Channel Structures of Online Retail Platforms

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Y. Ha ◽  
Shilu Tong ◽  
Yunjie Wang
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Online Retail ◽  
Sales Channels ◽  
Channel Choice ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Channel Structures

Problem definition: This paper investigates the channel choice problem of an online platform that exerts service effort to enhance the demand in its sales channels. Academic/practical relevance: In the existing literature on the channel structure of an online retail platform, it is usually assumed that a manufacturer sells through either the platform’s agency or reselling channel but not both. In practice, many manufacturers sell the same products through both channels of the same online retail platform, a phenomenon that cannot be explained by the existing theory. Moreover, online retail platforms routinely invest in retail services that enhance the demand in their sales channels. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate the equilibrium channel choice, wholesale price, and retail quantity decisions. We also conduct sensitivity analysis to evaluate the impact of some parameters on the equilibrium. Results: We derive conditions under which each of the three channel structures (agency channel, reselling channel, and dual channel) emerges in equilibrium. We show that the wholesale price in the reselling channel is reduced because of the addition of the agency channel even when both channels are equally efficient, which extends the wholesale price effect because of the addition of a less efficient direct channel in the supplier encroachment literature. Our analysis highlights the flexibility of a dual channel for firms to shift sales between the two channels, which could increase the retail platform’s incentive to exert service effort. Managerial implications: Our study provides useful insights to managers to understand and make channel choice decisions in supply chains with manufacturers selling through online retail platforms.

Sharing Manufacturer’s Demand Information in a Supply Chain with Price and Service Effort Competition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunjie Wang ◽  
Albert Y. Ha ◽  
Shilu Tong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Price Distortion ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Private Demand ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Share Information

Problem definition: This paper investigates the issue of sharing the private demand information of a manufacturer that sells a product to retailers competing on prices and service efforts. Academic/practical relevance: In the existing literature, which ignores service effort competition, it is known that demand signaling induces an informed manufacturer to distort the wholesale price downward, which benefits the retailers, and so, they do not have any incentive to receive the manufacturer’s private information. In practice, many manufacturers share demand information with their retailers that compete on prices and service efforts (e.g., demand-enhancing retail activities), a setting that has not received much attention from the literature. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model with one manufacturer selling to two competing retailers and solve for the equilibrium of the game. Results: We show how an informed manufacturer may distort the wholesale price upward or downward to signal demand information to the retailers, depending on the cost of service effort, the intensity of effort competition, and the number of uninformed retailers. We fully characterize the impact of such wholesale price distortion on the firms’ incentive to share information and derive the conditions under which the manufacturer shares information with none, one, or both of the retailers. We derive conditions under which a higher cost of service effort makes the retailers or the manufacturer better off. Managerial implications: Our results provide novel insights about how service effort competition impacts the incentives for firms in a supply chain to share a manufacturer’s private demand information. For instance, when the cost of effort is high or service effort competition is intense, a manufacturer should share information with none or some, but not all, of the retailers.

scholarly journals Impact of Retailer’s Vertical and Horizontal Fairness Concerns on Manufacturer’s Online Channel Mode

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Chenhao Ma ◽  
Haoran Chen ◽  
Guohu Qi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Direct Selling ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Channel Mode ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer exhibits vertical and horizontal fairness concerns. The manufacturer or the retailer direct selling and e-commerce platform agency selling modes are employed to characterize the impact of retailer’s fairness concerns on the online channel mode strategy. Results show that the retailer’s fairness concerns only affect the wholesale price and online channel mode strategy. Without the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer direct selling mode is the best strategy for the manufacturer, which harms the retailer’s utility. With the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer may choose the manufacturer direct selling or e-commerce platform agency selling mode. When the fairness concern parameters meet a certain range, the e-commerce platform agency selling mode strategy is better for the supply chain members, which can solve the interest conflict between supply chain members. These research findings help dual-channel supply chain members understand how to choose the channel structure strategy to balance the supply chain members’ interests by considering fairness concerns.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of Competing Tobacco Enterprises with Online Channel

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Rong Zhang ◽  
Jackson Jinhong Mi ◽  
Bin Liu
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Equilibrium Pricing ◽  
Sales Channels ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Online Sales ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Channel Structures

According to the new measurement of launching online distribution channels of tobacco enterprises in China, this paper investigates the tobacco firm’s pricing decisions on the supply chain which consists of two manufacturers and one retailer under three dual-channel structures. Three dual-channel structures include no online channel, only one online channel by one manufacture, and two online channels by two manufacturers. We apply the Stackelberg game to analyze the equilibrium pricing strategies under different structures and try to explore the necessity and advantages of launching online sales channels. The results demonstrate that the substitutability of a product has significant impact on introducing online sales channels, and the online dual-channel structure could result in less profit for manufacturers compared to the traditional retail channel structure; and thus, a dual-channel structure with online sales is not the best strategy for traditional manufacturers. Moreover, when the product is less substitutable, the effect of the tobacco control on the online sales channel is inferior to the traditional channels and vice versa.

