The Supreme Court, the Media, and the Uniform Civil Code Debate in India

2007 ◽  
pp. 294-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flavia Agnes
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 27-32
Author(s):  
V. K. Andreev ◽  

The article discusses the forms of clarification on matters of judicial practice by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, as well as in the Review of judicial practice on some issues of the application of legislation on business companies dated December 25, 2019. Clarifications of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on issues of judicial practice are characterized as the positions of the courts identified in the course of studying and summarizing the judicial practice of the corresponding category of cases, which are acts of individual regulation of public relations. Focusing on Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and Section 6, Art. 12 of the APC RF shows the validity of dividing wrong into two types of wrong: the «moderate» type of «judicial law-making and the position of the court» and the «radical» type of «judicial law-making», when the court develops the rule of law, which contradicts the constitutional principle of separation of powers. When resolving corporate disputes, it is necessary to investigate whether the charter of a non-public company does not contain the rights and obligations of its participants, which they themselves created by making a unanimous decision and including them in the charter of the company (paragraph 3 of Art. 66.3 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, paragraph 3 of Art. 14 of the Law about LLC).


Author(s):  
Anna Moskal

Does forgiveness nullify the effects of previous disinheritance? The legal nature of forgiveness is the subject of passionate debates among the representatives of civil law doctrine. According to the dominant position in the literature, forgiveness is an act of affection or its manifested expression of forgiveness of the perpetrator of experienced injustice and related to this grudge. This institution has been applied three times in the Civil Code — once with the donation agreement, twice in regulations of inheritance law. Article 1010 § 1 provides that a testator cannot disinherit eligible for legal portion if he forgave him. The wording of the above article indicates that accomplishment of disinheritance in case if testator eligible for legal portion has previously forgiven. The legislator did not, however, determine the effects of forgiveness in relation to previous disinheritance. In the act of 1971, the Supreme Court accepted that such forgiveness would automatically nullify the effects of disinheritance, and could be made in any form. In recent years, lower courts have begun to question the Supreme Court's position, and judges increasingly refer to the critical statements of numerous doctrines. As it was rightly stated, admitting the possibility of invoking the forgiveness made after disinheritance poses a serious threat to the realization of the testator’s will, who, by forgiving, does not necessarily want to revoke the effects of his previous disinheritance. The postulate of de lege ferenda is, according to the author of the article, giving of freedom of judging the effects of forgiveness to the courts and each examination of the forgiving testator’s will on the possible abatement of the consequences of previous disinheritance.]]>


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Diana Majury

In this paper, Diana Majury looks at the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent s.15 decision, R. v. Kapp, in a preliminary exploration of the different understandings of equality she sees operating in three different sites (the Supreme Court, equality advocates, and the general public). She looks at the first two sites simultaneously by offering her equality advocate’s critique of the Kapp decision, outlining where the decision falls short of the substantive equality that equality advocates have been theorizing and promoting. She then looks at media responses to the decision, responses that almost unanimously present a formal equality understanding of equality. Recognizing that media coverage provides only a very limited and partial window on public perceptions, the media coverage of Kapp nonetheless raises the spectre that the general public understands equality only to mean formal equality. This conclusion highlights the importance of Rose Vyovodic’s work in combining equality and public education and the need for that work to be continued and expanded.Dans cet article, Diana Majury examine le récent jugement R. c. Kapp de la Cour Suprême du Canada en rapport avec l’article 15 pour faire une exploration préliminaire des compréhensions diverses de l’égalité qu’elle constate être en jeu dans trois lieux différents (la Cour Suprême, chez les défenseurs de l’égalité et chez le grand public). Elle examine les deux premiers lieux simultanément en présentant sa critique du jugement Kapp en tant que défenseure de l’égalité, exposant en quoi le jugement n’atteint pas l’égalité de fond au sujet de laquelle théorisent et que préconisent les défenseurs de l’égalité. Puis elle examine les réactions médiatiques au jugement, réactions qui présentent presque unanimement une compréhension d’égalité comme égalité formelle. Tout en reconnaissant que la couverture médiatique ne présente qu’une fenêtre très limitée et partielle sur les perceptions du public, la couverture médiatique de Kapp laisse tout de même pressentir que le grand public ne conçoit l’égalité que dans le sens d’égalité formelle. Cette conclusion fait ressortir l’importance de l’oeuvre de Rose Vyovodic qui combinait égalité et éducation du public et le besoin que cette oeuvre se poursuive et grandisse.


1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 736-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malvina Halberstam

In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of a U.S. court to try a Mexican national, charged with various counts of conspiracy, kidnaping and the murder of a U.S. drug enforcement agent in Mexico, even though his presence in the United States was the result of abduction rather than extradition pursuant to the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. The Court did not hold, as widely reported in the media, that the Treaty permits abduction, that abduction is legal, or that the United States had a right to kidnap criminal suspects abroad. On the contrary, the Court acknowledged that the abduction may have been a violation of international law. It stated, “Respondent and his amici may be correct that respondent’s abduction was ’shocking’ and that it may be in violation of general international law principles.”


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 218-221
Author(s):  
Brian Sloan

THE media were unsurprisingly interested when the Supreme Court considered the case of a poverty-stricken New Age traveller turned multi-millionaire whose former wife appeared years after divorce to claim a share of his subsequently acquired wealth (Vince v Wyatt [2015] UKSC 14). The case also raised an important point of legal principle.


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