scholarly journals Digital markets, competition regimes and models of capitalism: A comparative institutional analysis of European and US responses to Google

2021 ◽  
pp. 102452942110112
Author(s):  
Andreas Kornelakis ◽  
Pauline Hublart
Keyword(s):  
Regional Differences ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Nonmarket Strategies ◽  
Comparative Capitalism ◽  
Societal Level ◽  
Comparative Institutional Analysis ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Cross National

The comparative capitalism literature examined how institutions vary on a national or societal level and how these differences affect multinational companies’ strategies. Yet, little attention has been devoted to cross-national or regional differences in the governance of competition, especially in the context of digitalization of markets. The article seeks to fill this gap by looking at the case of Google. It traces the process of the stark US–EU disagreement over Google’s abuse of dominant position in digital markets, which resulted in one of the largest fines in the EU history. It is argued that the variation in the response to the company’s market and nonmarket strategies are traced back to differences between Ordoliberal and Chicago School ideas, which are embedded in the ‘competition regimes’ of European and US capitalist models. The article concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for varieties of capitalism frameworks.

scholarly journals “Anti-competition agreements” and legal options to pursue claims for damages before common courts

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wojciech Paweł Szydło
Keyword(s):  
Power Transmission ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
Effective Competition ◽  
Oil Pipelines ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position ◽  
Energy Companies ◽  
Dominant Activity ◽  
The Eu

Aim: In the article the situation is discussed where the refusal by an energy supplier to connect other companies to join the network, will be treated (in Poland and the EU) as a prohibited abuse of a dominant position by this company. The identification of such practices is important because EU sectoral legislation does not contain specific provisions requiring companies managing and operating oil pipelines to conclude agreements with other companies to join their networks or to deliver oil.Design / Research methods: The aim of the article was achieved through doctrinal analysis of the relevant Polish and EU law and by analyzing guidelines issued by EU bodies. In the study, also functional analysis is applied, allowing to examine the functioning of the law.Conclusions / findings: Access to oil pipelines and the sale of their transmission capacity are determined by the network owners themselves. These owners are private oil companies, not being regulated by European Union law. The obligation to connect other entities to its own network by power transmission companies in Poland results only from the general provisions of Polish competition law. It is shown that refusal to access the network is a manifestation of prohibited abuse of dominant position, which is prohibited whenever the dominant activity is detrimental to allocation efficiency. In particular this concerns the case when the supply of goods or services objectively necessary for effective competition on the market in general is denied, and leads to the elimination of effective competition in the market and/or harm to consumers.Originality / value of the article: The article discusses the reasons for the legal obligation for energy companies involved in the transmission of crude oil to connect other companies into their own network. This obligation significantly influences the business conducted by the transmission companies.Implications of the research: The presented research results are useful for assessing decisions issued by the President of UOKiK (the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection) and in the judgments of Polish common courts and EU courts.

scholarly journals The Detection of Cases of Violations of Economic Competition and Modern Program of their Settlement

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1122-1126
Author(s):  
Gani Asllani ◽  
Bedri Statovci
Keyword(s):  
Unfair Competition ◽  
Economic Indicators ◽  
Economic Competition ◽  
Efficient Treatment ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Market Rules ◽  
Leniency Program ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position ◽  
The Eu

The paper addresses the issues of detection of cases of violations of economic competition by various undertakings (enterprises) such as the prohibited agreements, abuse of dominant position or other discriminatory practices, more efficient treatment in courts of such cases and easier resolution of initiated cases. Besides the national laws governing the protection and development of unfair competition from anticompetitive practices, market regulators, in particular national authorities for protection of competition tend to find easier methods of detecting violators of the market rules. Among the programs that apply in the EU two are the most important: the leniency program and the program of the settlements. Also during analyses and easier detection of cases there are two economic indicators which alerts for possible violation of competition. The paper treats the functioning of these programs and other indicators implemented by the national authorities of competition.

