scholarly journals Zero Undocumented Population Growth is Here to Stay and Immigration Reform Would Preserve and Extend These Gains

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 491-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Warren

This report demonstrates that a broad and sustained reduction in undocumented immigration to the United States occurred in the 2008 to 2015 period. First, the report shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Great Recession had little, if any, role in the transformation to zero population growth. The population stopped growing because of increased scrutiny of air travel after 9/11, a decade and a half of accelerating efforts to reduce illegal entries across the southern border, long-term increases in the numbers leaving the population each year, and improved economic and demographic conditions in Mexico. These conditions are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. It is time to recognize that the era of large-scale undocumented population growth has ended, and that there is a need to reform the US legal immigration system to preserve and extend these gains (Kerwin and Warren 2017, 319–21). Major findings of the report include: • The recession did not reduce arrivals or accelerate departures from the undocumented population; it essentially had very little impact on population change.1 • Population growth was lower in 2008 to 2015 than in 2000 to 2008 for all major sending areas and for 13 of the top 15 countries of origin.2 • Population growth was lower in 2008 to 2015 than in 2000 to 2008 in all of the top 15 states. In 10 of the 15 top states, growth changed to decline. • Nearly twice as many left3 the undocumented population from Mexico than arrived in the 2008 to 2015 period — 1.7 million left the population and 900,000 arrived. • Almost twice as many overstays as persons who entered without inspection (EWIs) “arrived” (joined the undocumented population) from 2008 to 2015 — 2.0 million overstays compared to 1.1 million EWIs. • Overstays leave the undocumented population at higher rates than EWIs: about 1.9 million, or 40 percent, of overstays that lived in the United States in 2008 had left the undocumented population by 2015, compared to 1.6 million, or 24 percent, of EWIs. • The rate of overstays (65% of the newly undocumented), compared to EWIs, is more dramatic than the numbers indicate since estimates of the undocumented count Central American asylum seekers that cross the US southern border as EWIs.

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Warren

This report demonstrates that a broad and sustained reduction in undocumented immigration to the United States occurred in the 2008 to 2015 period. First, the report shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Great Recession had little, if any, role in the transformation to zero population growth. The population stopped growing because of increased scrutiny of air travel after 9/11, a decade and a half of accelerating efforts to reduce illegal entries across the southern border, long-term increases in the numbers leaving the population each year, and improved economic and demographic conditions in Mexico. These conditions are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. It is time to recognize that the era of large-scale undocumented population growth has ended, and that there is a need to reform the US legal immigration system to preserve and extend these gains (Kerwin and Warren 2017, 319-21). Major findings of the report include:   The recession did not reduce arrivals or accelerate departures from the undocumented population; it essentially had very little impact on population change.[1]Population growth was lower in 2008 to 2015 than in 2000 to 2008 for all major sending areas and for 13 of the top 15 countries of origin.[2]Population growth was lower in 2008 to 2015 than in 2000 to 2008 in all of the top 15 states. In 10 of the 15 top states, growth changed to decline.Nearly twice as many left[3] the undocumented population from Mexico than arrived in the 2008 to 2015 period — 1.7 million left the population and 900,000 arrived.Almost twice as many overstays as persons who entered without inspection (EWIs) “arrived” (joined the undocumented population) from 2008 to 2015 — 2.0 million overstays compared to 1.1 million EWIs.Overstays leave the undocumented population at higher rates than EWIs: about 1.9 million, or 40 percent, of overstays that lived in the United States in 2008 had left the undocumented population by 2015, compared to 1.6 million, or 24 percent, of EWIs.The rate of overstays (65% of the newly undocumented), compared to EWIs, is more dramatic than the numbers indicate since estimates of the undocumented count Central American asylum seekers that cross the US southern border as EWIs.[1] The term “population” in this paper refers to the undocumented population, both persons who have stayed in the United States beyond the period of their temporary admission (“overstays”) and those who entered without inspection (EWIs).[2] In this paper, the terms “2000 to 2008 period” and “2008 to 2015 period” are not overlapping; they are used for ease of presentation. Estimates for the two time periods are based on data for 2000, 2008, and 2015. Technically, the earlier period is for 2000 through 2007 (eight years), and the latter period is for 2008 through 2014 (seven years).[3] Undocumented residents can leave the population in four ways: emigrate voluntarily, adjust to lawful status, be removed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or (a relatively small number) die.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Kerwin ◽  
Robert Warren

