scholarly journals The Treatment of Criminals

1901 ◽  
Vol 47 (198) ◽  
pp. 553-554

We have reprinted an address lately given to the Society of Comparative Legislation by Mr. Crackenthorpe, K.C., convinced that it will be of interest to our readers. The Lord Chief Justice stated that he noted a great change as to ideas as to prison treatment during the last few years, and never was the readiness to seek light from all quarters more marked than at present. It is remarkable that the discussion did not deal with responsibility and insanity, a question so often raised in connection with the treatment of criminals. The time is at hand when the present rule must be changed; the inequalities in administration resulting from the judge's answer in the McNaughten case are yearly becoming less marked, and should be swept aside by an authoratative reconsideration of the law in the light of later knowledge.

2019 ◽  
pp. 22-151
Author(s):  
Sudhanshu Ranjan

Judges are not above the law. Like the other institutions of the State, the judiciary must be accountable. Chief Justice Edward Coke told King James I point blank that was not above the law and quoted jurist Bracton, Non-sub homine sed sub deo et lege. (The King is under no man, save under God and the law.) Ironically, judges themselves don’t appear to be following this dictum giving an impression that they are above the law. The judiciary should be accountable according to its own reasonings employed for holding all other institutions to account. But it abhors the idea of accountability for itself in the name of its independence. It is a misnomer as independence and accountability are complementary, not antagonistic.


Social Change ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 004908572095775
Author(s):  
Pallavi Gupta ◽  
Nikhat Fatima ◽  
Sandeep Kandikuppa

Despite a law against sexual harassment of women at the workplace, persons holding high offices, including senior judges, seem to enjoy impunity. By critically examining the allegations made against Justice Ranjan Gogoi (retd), former Chief Justice of India, and analysing five other cases of sexual harassment, we highlight how women are routinely denied justice. In doing so, we ask: are women actually able to file complaints of sexual harassment without the fear of facing a backlash? And do they ultimately get justice when they do so? We argue that the implementation of the law against sexual harassment is mediated by caste, class and gender, both of the survivor and of the perpetrator. We point to a changing polity that makes laws, guarantees and protections for women, but stumbles in implementing them in a fair and non-arbitrary manner.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kearns

This essay argues that the 1675 conviction of John Taylor by the Court of King's Bench for slandering God reveals Chief Justice Matthew Hale implementing a model of conjoint law-making between courts, Parliament, and crown that gave pre-eminent power to the common lawyers, and none to the Church of England. In doing so, it counters the prevailing literature on Restoration English law, which has treated the law as hierarchical, with the common lawyers subordinate to the sovereign. Rather than following statute or ecclesiastical law, which emphasised the spiritual nature of crimes like Taylor's, Hale located Taylor's offence in the exclusively temporal common law jurisdiction of defamation, which existed largely outside of monarchical purview. Hale's judgment reflected his rhetoric of judicial office outside the courtroom, where he argued the judiciary worked alongside King and Parliament in making law, but were not subservient to these institutions, for common lawyers relied on sources of law beyond sovereign-made statute. The language of sovereignty as hierarchical was thus a factional attack on an independent common law, an attempt to subordinate the common lawyers to the crown that was resisted by the lawyers like Hale in his rhetoric and exercise of office, and should not ground accounts of the Restoration regime.


1997 ◽  
Vol 4 (21) ◽  
pp. 700-708 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conrad Russell

In October 1993, I had to decide whether it was proper for me, as an unbeliever, to go to Parliament to vote in favour of a Church of England measure. Was it proper that laymen, not members of the church, not involved in the decisions taken, should be allowed to sit in Parliament to decide what the law of the church should be? After some discussion, I was persuaded it was proper, and cast my vote accordingly. In that decision, I recognized the triumph of one version of the Royal Supremacy over another. It is the triumph of Christopher St. German over Bishop Stephen Gardiner, of Sir Francis Knollys over Queen Elizabeth I, of Chief Justice Coke over Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, and of John Pym over Archbishop Laud. That triumph took a century to arrive after Henry VIII's Act of Supremacy, and, like many other triumphs, it threw out a promising baby with its mess of popish bath-water.


1995 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 843-873 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lois G. Schwoerer

ABSTRACTGenerally dismissed by historians as just an hysterical gesture by parliamentary whig leaders disappointed and angered over the failure of the second Exclusion Bill, the attempted impeachment in 1680–1 of Sir William Scroggs was in fact a complicated and important affair. Although a failure in legal terms (because King Charles dissolved two parliaments), it succeeded in political terms when the king dismissed Scroggs. A propaganda ploy to embarrass the duke of York and also the king of England, re-unite the whig party, and re-ignite anti-popery fervour to promote another try at Exclusion (contrary to recent revisionism), the proceedings provoked discussion of many central issues, but most importantly of the legislative authority of parliament, or control of the law; the affair provoked a ‘crisis of authority’. Print culture played an unprecedented role: four of the eight articles of impeachment against Scroggs were connected with the press. Press people, in effect, brought down a chief minister of the crown and severely embarrassed the government, an event of signal importance in the history of the press.


1905 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 493
Author(s):  
D. L. Patterson
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Edward Chukwuemeke Okeke

This chapter examines the historical development of State immunity, from the absolute to the restrictive doctrine that distinguishes between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis. The provenance of the law on the jurisdictional immunity of States is widely held to be the case of Schooner Exchange. Although Schooner Exchange is, generally but not quite accurately, regarded as the authoritative anchor for the classical doctrine of absolute State immunity, Chief Justice Marshall saw immunity as an exception to the absolute jurisdiction of a State within its own territory. The chapter also examines the rationale of State immunity, which is based on the three major attributes of statehood: independence, sovereign equality, and dignity. The sovereignty of a State encompasses its jurisdiction over people and property within its territory. State immunity is a derogation of that jurisdiction. A major justification for State immunity is facilitation of international relations in conformity with international law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document