A Strategic Essay: Dynamics between a Super President, a Military Alliance and an Intrastate Entity

2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-304
Author(s):  
Bhaswati Mukherjee

The emerging dynamics between President Trump, NATO and EU promises to constitute a fascinating new narrative of the changing contours of the international order in this millennium. President Trump has completely reversed American policy towards NATO. As a businessman, Trump has made it clear that henceforth US funding and support would be linked to the US getting a ‘good deal’ from its NATO partners. NATO had earlier anchored itself to the benchmark goal that 2% of a country’s GDP should go to defence spending. President Trump is yet to establish close and friendly relations either with NATO Secretary General or leaders of NATO Member States. Trump’s public embrace of autocratic rulers has caused resentment within NATO. On CSDP the earlier European approach was to lean heavily on the Americans to fund NATO. The friction between the goals of NATO and CSDP increased under the Trump Presidency because of Trump’s insistence on burden sharing of resources and funds among NATO Member States. The CSDP and NATO have overlapping mandates which could be complicated in crisis situations. An independent CSDP remains the core issue causing friction. The U.S. and other non EU weapons producing countries (chiefly Norway and soon the U.K.) also believe that CSDP is manipulating the rules of defence procurement in favour of companies based on EU soil. Is the US justified in attacking CSDP? Many EU Member States believe that protecting European defence industries is a small price to pay for ensuring that a NATO under American leadership not get involved in small regional wars, as an example, in Francophone Africa. Brexit is casting a long shadow. EU and NATO would need to realign themselves from a strategic perspective. NATO and the EU need to prepare for a strategic scenario post Brexit. Following Brexit, 80 percent of NATO defence spending will come from non-EU members. This would shift the onus of decision making within NATO away from the EU. One of the greatest challenges for NATO and the EU is America’s new narrative on Iran and North Korea. EU and NATO are slowly waking up to the new reality that there will be no “business as usual”. If NATO’s military deterrence loses its credibility, this will undermine the credibility of both EU and NATO and endanger international peace and security. What could the EU and NATO do next? Are there any “low hanging fruits” that could be picked in the near future? The EU and NATO understand that there can be no ‘business as usual’. The new global narrative on security would depend on how NATO and EU respond to America’s changed narrative. A timely response is the need of the hour.

Subject EU immigration division. Significance Immigration to Europe has fallen substantially over the past three years, largely because of stricter rules in EU member states and enhanced cooperation with the EU's neighbours. This downward trend, however, coincides with growing tensions between member states over how to tackle immigration once migrants and refugees enter European territory. Impacts Unable to agree on an effect asylum seekers reform, the EU will continue funding African countries to stop irregular migratory flows. Disengagement of EU search and rescue assets and more reliance on under-trained North African coast guards will make sea migration deadlier. Divergent views on immigration burden-sharing could worsen foreign relations between populists in Italy and those in Hungary and Poland.


2002 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 72-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary O'Mahony

For most of the postwar period both labour and total factor productivity growth in the EU was higher than in the US. The 1990s witnessed a change in this trend with the US experiencing higher growth rates for the first time in decades. This was partly due to the end of catch-up growth as many larger EU Member States had reached US levels by the beginning of the decade with also some evidence of a higher ‘New Economy’ impact in the US. The productivity record of the UK was poor relative to its major European competitors throughout most of the postwar period, although this relative decline appears to have come to an end. This paper presents figures on relative productivity for the total EU and individual Member States in the 1990s. Both postwar convergence and trends in the 1990s are discussed in terms of a number of factors which result in the emergence of differences across European countries. These include the skill composition of the workforce, the rate of introduction of new technology and the institutional environment in which firms operate. The latter include the stability of the macroeconomic environment and aspects of competition and regulation. The paper concludes that trends in productivity largely reflect long-term structural aspects but that EMU membership might have a small favourable effect on UK productivity.


Author(s):  
Sanja Arezina

After the promotion of ?Made in China 2025? initiative and the beginning of US President Donald Trump?s tenure in power, in US and whole world there has been a rising negative attitude towards Chinese presence. The launch of a US-China ?trade war? and the closure of the US market for Chinese direct investment and product coincided with growing discontent of EU member states over the treatment that European companies have had at the Chinese market. As a result, there has been a change of the positive perception of the PR China by the EU member states, that was created mainly by strong inflow of Chinese investments and assistance within the ?One Belt, One Road? initiative, into a negative perception that is now forming policy changes and introduction of protectionist measures towards Chinese direct investments in European market. In this article, the author talks about the different perceptions (positive and negative) that have been formed in the PR China within the EU, the factors that have influenced the change in the perception of EU member countries towards the PR China and the consequences on the dynamics of the development of different policies at EU level. To be able to prove the basic hypothesis that Brussels, unlike the US, still shows some pragmatism by making policy changes moderate enough that the EU can remain loyal to open market principles while preventing these principles from becoming strategic vulnerability, the author uses the structural-functionalist analysis, induction, and deduction.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lyra Jakulevičienė ◽  
Mantas Bileišis