The conventional wisdom holds that the only point of consensus in the fractious US immigration debate is that the system is broken. Yet, the US public has consistently expressed a desire for a legal and orderly immigration system that serves compelling national interests. This paper describes how to create such a system. It focuses on the cornerstone of immigration reform,1 the legal immigration system,2 and addresses the widespread belief that broad reform will incentivize illegal migration and ultimately lead to another large undocumented population. The paper begins with an analysis of presidential signing statements on seminal immigration legislation over nearly a century. These statements reveal broad consensus on the interests and values that the United States seeks to advance through its immigration and refugee policies. They constitute additional common ground in the immigration debate. To serve these interests, immigration and refugee considerations must be “mainstreamed” into other policy processes. In addition, its policies will be more successful if they are seen to benefit or, at least, not to discriminate against migrant-sending states. Not surprisingly, the US immigration system does not reflect the vast, mostly unanticipated changes in the nation and the world since Congress last meaningfully reformed this system (27 years ago) and last overhauled the law (52 years ago). The paper does not detail the well-documented ways that US immigration laws fall short of serving the nation's economic, family, humanitarian, and rule of law objectives. Nor does it propose specific changes in categories and levels of admission. Rather, it describes how a legal immigration system might be broadly structured to deliver on its promises. In particular, it makes the case that Congress should create a flexible system that serves compelling national interests, allows for real time adjustments in admission based on evidence and independent analysis, and vests the executive with appropriate discretion in administering the law. The paper also argues that the United States should anticipate and accommodate the needs of persons compelled to migrate by its military, trade, development, and other commitments. In addition, the US immigration system needs to be able to distinguish between undocumented immigrants, and refugees and asylum seekers, and to treat these two populations differently. The paper assumes that there will be continued bipartisan support for immigration enforcement. However, even with a strong enforcement apparatus in place and an adaptable, coherent, evidence-based legal immigration system that closely aligns with US interests, some (reduced) level of illegal migration will persist. The paper offers a sweeping, historical analysis of how this population emerged, why it has grown and contracted, and how estimates of its size have been politically exploited. Legalization is often viewed as the third rail of immigration reform. Yet, Congress has regularly legalized discrete undocumented populations, and the combination of a well-structured legalization program, strengthened legal immigration system, and strong enforcement policies can prevent the reemergence of a large-scale undocumented population. In contrast, the immense US enforcement apparatus will work at cross-purposes to US interests and values, absent broader reform. The paper ends with a series of recommendations to reform the legal immigration system, downsize the current undocumented population, and ensure its permanent reduction. It proposes that the United States “reissue” (or reuse) the visas of persons who emigrate, as a way to promote legal immigration reform without significantly increasing annual visa numbers.


Author(s):  
Rickie Solinger

What is the state of population growth in the United States today, and how is it affected by immigration? According to the 2010 census, the US population has grown 9.7 percent (adding about 27 million people, including about 13 million immigrants) during the past...


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Charlie Laderman

This introductory chapter outlines why the American response to the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians offers such critical insights into the US rise to world power, its evolving relationship with Britain, and the development of ideas on humanitarian intervention and global order at the turn of the twentieth century. It introduces the Armenian question, setting it within the larger Eastern question, and explains why the Ottoman Empire became a target for outside intervention by the European great powers in the nineteenth century. It explains why the United States, which had traditionally avoided political entanglement in the Near East even while its missionaries established an exceptional role there, began to take a greater interest in the region as its emergence as a great power coincided with the first large-scale Armenian massacres.


1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 725-730 ◽  
Author(s):  
M-Françoise Hall

There are numerous reasons why Latin Americans do not place a high priority on the control of their hitherto unprecedented rate of population growth. Some of these are known and discussed at length in the United States. Others seem more difficult for us to understand. They are usually little discussed and if they are, find little sympathy. This article focuses on these little discussed reasons. In order to improve communications between our nation and Latin America, it is important that we see population growth and its meaning as it appears to Latin Americans for whom the implications of large-scale demographically-effective family planning programs are very different from our own.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 599-603 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colton Margus ◽  
Ritu R. Sarin ◽  
Michael Molloy ◽  
Gregory R. Ciottone

