State Disengagement: Evidence from French West Africa

Author(s):  
Richard J McAlexander ◽  
Joan Ricart-Huguet

Abstract How do states respond to political resistance? The standard repression or concession logic presumes that the state is strong enough to punish or co-opt dissent effectively. Instead, we argue that the state may disengage when it is weak. We show that colonial governments in French West Africa reduced public investments in districts where chiefs engaged in largely nonviolent disobedience. However, we also show that chieftain disobedience reduced government taxes and fees on Africans, rather than increased them as punishment. Because the state was too weak to punish with higher taxation or to concede by increasing investments, the state disengaged in hard-to-rule districts. Our findings show that chieftain resistance helps explain why subnational development was so unequal during colonialism. Low-level and nonviolent resistance, often overlooked in the conflict literature, also affect state–society relations and state formation. ¿Cómo responden los estados a la resistencia política? La lógica convencional de represión o concesión presupone que el estado es lo suficientemente poderoso como para castigar o cooptar la disidencia de forma eficaz. Sin embargo, sostenemos que el estado puede desentenderse cuando es vulnerable. Demostramos que los gobiernos coloniales del África Occidental Francesa redujeron las inversiones públicas en los distritos en los que los jefes ejercían una desobediencia mayoritariamente no violenta. Sin embargo, también demostramos que la desobediencia de los caciques permitió reducir los impuestos y aranceles del gobierno sobre los africanos, en lugar de aumentarlos como castigo. Como el estado era demasiado vulnerable para castigar con mayores impuestos o para ceder aumentando las inversiones, el estado se desentendió de los distritos difíciles de gobernar. Nuestros resultados muestran que la resistencia de los dirigentes ayuda a explicar por qué el desarrollo de la región fue tan desigual durante el colonialismo. La resistencia no violenta y de bajo riesgo, que a menudo se ignora en la literatura sobre conflictos, también afecta a las relaciones entre el estado y la sociedad, y a la formación del estado. Comment les États réagissent-ils à la résistance politique ? La logique standard de répression ou de concession présume que l’État est suffisamment puissant pour sanctionner ou coopter efficacement la dissidence. Au lieu de cela, nous soutenons que l’État peut se désengager lorsqu'il est faible. Nous montrons que les gouvernements coloniaux de l'Afrique Occidentale Française réduisaient les investissements publics dans les districts où les chefs s'engageaient dans une désobéissance en grande partie non violente. Toutefois, nous montrons également que la désobéissance des chefs réduisait aussi les taxes et frais imposés aux Africains par le gouvernement plutôt que de les accroître en guise de sanction. Étant donné que l’État était trop faible pour sanctionner par une taxation plus élevée ou pour faire des concessions en augmentant les investissements, l’État s'est désengagé dans les districts difficiles à gouverner. Nos conclusions montrent que la résistance des chefs contribue à expliquer pourquoi le développement subnational a été aussi inégal durant le colonialisme. La résistance non violente et de faible intensité, souvent négligée dans la littérature sur les conflits, affecte également les relations entre État et société et la formation des États.

1967 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-333
Author(s):  
W. A. E. Skurnik

The term ‘balkanization’, as applied to colonial policy in Africa, frequently suggests a European ‘divide and rule’ policy, intended to fragment pre-existing African unity. An examination of the policy of France towards the former federation of French West Africa indicates that the term is inaccurate to describe French policy.The federation was created by the French for the French. It served to streamline French administration during the period of expansion, to help develop the component territories' economies, and to guarantee the security of French private investments. France conceived of the territories as the basic political units and hence modern political life was implanted there rather than in the federation. Post World War II French public investments flowed chiefly to the territories, common federal services were decentralized as territories acquired expertise and funds to run their own, and the quasi-federal Senate called the Grand Conseil was allowed to expire. Other aspects of French policy had unintended centrifugal effects, such as the metropolitan party structure and consequent dispersal of African representatives in Paris, and the influence of some French parties in Africa. Since 1956, France logically responded to African leaders' demands for more power and eventual autonomy in the territories, and left it to the Africans to decide whether or not to continue their federal relationship.By 1956, the federation had outlived its usefulness to France. It is improbable that the metropole could have ‘saved’ it, because political territorial roots were too strong, the Africans were not agreed, and relations between France and Africa had already become mainly bilateral with the territories directly. Consequently it appears that the federation, a purely French creation, was simply permitted to fade away once its functions were no longer relevant to French needs. It is true that France preferred eight small, powerless states to a strong federation when national independence approached, but ‘powerless’ and ‘strong’ in this context are but relative terms. The story of the federation of French West Africa suggests that such political structures can survive the colonial period only if they are anchored in fundamental African needs; this was not the case with that federation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elise Huillery

