How do institutional constraints affect judicial decision-making? The European Court of Justice’s French language mandate

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sivaram Cheruvu
ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla M Zoethout

AbstractOver the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) seems more and more inclined to use foreign sources of law, that is to say, law that does not originate in the Convention itself or in one of the Member States of the Council of Europe. Unlike in the US, there is little discussion in Europe about this form of judicial dialogue in the case-law of the ECtHR. This paper seeks both to clarify transnational dialogue by the ECtHR and find ways to justify this practice, against the backdrop of the American debate on this topic. First, the concept of transnational judicial dialogue is analysed (Part II). Then judicial dialogue as it presents itself in the judgments of the ECtHR is assessed, especially when non-Convention or foreign law is being used in a substantive way (Part III). Subsequently, an attempt is made to define when and why the use of foreign law by the ECtHR can be considered a justifiable approach in judicial decision-making (Part IV). The paper rounds off with some concluding remarks (Part V).


2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jocelynne Scutt

Rights of assembly and freedom of speech are a rich ground for decision-making by police, prosecutors and courts in determining a balance with obligations of authorities to keep the peace and prevail against disorderly conduct or riot. Recent claims of abuse of police powers through “kettling” have reached the European Court of Justice. These cases directly address the scope and exercise of police authority in maintaining order during demonstrations. Yet not only police powers are in issue at times of political disputation. Two cases heard early last century by the Australian High Court illustrate the way in which both the decision to prosecute and judicial decision-making may be influenced by socio-political considerations, particularly in time of war. Pankhurst v Porter and Pankhurst v Kiernan saw Adela Pankhurst, youngest daughter in the redoubtable Pankhurst family of Suffragette fame, testing the limits of the law during the struggles to ensure that sending wheat abroad to feed the troops would not justify pricing bread out of the reach of ordinary, working-class households. The success of the appeal in Pankhurst v Porter exposed error in the prosecutorial process. The failure of the appeal in Pankhurst v Kiernan exposed flawed reasoning in the majority opinion and the strength of the dissenting judgment in it’s application of the law to the facts and the need to maintain objectivity or at least neutrality as to the particular appellant.


Author(s):  
Jean-Paul Costa

The chapter first gives several examples of where ‘dignity’ (or ‘a person’s dignity’, or ‘human dignity’) has been a central element in the reasoning of the Court, or in the arguments advanced by judges in separate opinions. Based on this analysis, the principal question addressed is why the Court draws on ‘dignity’, a word neither explicitly nor, implicitly mentioned in the text of the Convention or the Protocols. What are the reasons for having—or not having—recourse to the concept of dignity in judicial decisions? Is there any objective reason for such choice? Or does it depend on the subjective preferences of the judges sitting on the bench? Is ‘dignity’ necessary for judicial decision-making in order to reach a specific conclusion in a case? Or does ‘dignity’ simply reinforce the legal reasoning of the Court, enabling the Court to give more weight to the arguments of one of the parties in the case? Finally, the chapter looks for a possible conceptual link between human dignity and human rights, insofar as this arises from the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ◽  
Chris Guthrie ◽  
Andrew J. Wistrich

Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Claire Hamilton

Abstract The changes to the Irish exclusionary rule introduced by the judgment in People (DPP) v JC mark an important watershed in the Irish law of evidence and Irish legal culture more generally. The case relaxed the exclusionary rule established in People (DPP) v Kenny, one of the strictest in the common law world, by creating an exception based on ‘inadvertence’. This paper examines the decision through the lens of legal culture, drawing in particular on Lawrence Friedman's distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ legal culture to help understand the factors contributing to the decision. The paper argues that Friedman's concept and, in particular, the dialectic between internal and external legal culture, holds much utility at a micro as well as macro level, in interrogating the cultural logics at work in judicial decision-making.


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