scholarly journals History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elise Huillery

To what extent do colonial public investments continue to influence current regional inequalities in French-speaking West Africa? Using a new database and the spatial discontinuities of colonial investment policy, this paper gives evidence that early colonial investments had large and persistent effects on current outcomes. The nature of investments also matters. Current educational outcomes have been more specifically determined by colonial investments in education rather than health and infrastructures, and vice versa. I show that a major channel for this historical dependency is a strong persistence of investments; regions that got more at the early colonial times continued to get more. (JEL H41, H54, N37, N47, 016)

1967 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-333
Author(s):  
W. A. E. Skurnik

The term ‘balkanization’, as applied to colonial policy in Africa, frequently suggests a European ‘divide and rule’ policy, intended to fragment pre-existing African unity. An examination of the policy of France towards the former federation of French West Africa indicates that the term is inaccurate to describe French policy.The federation was created by the French for the French. It served to streamline French administration during the period of expansion, to help develop the component territories' economies, and to guarantee the security of French private investments. France conceived of the territories as the basic political units and hence modern political life was implanted there rather than in the federation. Post World War II French public investments flowed chiefly to the territories, common federal services were decentralized as territories acquired expertise and funds to run their own, and the quasi-federal Senate called the Grand Conseil was allowed to expire. Other aspects of French policy had unintended centrifugal effects, such as the metropolitan party structure and consequent dispersal of African representatives in Paris, and the influence of some French parties in Africa. Since 1956, France logically responded to African leaders' demands for more power and eventual autonomy in the territories, and left it to the Africans to decide whether or not to continue their federal relationship.By 1956, the federation had outlived its usefulness to France. It is improbable that the metropole could have ‘saved’ it, because political territorial roots were too strong, the Africans were not agreed, and relations between France and Africa had already become mainly bilateral with the territories directly. Consequently it appears that the federation, a purely French creation, was simply permitted to fade away once its functions were no longer relevant to French needs. It is true that France preferred eight small, powerless states to a strong federation when national independence approached, but ‘powerless’ and ‘strong’ in this context are but relative terms. The story of the federation of French West Africa suggests that such political structures can survive the colonial period only if they are anchored in fundamental African needs; this was not the case with that federation.


Author(s):  
Richard J McAlexander ◽  
Joan Ricart-Huguet

Abstract How do states respond to political resistance? The standard repression or concession logic presumes that the state is strong enough to punish or co-opt dissent effectively. Instead, we argue that the state may disengage when it is weak. We show that colonial governments in French West Africa reduced public investments in districts where chiefs engaged in largely nonviolent disobedience. However, we also show that chieftain disobedience reduced government taxes and fees on Africans, rather than increased them as punishment. Because the state was too weak to punish with higher taxation or to concede by increasing investments, the state disengaged in hard-to-rule districts. Our findings show that chieftain resistance helps explain why subnational development was so unequal during colonialism. Low-level and nonviolent resistance, often overlooked in the conflict literature, also affect state–society relations and state formation. ¿Cómo responden los estados a la resistencia política? La lógica convencional de represión o concesión presupone que el estado es lo suficientemente poderoso como para castigar o cooptar la disidencia de forma eficaz. Sin embargo, sostenemos que el estado puede desentenderse cuando es vulnerable. Demostramos que los gobiernos coloniales del África Occidental Francesa redujeron las inversiones públicas en los distritos en los que los jefes ejercían una desobediencia mayoritariamente no violenta. Sin embargo, también demostramos que la desobediencia de los caciques permitió reducir los impuestos y aranceles del gobierno sobre los africanos, en lugar de aumentarlos como castigo. Como el estado era demasiado vulnerable para castigar con mayores impuestos o para ceder aumentando las inversiones, el estado se desentendió de los distritos difíciles de gobernar. Nuestros resultados muestran que la resistencia de los dirigentes ayuda a explicar por qué el desarrollo de la región fue tan desigual durante el colonialismo. La resistencia no violenta y de bajo riesgo, que a menudo se ignora en la literatura sobre conflictos, también afecta a las relaciones entre el estado y la sociedad, y a la formación del estado. Comment les États réagissent-ils à la résistance politique ? La logique standard de répression ou de concession présume que l’État est suffisamment puissant pour sanctionner ou coopter efficacement la dissidence. Au lieu de cela, nous soutenons que l’État peut se désengager lorsqu'il est faible. Nous montrons que les gouvernements coloniaux de l'Afrique Occidentale Française réduisaient les investissements publics dans les districts où les chefs s'engageaient dans une désobéissance en grande partie non violente. Toutefois, nous montrons également que la désobéissance des chefs réduisait aussi les taxes et frais imposés aux Africains par le gouvernement plutôt que de les accroître en guise de sanction. Étant donné que l’État était trop faible pour sanctionner par une taxation plus élevée ou pour faire des concessions en augmentant les investissements, l’État s'est désengagé dans les districts difficiles à gouverner. Nos conclusions montrent que la résistance des chefs contribue à expliquer pourquoi le développement subnational a été aussi inégal durant le colonialisme. La résistance non violente et de faible intensité, souvent négligée dans la littérature sur les conflits, affecte également les relations entre État et société et la formation des États.


