scholarly journals Views on the Imperative of EU-US Relations

Author(s):  
Yusuf Avar ◽  
Yu Chou Lin

The EU Member States share various perceptions and preferences on lots of Union’s issues, particularly in the areas of foreign and security policies. Some countries, such as France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, focus on the establishment of the European autonomous defence. Others, especially most of the Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the UK, supported the transatlantic burden sharing. The neutral states also concur with the concept of transatlantic burden sharing. However, the transatlantic relations between the EU and the US are problematic. This study argues that the EU would increase its importance to the role of international politics to effectively implement its goals if the transatlantic relations are stable. The EU requires the military capability and leadership of the US; on the other hand, the US also relies on the EU’s peacemaking and peacekeeping capacity. When both blocs closely cooperate with each other as an important partnership to counter international terrorism, regional disputes, climate change, failed states, mass movements of migration, epidemic diseases, and so on, they would respond to these problems and resolve them within a shorter time.

2002 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 72-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary O'Mahony

For most of the postwar period both labour and total factor productivity growth in the EU was higher than in the US. The 1990s witnessed a change in this trend with the US experiencing higher growth rates for the first time in decades. This was partly due to the end of catch-up growth as many larger EU Member States had reached US levels by the beginning of the decade with also some evidence of a higher ‘New Economy’ impact in the US. The productivity record of the UK was poor relative to its major European competitors throughout most of the postwar period, although this relative decline appears to have come to an end. This paper presents figures on relative productivity for the total EU and individual Member States in the 1990s. Both postwar convergence and trends in the 1990s are discussed in terms of a number of factors which result in the emergence of differences across European countries. These include the skill composition of the workforce, the rate of introduction of new technology and the institutional environment in which firms operate. The latter include the stability of the macroeconomic environment and aspects of competition and regulation. The paper concludes that trends in productivity largely reflect long-term structural aspects but that EMU membership might have a small favourable effect on UK productivity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-304
Author(s):  
Bhaswati Mukherjee

The emerging dynamics between President Trump, NATO and EU promises to constitute a fascinating new narrative of the changing contours of the international order in this millennium. President Trump has completely reversed American policy towards NATO. As a businessman, Trump has made it clear that henceforth US funding and support would be linked to the US getting a ‘good deal’ from its NATO partners. NATO had earlier anchored itself to the benchmark goal that 2% of a country’s GDP should go to defence spending. President Trump is yet to establish close and friendly relations either with NATO Secretary General or leaders of NATO Member States. Trump’s public embrace of autocratic rulers has caused resentment within NATO. On CSDP the earlier European approach was to lean heavily on the Americans to fund NATO. The friction between the goals of NATO and CSDP increased under the Trump Presidency because of Trump’s insistence on burden sharing of resources and funds among NATO Member States. The CSDP and NATO have overlapping mandates which could be complicated in crisis situations. An independent CSDP remains the core issue causing friction. The U.S. and other non EU weapons producing countries (chiefly Norway and soon the U.K.) also believe that CSDP is manipulating the rules of defence procurement in favour of companies based on EU soil. Is the US justified in attacking CSDP? Many EU Member States believe that protecting European defence industries is a small price to pay for ensuring that a NATO under American leadership not get involved in small regional wars, as an example, in Francophone Africa. Brexit is casting a long shadow. EU and NATO would need to realign themselves from a strategic perspective. NATO and the EU need to prepare for a strategic scenario post Brexit. Following Brexit, 80 percent of NATO defence spending will come from non-EU members. This would shift the onus of decision making within NATO away from the EU. One of the greatest challenges for NATO and the EU is America’s new narrative on Iran and North Korea. EU and NATO are slowly waking up to the new reality that there will be no “business as usual”. If NATO’s military deterrence loses its credibility, this will undermine the credibility of both EU and NATO and endanger international peace and security. What could the EU and NATO do next? Are there any “low hanging fruits” that could be picked in the near future? The EU and NATO understand that there can be no ‘business as usual’. The new global narrative on security would depend on how NATO and EU respond to America’s changed narrative. A timely response is the need of the hour.