A refusal to grant access to a grid within the provision of crude oil transfer services as an example of a prohibited abuse of a dominant position in the EU and Polish competition law

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wojciech Paweł SZYDŁO
Keyword(s):  
Crude Oil ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Oil Companies ◽  
Effective Competition ◽  
Oil Pipelines ◽  
Transfer Services ◽  
The Eu

Aim: The paper discusses cases in which a refusal by an energy enterprise to connect other enterprises to the network is treated as a prohibited abuse of the enterprise's dominant position and, equally, will represent behavior prohibited by art. 12 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by art. 9 par. 2 item 2 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Law as well as legal consequences of such refusal. It is important to pinpoint such cases since the EU sectoral regulation does not provide for obligating any undertakings which manage and operate oil pipelines to enter into contracts with other undertakings such as contracts on connecting into their network or contracts on providing crude oil transfer services. Conditions for accessing oil pipelines and selling their transfer capacities are determined by the owners of the networks: private oil companies in the countries across which the pipelines are routed. These conditions are not governed by the EU law.  Furthermore, the very obligation of connecting other entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector in Poland will only arise from generally applicable provisions of the Polish competition law.  Design / Research methods: The purpose of the paper has been reached by conducting a doctrinal analysis of relevant provisions of Polish and EU law and an analysis of guidelines issued by the EU governing bodies. Furthermore, the research included the functional analysis method which analyses how law works in practice. Conclusions / findings: The deliberations show that a refusal to access the network will be a manifestation of a prohibited abuse of a dominant position and will be a prohibited action always when the dominant's action is harmful in terms of the allocation effectiveness. It will be particularly harmful when delivery of goods or services objectively required for effective competition on a lower level market, a discriminatory refusal which leads to elimination of an effective competition on the consequent market, a refusal leading to unfair treatment of consumers and an unjustified refusal. Originality / value of the article: The paper discusses the prerequisites which trigger the obligation to connect entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector. The obligation has a material impact on the operations of the oil transmitting undertakings, in particular on those who dominate the market. The regulatory bodies in the competition sector may classify a refusal of access to own network by other enterprises as a prohibited abuse of the dominant position, exposing such undertakings to financial consequences.Implications of the research: The research results presented in the paper may be used in decisions issued by the President of the OCCP and in judgement of Polish civil courts and EU courts. This may cause a significant change in the approach to classifying prohibited practices to prohibited behavior which represent abuse of the dominant position. The deliberations may also prompt the Polish and EU legislator to continue works on the legislation.

Two Countries, Five Years: Islam in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan through the Lens of Public Opinion Surveys

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Junisbai ◽  
Azamat Junisbai ◽  
Baurzhan Zhussupov
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Regional Differences ◽  
Religious Practice ◽  
Political Context ◽  
Religious Revival ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Public Opinion Surveys ◽  
Daily Prayer ◽  
Cross National

Drawing on two waves of public opinion surveys conducted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, we investigate the rise in religiosity and orthodoxy among Central Asian Muslims. We confirm that a religious revival is underway, with nearly 100 percent of Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani Muslims self-identifying as such in 2012—up from 80 percent in Kazakhstan in 2007. If we dig a bit deeper, however, we observe cross-national variations. Religious practice, as measured by daily prayer and weekly mosque attendance, is up in Kyrgyzstan, but has fallen in Kazakhstan. While the share of those who express preferences associated with religious orthodoxy has grown in both, this group has more than doubled in Kazakhstan. We attribute these differences to political context, both in terms of cross-national political variation and, within each country, variation based on regional differences.

scholarly journals Free movement of workers in the EU and occupational pensions

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Del Sol ◽  
Marco Rocca
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Occupational Pensions ◽  
Minimum Standards ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Free Movement Of Workers ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Cross National

The European Union appears to be promoting at the same time both cross-national mobility of workers and an increased role for occupational pensions. There is, however, a potential tension between these two objectives because workers risk losing (some of) their pension rights under an occupational scheme as a consequence of their mobility. After long negotiations, the EU has addressed this issue through a minimum standards Directive. Shortly before the adoption of this Directive, the Court of Justice also delivered an important decision in the same field, in the case of Casteels v British Airways. By analysing the resulting legal framework for safeguarding pension rights under occupational schemes in the context of workers’ mobility, we argue that the application of the case law developed by the Court of Justice in the field of free movement of workers has the potential to offer superior protection compared to the Directive. We also highlight the fact that the present legal framework seems to afford a much fuller protection to the intra-company cross-national mobility of workers employed by multinational companies, while also seemingly favouring mobility for highly specialised workers.