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Shang ◽  
Gangshu (George) Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Price Matching ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Problem definition: Few papers have explored the impact of price matching negotiation (PM), in which a channel matches its price with the resulting wholesale price bargained by another channel, on firms’ performances, consumer welfare, and social welfare, with and without supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: Negotiation has been widely seen in determining both uniform and discriminatory wholesale prices, which affect outcomes of competitive supply chain practices. Methodology: To characterize the PM mechanism, we use game theory and Nash bargaining theory to compare PM with simultaneous negotiation (SN) through a common-seller two-buyer differentiated Bertrand competition model. Results: Our analysis reveals that PM can benefit the seller but hurt all buyers, which is at odds with some fair wholesale pricing clauses intending to protect buyers. Under coordination with side payments, however, all firms can conditionally benefit more from PM than from SN. Despite firms’ gains, PM leads to less consumer utility and social welfare compared with SN, unless the second buyer in PM is considerably less powerful than the first buyer. Coordination further worsens PM’s negative impact on consumer utility and social welfare. Moreover, the existence of a spot market can increase the wholesale price in PM, hurting buyers, consumers, and society. Furthermore, the qualitative results about PM remain robust under an alternative disagreement point for PM, multiple buyers, and other extensions. Managerial implications: This paper delivers insights on when price matching in supply chain wholesale price negotiation can benefit a seller, buyers, consumers, and society in a variety of scenarios. It advocates how managers can use PM to their own advantages and provides rationale to decision makers for policy regulations regarding wholesale pricing.

On Co-opetitive Supply Partnerships with End-Product Rivals: Information Asymmetry, Dual Sourcing and Supply Market Efficiency

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seung Hwan Jung ◽  
Panos Kouvelis
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Market Information ◽  
Dual Sourcing ◽  
Strategic Sourcing ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

Problem definition: We consider opportunities for cooperation at the supply level between two firms that are rivals in the end-product market. One of our firms is vertically integrated (VI), has in-house production capabilities, and may also supply its rival. The other is a downstream outsourcing (DO) firm that has better market information. The DO is willing to consider a supply partnership with the VI, but it also has the option to use the outside supply market. Academic/practical relevance: Such co-opetitive practices are common in industrial supply chains, but firms’ co-opetitive strategic sourcing with the potential of information leakage has not been examined in the literature. Methodology: We build a game-theoretic model to capture the firms’ strategic interactions under the co-opetitive supply partnership with the potential information leakage. Results: The DO exploits its information advantage to obtain a better wholesale price from the VI and may use dual sourcing to protect its private information. Anticipating that, the VI may offer wholesale price concessions as an information rent to obtain the DO’s information. Our work identifies demand uncertainty and efficiency of outside supply market as the factors affecting the VI’s pricing decision and the resulting equilibrium. Pooling equilibrium arises often, but in a few cases, the equilibrium is separating. At the separating equilibrium, the DO always single sources, either from the VI or the independent supplier depending on the demand state. The VI benefits from ancillary revenue-generating opportunity, and from information acquisition in a separating equilibrium. On the other hand, the DO’s benefit is a cheaper price in exchange for market information in a separating equilibrium. In the pooling case, the DO uses dual sourcing to hide demand information, especially in the high demand case, and to better supply the end-market through his accurate demand information. Managerial implications: Our work provides useful insights into firms’ strategic sourcing behaviors to efficiently deal with the potential of information leakage in the co-opetitive supply environment and for the rationale behind such relationships often observed in industries.