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 168-170
Author(s):  
Robin Blake

This virtual event was held as a follow-up to the inaugural Biopesticide Summit and Exhibition at Swansea University in July 2019, and postponed in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Sarah Harding, Communication Director at The World BioProtection Forum (WBF) & Biopesticide Summit opened the event with a few brief words of introduction before handing over to Dr Minshad Ansari, Chairman of the WBF.<br/> Dr Ansari was delighted with the more than 150 attendees already logged into the event with over 300 registered. The WBF was created in 2019 as a non-profit organization to bring together industry and academia for innovation. Dr Ansari thanked the event's supporters – AgBio, Agri Life, Bayer, Bionema, Ecolibrium Biologicals, Koppert Biological Systems, Harry Butler Institute and Sri BioAesthetics, as well as the media partners including Outlooks on Pest Management. He reiterated the need for regulatory reform due to removal of chemical pesticides, demands for organic food, limited biopesticide products registered and a lengthy and costly biopesticide registration process (5 years in EU where there are just 60 products available vs. 2.1 years in USA and where over 200 products are already available on market). The US is clearly in a much better place; in Europe, it is too expensive for SMEs and little progress has been made despite the work of the IBMA (International Biocontrol Manufacturers Association) and others. With respect to the biopesticides market share (value) by region, Europe has 27.7% market share (21.3% CAGR) and yet within UK, the CAGR is limited (unlike other European countries) – there are few products available in the market compared to chemical pesticides. The current biopesticide regulation is complex and not fit for purpose (compare 60 vs 200). Industry is facing a serious problem with pest control following the removal of some chemical pesticides, e.g.European cranefly which has caused many problems to the turf industry and has been impacted by the removal of chlorpyrifos. However, Brexit provides opportunities in the UK through government plans to "Build Back Better" by supporting Green Tech. At the EU level, the EU has committed to reducing use of pesticides by 50% (equating to 505 products) by 2030 so there are opportunities here for biopesticides to fill the market.<br/> Dr Ansari finished his introduction by restating the objectives for the meeting: for the speakers to present and debate the need for reform, their visions for a successful regulatory system, and how the WBF is working towards process reform in UK biopesticide regulation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 81 (6-8) ◽  
pp. 602-622
Author(s):  
Dennis Lichtenstein ◽  
Christiane Eilders

The Euro crisis has revealed severe conflicts between EU member states and challenged a shared European identity. This article investigates how the crisis was reflected in identity constructions in media discourses in EU key countries. European identity construction is conceptualized as framing of the EU in favour or against belonging to the EU and togetherness with other members. Conducting a systematic content analysis of two weekly newspapers and magazines in Germany, France and the UK, we compare identity constructions between 2011 and 2014. Findings show that while support of belonging to the EU is low in general, the countries differ remarkably in terms of their sense of togetherness. This particularly applies to strong or weak political integration, market regulation or market freedom and financial stability or impulses for economic growth. The positions reflect long-term political conflicts between the countries but are also flexible enough to adapt to the particular event context.


Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (23) ◽  
pp. 7971
Author(s):  
Felix Kattelmann ◽  
Jonathan Siegle ◽  
Roland Cunha Montenegro ◽  
Vera Sehn ◽  
Markus Blesl ◽  
...  

The Green Deal of the European Union defines extremely ambitious climate targets for 2030 (−55% emissions compared to 1990) and 2050 (−100%), which go far beyond the current goals that the EU member states have agreed on thus far. The question of which sectors contribute how much has already been discussed, but is far from decided, while the question of which countries shoulder how much of the tightened reduction targets has hardly been discussed. We want to contribute significantly to answering these policy questions by analysing the necessary burden sharing within the EU from both an energy system and an overall macroeconomic perspective. For this purpose, we use the energy system model TIMES PanEU and the computational general equilibrium model NEWAGE. Our results show that excessively strong targets for the Emission Trading System (ETS) in 2030 are not system-optimal for achieving the 55% overall target, reductions should be made in such a way that an emissions budget ratio of 39 (ETS sector) to 61 (Non-ETS sector) results. Economically weaker regions would have to reduce their CO2 emissions until 2030 by up to 33% on top of the currently decided targets in the Effort Sharing Regulation, which leads to higher energy system costs as well as losses in gross domestic product (GDP). Depending on the policy scenario applied, GDP losses in the range of −0.79% and −1.95% relative to baseline can be found for single EU regions. In the long-term, an equally strict mitigation regime for all countries in 2050 is not optimal from a system perspective; total system costs would be higher by 1.5%. Instead, some countries should generate negative net emissions to compensate for non-mitigable residual emissions from other countries.