Party placement in supranational elections

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 333-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Garzia ◽  
Alexander Trechsel ◽  
Lorenzo De Sio
Keyword(s):  
Iterative Method ◽  
Longitudinal Research ◽  
Policy Issue ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Policy Statements ◽  
Data Collection Procedure ◽  
Voting Advice Applications ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Cross National

Throughout the years, political scientists have devised a multitude of techniques to position political parties on various ideological and policy/issue dimensions. So far, however, none of these techniques was able to evolve into a “gold standard” in party positioning. Against this background, one could recently witness the appearance of a new methodology for party positioning tightly connected to the spread of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs), i.e. an iterative method that aims at improving existing techniques using a combination of party self-placement and expert judgement. Such a method, as pioneered by the Dutch Kieskompas, was first systematically employed on a large cross-national scale by the EU Profiler VAA in the context of the 2009 European Parliamentary elections. This article introduces the party placement datasets generated by euandi (reads: EU and I), a transnational VAA for the 2014 EP elections. The scientific relevance of the euandi endeavour lies primarily in its choice to stick to the iterative method of party positioning employed by the EU Profiler in 2009 as well as in the choice to keep as many as 17 policy statements in the 2014 questionnaire in order to allow for cross-national, longitudinal research on party competition in Europe across a five-year period. This article provides a brief review of traditional methods of party positioning and contrasts them to the iterative method employed by the euandi team. It then introduces the specifics of the project, facts and figures of the data collection procedure, and the details of the resulting dataset encompassing 242 parties from the whole EU28.

Excessive Pharmaceutical Pricing as an Abuse of Dominant Position – The Case of CD Pharma (Denmark)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Behrang Kianzad
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Pharmaceutical Market ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Pharmaceutical Pricing ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Abstract On 31 January 2018, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority adopted a decision1 finding the Swedish company generic distributor CD Pharma in breach of Art. 102(a) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by abusing its dominant position and having imposed excessive and unfair prices for the drug Syntocinon. The company increased the price of the drug by 2000% in the period April-October 2014 in the Danish pharmaceutical market. CD Pharma appealed to the Danish Competition Appeals Board,2 which on 29 November 2018 upheld the decision by the Authority. On subsequent appeal to the Danish Maritime and Commercial Court,3 the judgment by the previous court was upheld in a 3-2 decision on 2 March 2020, thus finding CD Pharma liable for infringement of Danish competition law as well as Art. 102(a) TFEU. The decision is final and not subject to further appeal. The case raises outstanding legal-economic issues regarding excessive pricing such as relevant market definition in pharmaceutical cases, the length of abuse, competitive price benchmarks, definition of economic value and the matter of dominance in public procurement and tenders. The case is rather unusual in that the alleged abusive period amounted to a six-month period, CD Pharma was the ‘losing’ party in the bidding process for the supply of the medicine in question, and CD Pharma subsequently had reduced prices through negotiations with the Danish central medicine procurer, Amgros. Similar to the Aspen Pharma decision4 by the Italian Competition Authority, where the Italian Medicine Agency (AIFA) reported the case to the Competition Authority, it was the Danish medicine procurer Amgros who had notified the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority about allegedly abusive practices. This subsequently led to an investigation and the adoption of the Decision. Following an introduction describing the Danish pharmaceutical market and specifics of the case, section two of this contribution details the proceedings at Danish Competition Authority. Section three depicts the proceedings at Competition Appeals Tribunal, and section four deals with the proceedings at the Maritime and Commercial Court. Section five concludes.

scholarly journals Digital Economy, Big Data and Competition Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-89
Author(s):  
Roberto Augusto Castellanos Pfeiffer
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Data Driven ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Privacy Concerns ◽  
Sense Data ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Big data has a very important role in the digital economy, because firms have accurate tools to collect, store, analyse, treat, monetise and disseminate voluminous amounts of data. Companies have been improving their revenues with information about the behaviour, preferences, needs, expectations, desires and evaluations of their consumers. In this sense, data could be considered as a productive input. The article focuses on the current discussion regarding the possible use of competition law and policy to address privacy concerns related to big data companies. The most traditional and powerful tool to deal with privacy concerns is personal data protection law. Notwithstanding, the article examines whether competition law should play an important role in data-driven markets where privacy is a key factor. The article suggests a new approach to the following antitrust concepts in cases related to big data platforms: assessment of market power, merger notification thresholds, measurement of merger effects on consumer privacy, and investigation of abuse of dominant position. In this context, the article analyses decisions of competition agencies which reviewed mergers in big data-driven markets, such as Google/DoubleClick, Facebook/ WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn. It also reviews investigations of alleged abuse of dominant position associated with big data, in particular the proceeding opened by the Bundeskartellamt against Facebook, in which the German antitrust authority prohibited the data processing policy imposed by Facebook on its users. The article concludes that it is important to harmonise the enforcement of competition, consumer and data protection polices in order to choose the proper way to protect the users of dominant platforms, maximising the benefits of the data-driven economy.

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