A Study on the Price Decisions of the Dual-Channel Composite Decision in B2C Mode

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 46-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haoxiong Yang ◽  
Wen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Marketing Channels ◽  
Online Marketing ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Online Retail ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies the subject of pricing decisions of online dual-channel based on hybrid decisions wherein a manufacturer introduces direct online marketing channels beyond the traditional online retail channels. The purpose is to study how to balance the interests of different online channels and maximize the overall efficiency of the channel. Having considered both online channels' satisfaction and the hidden costs of channel selection, by means of the demand function of both channels derived from a consumer utility and selection model, the author investigates the impacts of these two factors on the online dual-channel pricing decisions. This article also further analyzes the impact of changes in these two factors for manufacturers, retailers and channel' total revenue, with the purpose to provide decision-making reference for the enterprises' managers in the supply chain to develop optimal pricing strategies.

scholarly journals Research on Cost Information Sharing and Channel Choice in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huihui Liu ◽  
Shuguang Sun ◽  
Ming Lei ◽  
G. Keong Leong ◽  
Honghui Deng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
General Distribution ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Channel Choice ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Many studies examine information sharing in an uncertain demand environment in a supply chain. However there is little literature on cost information sharing in a dual-channel structure consisting of a retail channel and a direct sales channel. Assuming that the retail sale cost and direct sale cost are random variables with a general distribution, the paper investigates the retailer’s choice on cost information sharing in a Bertrand competition model. Based on the equilibrium outcome of information sharing, the manufacturer’s channel choice is discussed in detail. Our paper provides several interesting conclusions. In both single- and dual-channel structures, the retailer has little motivation to share its private cost information which is verified to be valuable for the manufacturer. When the cost correlation between the two channels increases, our analyses show that the manufacturer’s profit improves. However, when channel choice is involved, the value of information could play a different role. The paper finds that a dual-channel structure can benefit the manufacturer only when the cost correlation is sufficiently low. In addition, if the cost correlation is weak, the cost fluctuation will bring out the advantage of a dual-channel structure and adding a new direct channel will help in risk pooling.

AI and Procurement

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruomeng Cui ◽  
Meng Li ◽  
Shichen Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Recommendation System ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Practical Relevance ◽  
Trading Company ◽  
Smart Control ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Price Quotes

Problem definition: In this research, we study how buyers’ use of artificial intelligence (AI) affects suppliers’ price quoting strategies. Specifically, we study the impact of automation—that is, the buyer uses a chatbot to automatically inquire about prices instead of asking in person—and the impact of smartness—that is, the buyer signals the use of a smart AI algorithm in selecting the supplier. Academic/practical relevance: In a world advancing toward AI, we explore how AI creates and delivers value in procurement. AI has two unique abilities: automation and smartness, which are associated with physical machines or software that enable us to operate more efficiently and effectively. Methodology: We collaborate with a trading company to run a field experiment on an online platform in which we compare suppliers’ wholesale price quotes across female, male, and chatbot buyer types under AI and no recommendation conditions. Results: We find that, when not equipped with a smart control, there is price discrimination against chatbot buyers who receive a higher wholesale price quote than human buyers. In fact, without smartness, automation alone receives the highest quoted wholesale price. However, signaling the use of a smart recommendation system can effectively reduce suppliers’ price quote for chatbot buyers. We also show that AI delivers the most value when buyers adopt automation and smartness simultaneously in procurement. Managerial implications: Our results imply that automation is not very valuable when implemented without smartness, which in turn suggests that building smartness is necessary before considering high levels of autonomy. Our study unlocks the optimal steps that buyers could adopt to develop AI in procurement processes.

A Trade Value Perspective on Ecommerce Research

2011 ◽  
pp. 59-78
Author(s):  
Ruth C. King ◽  
Ravi Sen ◽  
Fergle D’Aubeterre ◽  
Vikram Sethi
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Cost Minimization ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Web Based ◽  
Inhibiting Factors ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Economic Measure ◽  
Channel Structures ◽  
Structure Research

The impact of web-based electronic commerce on the process of disintermediation and re-intermediation has been extensively studied. Two major limitations of the existing work are the focus on a single economic measure (i.e., transaction cost minimization) and the examination of channel-structure decisions from only a single perspective (the seller’s). This paper introduces transactional value theory in the context of channel-structure research and integrates it with transaction cost theory to generate a trade value framework. The trade value framework considers channel-structure decisions from the perspectives of both buyers and sellers and is used to analyze the impact of web-based e-commerce on intermediated channel-structures. The proposed framework suggests that intermediaries function best in a channel-structure if they can reduce trade-inhibiting factors and improve trade-enhancing factors. Intermediaries may also prosper if they deliver extraordinary value on one side of the trade value framework to the point that inhibiting factors on the other end of the trade can be overlooked. Intermediaries maximize the value of the trade for both the buyers and the sellers by trading through an intermediated channel-structure as opposed to trading directly.

scholarly journals An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 3433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arshad ◽  
Qazi Khalid ◽  
Jaime Lloret ◽  
Antonio Leon
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer’s direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality.

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