Author(s):  
Olha Ovechkina

In connection with the decision to withdraw the UK from the EU a number of companies will need to take into account that from 1 January 2021 EU law will no longer apply to the United Kingdom and will become a "third country" for EU Member States, unless the provisions of bilateral agreements or multilateral trade agreements. This means that the four European freedoms (movement of goods, services, labor and capital) will no longer apply to UK companies to the same extent as they did during the UK's EU membership. The purpose of the article is to study, first of all, the peculiarities of the influence of Great Britain's withdrawal from the European Union on the legal regulation of the status of European legal entities. Brexit results in the inability to register European companies and European economic interest groups in the UK. Such companies already registered before 01.01.2021 have the opportunity to move their place of registration to an EU Member State. These provisions are defined in Regulations 2018 (2018/1298) and Regulations 2018 (2018/1299).British companies with branches in EU Member States will now be subject to the rules applicable to third-country companies, which provide additional information on their activities. In the EU, many countries apply the criterion of actual location, which causes, among other things, the problem of non-recognition of legal entities established in the country where the criterion of incorporation is used (including the United Kingdom), at the same time as the governing bodies of such legal entities the state where the settlement criterion is applied. Therefore, to reduce the likelihood of possible non-recognition of British companies, given the location of the board of such a legal entity in the state where the residency criterion applies, it seems appropriate to consider reincarnation at the actual location of such a company. Reducing the risks of these negative consequences in connection with Brexit on cross-border activities of legal entities is possible by concluding interstate bilateral and multilateral agreements that would contain unified rules on conflict of law regulation of the status of legal entities.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Wallis ◽  
Anna Powles

Abstract One of President Joseph Biden's foreign policy priorities is to ‘renew’ and ‘strengthen’ the United States' alliances, as they were perceived to have been ‘undermined’ during the Trump administration, which regularly expressed concern that allies were free-riding on the United States' military capability. Yet the broad range of threats states face in the contemporary context suggests that security assistance from allies no longer only—or even primarily—comes in the form of military capability. We consider whether there is a need to rethink understandings of how alliance relationships are managed, particularly how the goals—or strategic burdens—of alliances are understood, how allies contribute to those burdens, and how influence is exercised within alliances. We do this by analysing how the United States–Australia and Australia–New Zealand alliances operate in the Pacific islands. Our focus on the Pacific islands reflects the United States' perception that the region plays a ‘critical’ role in helping to ‘preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific region’. We conclude that these understandings need to be rethought, particularly in the Pacific islands, where meeting non-traditional security challenges such as economic, social and environmental issues, is important to advancing the United States, Australia and New Zealand's shared strategic goal of remaining the region's primary security partners and ensuring that no power hostile to their interests establishes a strategic foothold.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-147
Author(s):  
Song Lilei ◽  
Bian Sai

International public health cooperation has always been one of the typical issues of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic ties in the international community. As two important actors in the international community, China and the EU have worked on many transnational public health cooperation projects. The two-level division of the EU's foreign policy competence decided the Cooperation and Challenges on Public Health between China-EU. Cooperation with the EU member states is expanding, the cooperation with the level of the EU started to show up. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, both China and the EU have publicly expressed their support for WHO's anti-pandemic measures. China has actively provided public health aid to Central and Eastern European countries and shared the Anti-COVID-19 experience. In this article, the author reviewed the progress and mechanism of China-EU public health cooperation, discussed how China and the EU have jointly dealt with the pandemic by sharing experience, providing aids, strengthening multilateralism and international cooperation, and building a community with a healthy future for humankind since the outbreak of COVID-19. Facing the COVID-19,China-EU health cooperation should be further strengthened to show the importance of a community with a shared future for humanity.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document