Abstract Refugee resettlement is not new to EU member states. But the EU only accounts for about 10 percent of resettlements globally. Before the 2015 European Council decisions to relocate about 160,000 persons from Italy and Greece only half of EU Member States participated in resettlement programs. Relocation of refugees has emerged as a new form of resettlement as an EU reaction to the growing refugee influx. It is likely to become a permanent part of Common European Asylum Policy. The refugee emergency has intensified discussions about the application of the solidarity principle to pressure member states not yet engaged in relocation to contribute to the joint efforts of the EU. But this has created serious political controversy in many of the new (eastern) member states. The article outlines key elements of refugee resettlement and relocation that have recently emerged in the EU and discusses the prerequisites for the sustainable use of this tool in an unfavorable political and unclear legal environment, with particular focus on new member states. The main goal of the article is to identify factors that need to be considered for the design of sustainable resettlement and relocation programs, considering the aspects of political salience, legal conditions, burden-sharing, and member states’ capacity. The case study of Lithuania presented in this article suggests that such programs need to be carefully considered and adequately funded as there are ample pitfalls which can quickly discredit the idea among the citizens.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anneliese Baldaccini

AbstractThis article examines the way in which the EU amd its Member States have approached border security issues since the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. A key aspect of this approach has been to tighten control of borders and the safety of documents by the use of biometric systems. The new policies on border security and document security are resulting in the mass collection and storage of biometric data in relation to third-country nationals seeking entry into the territory of EU Member States, and in relation to EU nationals within the context of travel and identity documents. These developments are significant as the Union is considering the potential offered by biometrics not only for the effective management of borders but also for the prevention and combating of crime.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasin Kerem Gümüs

AbstractIn October 2007, the European Commission adopted a controversial proposal on the conditions for entry and residence of third-country nationals for highly qualified employment. The Blue Card scheme is intended to provide Member States and European Union (EU) companies with additional “tools” to recruit, retain and better allocate the workers they require, and so to increase the competitiveness of the EU economy through legal immigration and provide the EU with an advantage to compete with the US Green Card. However, the EU Blue Card scheme has been the subject of much controversy among not only EU Member States but also among less developed countries. This article aims to analyze the Blue Card scheme, which was adopted on 25 May 2009 and gives Member States two years to incorporate the new provisions into their domestic legislation. After providing an overview of the scheme, the second part deals with critics of the scheme and national responses of Member States to the scheme. Finally, the third part of the article seeks to answer the question: is the Blue Card scheme the right step in the right direction?


Author(s):  
Yusuf Avar ◽  
Yu Chou Lin

The EU Member States share various perceptions and preferences on lots of Union’s issues, particularly in the areas of foreign and security policies. Some countries, such as France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, focus on the establishment of the European autonomous defence. Others, especially most of the Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the UK, supported the transatlantic burden sharing. The neutral states also concur with the concept of transatlantic burden sharing. However, the transatlantic relations between the EU and the US are problematic. This study argues that the EU would increase its importance to the role of international politics to effectively implement its goals if the transatlantic relations are stable. The EU requires the military capability and leadership of the US; on the other hand, the US also relies on the EU’s peacemaking and peacekeeping capacity. When both blocs closely cooperate with each other as an important partnership to counter international terrorism, regional disputes, climate change, failed states, mass movements of migration, epidemic diseases, and so on, they would respond to these problems and resolve them within a shorter time.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Filauro ◽  
Zachary Parolin

This study applies improved household income data to measure and decompose trends in pan-European income inequality from 2006 to 2014. To contrast the relative significance of economic homogeneity versus the efficacy of welfare state and labor market institutions in shaping income distributions, we compare the structure of inequality in the EU-28 to that of the 50 United States. This comparison stands in contrast to the standard practice of evaluating the US against individual EU Member States. Despite the greater relative heterogeneity of the 28 EU Member States and our corrections for the underreporting of household income in the US, post-fisc income inequality in the EU-28 remains lower than that of the US from 2006 onward. Moreover, inequality appears to be rising in the US while it has remained stagnant since 2008 in the EU-28. In both unions, and particularly the US, within-state income differences contribute more to union-wide inequality than between-state differences. In a counterfactual analysis, we find that if the EU-28 matched the between-state homogeneity of the US, but maintained its relative within-country inequalities, pan-European inequality would fall by only 20 percent. Conversely, inequality in the US would fall by 34 percent if it matched the within-country inequality of the EU-28. Our findings suggest that the strengthening of egalitarian institutions within the 28 Member States is more consequential than economic convergence in reducing pan-European income inequality. We highlight institutional challenges toward achieving a ‘more equal’ Europe and discuss implications for future EU policymaking.


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