Distribution in Benefit-Cost Analysis: A Review of Theoretical Issues

1976 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Hettich

The paper investigates the distributional basis for benefit-cost analysis when utility functions are independent. The change in utility for any individual caused by a given project can be written as the product of the marginal utility of income (Λ) and the income equivalent (measured by the appropriate area under the demand curve). Three theoretical positions are possible to deal with the distributional issue. First, one may assume Λ to be the same for all those affected by the project. A second position admits that Λ is dependent on income and tries to determine how different people view their own marginal utilities of income. Finally, it is possible to define the marginal utility of income in terms of social value judgments. This requires a social welfare function which reflects either the collectivity's expressed consensus or the decision maker's own set of judgments. The first approach is most commonly adopted and most convenient for actual analysis. The paper advocates more explicit analysis of distributional effects than is commonly undertaken and disputes the claim that such analysis is outside the professional realm of the economist.

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Posner ◽  
E. Glen Weyl

Calls for benefit-cost analysis in rule-making, based on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, have revealed a paucity of work on allocative efficiency in financial markets. We propose three principles to help fill this gap. First, we highlight the need for quantifying the statistical cost of a crisis to trade off the risk of a crisis against loss of growth during good times. Second, we propose a framework quantifying the social value of price discovery, and highlighting which arbitrages are over- and under-supplied from a social perspective. Finally, we distinguish between insurance benefits and gambling-facilitation harms of market completion.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Daniel Acland

Abstract Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is typically defined as an implementation of the potential Pareto criterion, which requires inclusion of any impact for which individuals have willingness to pay (WTP). This definition is incompatible with the exclusion of impacts such as rights and distributional concerns, for which individuals do have WTP. I propose a new definition: BCA should include only impacts for which consumer sovereignty should govern. This is because WTP implicitly preserves consumer sovereignty, and is thus only appropriate for ‘sovereignty-warranting’ impacts. I compare the high cost of including non-sovereignty-warranting impacts to the relatively low cost of excluding sovereignty-warranting impacts.


Author(s):  
Charles B. Moss ◽  
Andrew Schmitz

Abstract The question of how to allocate scarce agricultural research and development dollars is significant for developing countries. Historically, benefit/cost analysis has been the standard for comparing the relative benefits of alternative investments. We examine the potential of shifting the implicit equal weights approach to benefit/cost analysis, as well as how a systematic variation in welfare weights may affect different groups important to policy makers. For example, in the case of Rwandan coffee, a shift in the welfare weights that would favor small coffee producers in Rwanda over foreign consumers of Rwandan coffee would increase the support for investments in small producer coffee projects. Generally, changes in welfare weights alter the ordering for selecting investments across alternative projects.


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