scholarly journals How have EU ‘fire-fighters’ sought to douse the flames of the eurozone’s fast- and slow-burning crises? The 2013 structural funds reform

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 540-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramona Coman

This article examines the debates surrounding the Regulation 1303/2013 on structural funds, arguing that the rules adopted in the midst of the eurozone crisis to strengthen the governance of the euro area had spill-over effects on cohesion policy. It shows how, in the fast-burning phase of the crisis (2010–2013), some actors pushed forward the idea of suspending structural funds in case of non-compliance with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, making funding conditional on Member States’ compliance with the rules of the new economic governance, and how, after the entry into force of this Regulation, in the slow-burning phase of the crisis (from 2013 onwards), a greater number of actors has been calling for a more flexible interpretation of the rules. To explain the disruption between t1 and t2, the article examines the change in the power relations between and within institutions and the change in ideas.

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (125) ◽  
pp. 637-648
Author(s):  
Hansjörg Herr

The terrorattack hit the western world in a situation of a sharp cyclical downturn in the USA, Europe and Japan. Mainly because of increased uncertainty the downturn will be intensified by the attack. Immediately after the attack US monetary and fiscal policy became even more expansive. In Europe monetary policy reacted very reluctantly. Active fiscal policy in the Euro-area is nearly not existing as the Stability and Growth Pact as well as neo-liberal ideology prevents fiscal measures. The inactive economic policy in the Euro-area is not only dangerous for Europe but also a depressing factor for the world economy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 239 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 861-894
Author(s):  
Christophe Kamps ◽  
Nadine Leiner-Killinger

Abstract This paper reviews how the European Union’s fiscal rules have developed from the Maastricht Treaty that established the single monetary policy up until today. It shows that the design of these rules did not always follow economic logic but often resulted from political constraints, giving rise to some flaws in the framework from its very beginning. At the same time, the repeated attempts to adjust the fiscal framework to a multitude of circumstances over the past 25 years have made it overly complex and incoherent. Based on a finding that euro area countries’ compliance with the EU fiscal rules has been unsatisfactory, the paper concludes that in its current shape the Stability and Growth Pact is an insufficient disciplining device in good economic times, with the consequence that there are no fiscal buffers, in particular in high-debt countries, such that growth can be supported in economic troughs. Based on this finding, the paper reviews reform options for making the fiscal framework more effective in bringing about sounder public finances and avoiding the pro-cyclicality observed over the past two decades.


2000 ◽  
Vol 174 ◽  
pp. 92-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Buti ◽  
Bertrand Martinot

Now that the budget deficits in the Euro Area are approaching balance, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) looks like a largely non-constraining institutional framework with little impact on national fiscal policies. This article challenges this view and argues that the implementation of the SGP ‘at cruising speed’ is faced with a number of outstanding issues: safeguarding the automatic stabilisers under the SGP; coping with the consequences of the asymmetric nature of the SGP for the co-ordination of macroeconomic policies; and ensuring the long-run sustainability of public finances. It concludes that enlarging the scope and enhancing the credibility of the stability and convergence programmes to become a true instrument of fiscal policy coordination in the Euro Area would be a first step in lifting the uncertainties surrounding the implementation of the SGP.


Significance This follows the submission by euro-area countries of their 2016 draft budgetary plans (DBPs), in compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The Commission will release its judgements by end-November. DBPs can be deemed 'compliant', 'broadly compliant' or 'at risk of non-compliance'. Impacts Under October 21 plans, the Commission will pursue more transparency for economic forecasts and surveillance decisions. The ongoing recovery and the Commission's flexible approach will support fiscal consolidation efforts. Submission of Portugal's DBP remains subject to the fate of newly reappointed centre-right Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho. The Spanish government will have to submit a revised budget following the Commission's early judgement in its case.


2009 ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Carlo Panico ◽  
Vŕzquez Suŕrez Marta

The paper deals with the problems of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies in the Euro area. It examines how the existing institutions handle these problems and how the literature evaluates their working, deriving from these evaluations a proposal to reorganise them. The paper points out that there is a need for coordination between monetary and fiscal policies when both cyclical (short-run) and structural (long-run) problems are dealt with. Then it assesses how coordination is carried out under the existing institutional arrangements and identifies which parts of them, according to the existing literature, are in need of modification. Finally, on the basis of the content of this literature, it formulates a proposal to reform the institutional arrangements and the economic content of the Stability and Growth Pact, which aims at making them work effectively.


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