To what extent do colonial public investments continue to influence current regional inequalities in French-speaking West Africa? Using a new database and the spatial discontinuities of colonial investment policy, this paper gives evidence that early colonial investments had large and persistent effects on current outcomes. The nature of investments also matters. Current educational outcomes have been more specifically determined by colonial investments in education rather than health and infrastructures, and vice versa. I show that a major channel for this historical dependency is a strong persistence of investments; regions that got more at the early colonial times continued to get more. (JEL H41, H54, N37, N47, 016)


Author(s):  
Arjun Chowdhury

This chapter provides an informal rationalist model of state formation as an exchange between a central authority and a population. In the model, the central authority protects the population against external threats and the population disarms and pays taxes. The model specifies the conditions under which the exchange is self-enforcing, meaning that the parties prefer the exchange to alternative courses of action. These conditions—costly but winnable interstate war—are historically rare, and the cost of such wars can rise beyond the population’s willingness to sacrifice. At this point, the population prefers to avoid war rather than fight it and may prefer an alternative institution to the state if that institution can prevent war and reduce the level of extraction. Thus the modern centralized state is self-undermining rather than self-enforcing. A final section addresses alternative explanations for state formation.


Author(s):  
Giacomo Benati ◽  
Carmine Guerriero

Abstract We develop a theory of state formation shedding light on the rise of the first stable state institutions in Bronze Age Mesopotamia. Our analysis suggests that the mix of adverse production conditions and unforeseen innovations pushed groups favored by old technologies to establish the state by granting political and property rights to powerless individuals endowed with new and complementary skills. Through these reforms, the elite convinced the nonelite that a sufficient part of the returns on joint investments would be shared via public spending and, thus, to cooperate and accumulate a culture of cooperation. Different from the main alternative theories, we stress that: (1) group formation is heavily shaped by unforeseen shocks to the returns on both risk-sharing and innovation; (2) complementarity in group-specific skills, and not violence, is key determinant of state formation; (3) military, merchant and, especially, religious ranks favored state formation and culture accumulation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-59
Author(s):  
Jim van der Meulen

AbstractThis article charts the long-term development of seigneurial governance within the principality of Guelders in the Low Countries. Proceeding from four quantitative cross-sections (c. 1325, 1475, 1540, 1570) of seigneurial lordships, the conclusion is that seigneurial governance remained stable in late medieval Guelders. The central argument is that this persistence of seigneurial governance was an effect of active collaboration between princely administrations, lords, and local communities. Together, the princely government and seigneuries of Guelders formed an integrated, yet polycentric, state. The article thereby challenges the narrative of progressive state centralisation that predominates in the historiography of pre-modern state formation.


Focaal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (68) ◽  
pp. 105-123
Author(s):  
Jennifer Alvey

This article examines a 20-year border dispute between two adjacent southern interior municipalities in Nicaragua. The dispute acts as window into the politics of state formation and the consolidation of the dictatorship of Anastacio Somoza García (1936–1956). This conflict was waged by locally based “state actors” who contested each other's attempts to stake and extend spatially based claims to authority. Contending parties developed a shared language of contention that I call “administrative disorder”, which tracked closely with accusations of invasion and abuse of authority. Administrative disorder discourses were representational practices that contributed to the discursive construction of the state. They were also the means by which representatives of the state sought to justify or normalize their own activities. As such, these discourses concealed political tensions rooted in patronage networks, municipal formation, land privatization, and ethnic assimilation, which shaped the contours and longevity of the dispute, but remained lurking silences in administrative disorder discourses.


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