AbstractIntroduction:In 2009, the Institute of Medicine published guidelines for implementation of Crisis Standards of Care (CSC) at the state level in the United States (US). Based in part on the then concern for H1N1 pandemic, there was a recognized need for additional planning at the state level to maintain health system preparedness and conventional care standards when available resources become scarce. Despite the availability of this framework, in the years since and despite repeated large-scale domestic events, implementation remains mixed.Problem:Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) rejuvenates concern for how health systems can maintain quality care when faced with unrelenting burden. This study seeks to outline which states in the US have developed CSC and which areas of care have thus far been addressed.Methods:An online search was conducted for all 50 states in 2015 and again in 2020. For states without CSC plans online, state officials were contacted by email and phone. Public protocols were reviewed to assess for operational implementation capabilities, specifically highlighting guidance on ventilator use, burn management, sequential organ failure assessment (SOFA) score, pediatric standards, and reliance on influenza planning.Results:Thirty-six states in the US were actively developing (17) or had already developed (19) official CSC guidance. Fourteen states had no publicly acknowledged effort. Eleven of the 17 public plans had updated within five years, with a majority addressing ventilator usage (16/17), influenza planning (14/17), and pediatric care (15/17), but substantially fewer addressing care for burn patients (9/17).Conclusion:Many states lacked publicly available guidance on maintaining standards of care during disasters, and many states with specific care guidelines had not sufficiently addressed the full spectrum of hazard to which their health care systems remain vulnerable.


Author(s):  
Robert Warren ◽  
Donald Kerwin

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); Its inability to meet the administration’s goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one- third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.  


Author(s):  
J. Yu. Parshkova

The article reflects the US officials' point of view on the development of its national missile defense. The major threat to international security is the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the former Soviet Union made huge efforts to reduce and limit offensive arms. However, presently the proliferation of ballistic missiles spreads all over the world, especially in the Middle East, because of the ballistic missile technology falling into the hands of hostile non-state groups. Missile defenses can provide a permanent presence in a region and discourage adversaries from believing they can use ballistic missiles to coerce or intimidate the U.S. or its allies. With the possible attack regional missile defense systems will be promptly mobilized to enhance an effective deterrent. The ultimate goal of such large-scale missile defense deployment is to convince the adversaries that the use of ballistic missiles is useless in military terms and that any attack on the United States and its allies is doomed to failure. The United States has missile defense cooperative programs with a number of allies, including United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Israel, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and many others. The Missile Defense Agency also actively participates in NATO activities to maximize opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability. The initiative of the development of US BMD naturally belongs to the United States. That country has enormous technological, financial, economic, military and institutional capabilities, exceeding by far those of the other NATO members combined.


Subject Mexico is becoming a buffer zone for thousands of US-bound Central American migrants. Significance Since a surge of undocumented minors arrived at the US border in 2014, the United States and Mexico have developed a strategy of coordinated containment aimed at stemming migrant flows. However, within four months of President Enrique Pena Nieto's announcement of a Southern Border Programme (PFS) on July 7, 2014, detentions of undocumented Central American migrants in Mexico almost doubled, suggesting that the wave is not ebbing, but is instead being held back in Mexico. Impacts Mexico's strong record of migrant detentions and deportations is unlikely to stem the flow. The varied causes of the migration tide raise doubts about the viability of US-Mexico containment strategies. A lack of focus on multilateral migration frameworks will increase the risk of humanitarian crises.


2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Bellman ◽  
Seth E. Spielman ◽  
Rachel S. Franklin

While population growth has been consistently tied to decreasing racial segregation at the metropolitan level in the United States, little work has been done to relate small-scale changes in population size to integration. We address this question through a novel technique that tracks population changes by race and ethnicity for comparable geographies in both 2000 and 2010. Using the Theil index, we analyze the fifty most populous metropolitan statistical areas in 2010 for changes in multigroup segregation. We classify local areas by their net population change between 2000 and 2010 using a unique unit of analysis based on aggregating census blocks. We find strong evidence that growing parts of rapidly growing metropolitan areas of the United States are crucial to understanding regional differences in segregation that have emerged in past decades. Multigroup segregation declined the most in growing parts of growing metropolitan areas. Comparatively, growing parts of shrinking or stagnant metropolitan areas were less diverse and had smaller declines in segregation. We also find that local areas with shrinking populations had disproportionately high minority representation in 2000 before population loss took place. We conclude that the regional context of population growth or decline has important consequences for the residential mixing of racial groups.


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