1960 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliot J. Berg

Africans in French Tropical Africa have recently been called on to make several farreaching political decisions. Two basic questions have been at issue: the nature of the relationship between France and the African territories, and the nature of relations between the African territories themselves. On the first question, the Referendum of September 28, 1958 on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic gave Africans the choice between total independence and internal autonomy within “The (French) Community.” With regard to their mutual relations, the territories which made up the federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa could remain tied together politically, or they could sever all formal political connections among themselves; in French African political terminology, the second issue has been whether or not the individual territories should form “primary federations.”The issue of total independence or internal autonomy within “The Community” was temporarily decided at the 1958 Referendum, when eleven of the twelve territories of French West and Equatorial Africa voted to remain with France, Guinea alone choosing immediate independence. Since then several members of “The Community” have initiated negotiations with France for the full transfer of sovereign powers to local African governments, and the indications are that all French-speaking West Africa will be fully independent within the near future.The outcome of the second question—political relations among the African territories–is not so clear. The trend up to now has been against the re-creation of primary federations.


1980 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Roberts ◽  
Martin A. Klein

One of the most important changes to take place during the early colonial period was the transformation from slave labour to free labour. In French West Africa this resulted not from a policy decision by the French administration but from the massive departure of slaves in those societies most reliant on slave labour. The focal event was an exodus from Banamba, a Maraka town which had been a major centre both of the slave trade and of the exploitation of slave labour. During the period before the Banamba exodus, tensions were building up within various slave societies, tensions that reflected themselves in a gradual filtering away of slaves and in occasional slave revolts. The French were generally afraid to deal with these tensions and limited themselves to stopping the slave trade while reinforcing allied élites, most of whom were slave owners. There were three major factors in the exodus:(1) Massive enslavement during the late nineteenth century created large reservoirs of slaves who were homogeneous and remembered a free state.(2) The closing-off of recruitment pushed slave-owners to exploit slave labour more systematically.(3) With the end of warfare and the opening of new opportunities in the cities and in the Senegambian peanut fields, slaves had increasing opportunities to go elsewhere.


2014 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 68-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieu Donné Gnonlonfoun ◽  
Constant Adjien ◽  
Paul Macaire Ossou-Nguiet ◽  
Isaac Avlessi ◽  
Gérald Goudjinou ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110363
Author(s):  
Olivier Jacques

When do political parties propose long-term investments? Electoral competitiveness should be a key variable explaining parties’ investment priorities: parties can be less responsive to voters’ short-term priorities and overcome time inconsistencies when they are more likely to win the next election. The article distinguishes the characteristics of three types of investments in education, environmental protection and technology and infrastructure, gathered from the Comparative Manifesto Project. It finds a linear positive relationship between parties’ probability of entering office and the proportion of manifestoes allocated to statements about technology and infrastructure. In contrast, statements about education are highest at high levels of electoral competitiveness, as parties propose more education to attract voters, while statements about the environment are affected by parties’ ideology on the left-right axis rather than by electoral competitiveness. Power-sharing institutions help parties to overcome time inconsistency problems, reducing the impact of electoral competition on investments.


Crisis ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 220-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Stack

Abstract. Background: There has been no systematic work on the short- or long-term impact of the installation of crisis phones on suicides from bridges. The present study addresses this issue. Method: Data refer to 219 suicides from 1954 through 2013 on the Skyway Bridge in St. Petersburg, Florida. Six crisis phones with signs were installed in July 1999. Results: In the first decade after installation, the phones were used by 27 suicidal persons and credited with preventing 26 or 2.6 suicides a year. However, the net suicide count increased from 48 in the 13 years before installation of phones to 106 the following 13 years or by 4.5 additional suicides/year (t =3.512, p < .001). Conclusion: Although the phones prevented some suicides, there was a net increase after installation. The findings are interpreted with reference to suggestion/contagion effects including the emergence of a controversial bridge suicide blog.


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