Self Rescue Model-SeReMo-a model to determine the effects of human behaviour and safety measures on the consequences of a hazard ous material release-development of the new triage injury model and self-rescue for fire and explosion accidents

2013 ◽  
pp. 483-489
Author(s):  
I Trijssenaar ◽  
M van der Horst ◽  
M Simons ◽  
R Sterkenburg
2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 516-523
Author(s):  
Marzena Półka ◽  
Bożena Kukfisz

The purpose of this article is to present fire and explosion properties of acetylene, the requirements for storing and transporting this gas, and to present the results of tests conducted on single acetylene cylinders and on cylinder bundles. Hazardous area coverage during rescue operations involving acetylene cylinders in open areas should be at least 300 m. Care must be taken when handling rescue operations and all available safety measures should be used.


Author(s):  
Asmund Huser ◽  
Luiz Fernando Oliveira ◽  
Joar Dalheim

An improved procedure for optimization of flammable gas detector systems in process plant modules is presented in the paper. The main features of the new procedure are that it uses a detailed explosion Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) model to obtain the risk reducing effects of applying more gas detectors; and it uses detailed transient Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulations to assess the most effective locations of the gas detectors. This results in a cost optimized solution which gives the minimum fire and explosion risk, at the lowest cost. A field example is included where it is indicated that with the optimal number of gas detectors, the total costs of fire and explosion accidents are reduced by 18% compared to having no gas detection system at all.


2004 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshitomo Inaba ◽  
Tetsuo Nishihara ◽  
Yoshikazu Nitta

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
pp. 396-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vytenis Babrauskas

On 17 April 2013, the West Fertilizer Company’s ammonium nitrate storage building exploded, killing 15 persons and injuring over 200. Numerous Federal and State agencies regulated the facility. But none of the agencies demonstrated a viable understanding of what is liable to cause accidental ammonium nitrate explosions, nor what is needed to prevent these. Specifically, none of them recognized the fact that ammonium nitrate fertilizer explosion accidents, when they occur, are inevitably the consequence of an uncontrolled fire and that such fires can be precluded by well-known fire safety measures. In fact, existing regulations have generally focused on everything but features needed to make such storage facilities incapable of sustaining an uncontrolled fire. Ammonium nitrate manufacturers, however, did have technical knowledge concerning safety and were aware of the ineffectiveness of governmental regulations. Espousing proper Product Stewardship principles by the manufacturers would have precluded selling dangerous chemicals to buyers who cannot safely store them.


2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miao Zhang ◽  
Wenhua Song ◽  
Zhen Chen ◽  
Ji Wang

2021 ◽  
Vol 261 ◽  
pp. 03055
Author(s):  
Kezhen Chen ◽  
Jihong Ye ◽  
Xiaofeng Zhang ◽  
Qingqing Lv

In order to explore the basic events and risk occurrence probability of fire and explosion accidents in CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) filling station, a corresponding Bayesian network risk model was established based on the fault tree of filling station. The prior probability was modified by introducing fuzzy mathematics in the process of transforming the fault tree into Bayesian network, and the posterior probability of the basic events of CNG filling station fire and explosion accidents was analyzed and calculated by GeNIe software. Finally, through case analysis, it is found out that the most dangerous factors that lead to the greatest risk of fire and explosion accidents in a filling station are: personnel misoperation, management defects, etc. After verifying the model, it shows that paying attention to the polymorphism of the base events and determining the rationality of the logical relationship between the base events can calculate the more accurate probability distribution of the base events, and at the same time provide reasonable suggestions for the accident prevention of the gas filling station.


2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (11) ◽  
pp. 3990-4006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Ji ◽  
Qi Tong ◽  
Faisal Khan ◽  
Mohammad Dadashzadeh ◽  
Rouzbeh Abbassi

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mengmeng Chen ◽  
Kai Wang ◽  
Haijun Guo ◽  
Yingfeng Yuan

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 844
Author(s):  
Young-Joong Ahn ◽  
Yong-Ung Yu ◽  
Jong-Kwan Kim

Fire and explosion accidents occur frequently in tankers because they transport large quantities of dangerous cargo. To prevent fire and explosion accidents, it is necessary to analyze factors that cause accidents and their effects. In this study, factors that cause fire and explosion accidents were classified using the 4M disaster analysis method, and each factor’s effect on the accident was analyzed using fault tree analysis (FTA). First, the unsafe tank atmosphere environment was identified as a primary cause of fire and explosion accidents in tankers, and the underlying causes of these accidents were investigated. The probability of underlying causes leading to primary causes was derived using an expert survey. The results showed that management and media factors had a greater impact on the unsafe tank atmosphere environment than human factors. To prevent fire and explosion accidents, it is necessary to ensure sufficient working and resting times for seafarers and compliance with procedures and work guidelines. A generalization of the results of present and future studies will enable the identification of the cause and preventive measures for fire and explosion accidents in tankers. Furthermore, this will reduce accidents in tankers and contribute to future safety management measures of ships and companies.


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