects of the disease but delivery of these technologies to farmers has been undertaken on trial and error basis without a proper strategy leading to more failure than success and wastage of scarce resources. The purpose of this paper was to carry out an analysis of transaction costs incurred in accessing and using insecticide treated net in tsetse and trypanosomiasis control among smallholder cattle farms in Busia County, Kenya. The study utilized cross–sectional survey design and was guided by the New Institutional Economics approach and utilized stratified and simple random sampling technique to get 211 respondents for the study. Data was collected by use of structured questionnaires and analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Conjoint analysis results for zero grazing net showed that cost was the most important factor influencing farmers’ decision, accounting for 38.52% of the total while durability and availability each accounted for 25% and retreatability accounted for 10% of the decisions. Further t-test results showed that there were significant differences between men and women with respect to attribute scores (at 99 d.f. and alpha = 0.05%) suggesting that men and women face different transaction costs in accessing T&T control technologies. Therefore there is need for gender sensitive strategies in T&T technology design and dissemination. Tsetse fly and Trypanosomiasis control by use of low cost technologies such as insecticide treated zero grazing net should be promoted by government and other development partners. The net should be affordable, available at supply outlets close to farmers, long lasting and re-treatable for famers to take it up.

scholarly journals Reform of Compulsory Education Teachers’ Communication System from the Perspective of New Institutional Economics

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 176-183
Author(s):  
Liang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Compulsory Education ◽  
State Theory ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Theory ◽  
Exchange System ◽  
Education Teacher ◽  
Property Rights Theory ◽  
Theory State ◽  
Teacher Exchange

According to the four main theory of transaction cost theory, property rights theory, state theory and the theory of institutional change from the new institutional economics, this paper gives a theoretical analysis about our country’s compulsory education teacher exchange system and puts for ward the reform path of the system.

Transaction Costs and Information Systems: Does IT Add Up?

2006 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Cordelia
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Information And Communication Technology ◽  
Information Flow ◽  
Communication Technology ◽  
Flow Distribution ◽  
Transaction Cost Theory ◽  
Design And Implementation ◽  
Is Research ◽  
Information And Communication

Transaction cost theory has often been used to support the use of information and communication technology (ICT) to reduce imperfection in the economic system. Electronic markets and hierarchies have repeatedly been described as solutions to inefficiencies in the organisation of transactions in complex and uncertain settings. Far from criticising this assumption, this paper highlights the limits associated with this application of transaction cost theory that has been prevalent in IS research. Building on the concepts first proposed by Ciborra, the paper argues that information-related problems represent only some of the elements contributing to transaction costs. These costs also emerge due to the interdependencies among the various factors contributing to their growth. The study of the consequences associated with ICT design and implementation, grounded in transaction cost theory, should consider the overall implication associated with the adoption and use of ICT and not only the direct effect on problems associated with information flow, distribution, and management.

To affiliate, or not to affiliate. Transaction costs and governance choices in luxury hotels in Germany

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-287
Author(s):  
Matteo Pedrini ◽  
Chiara De Bernardi
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Theory ◽  
Luxury Hotels ◽  
Entry Strategies ◽  
Property Owners ◽  
Luxury Hotel ◽  
Governance Choices ◽  
Hotel Chain

This paper examines the choice of affiliation or no affiliation to a large hotel chain from the viewpoint of luxury hotel property owners in Germany. Grounded in transaction cost theory, this study identifies how uncertainty and frequency influence the owners’ choice of unaffiliated operation and affiliation. The study augments the traditional governance literature in the field of the hotel by shedding light on the market/hierarchy decision of property owners rather than on the market entry strategies of international hotels firm. Through a multiple regression analysis on a sample of 122 existing five-star hotels in Germany, this study provides new empirical evidence that a frequent contract conclusion with the same hotel chain and a “hotel unrelated” background of the owner increases the likelihood of affiliation. In contrast to what transaction cost theory traditionally predicts, our results reveal that uncertainty is not influencing the owners’ market/hierarchy decision.

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