scholarly journals Compassionate Exclusivism: Relational Atonement and Post-Mortem Salvation

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 158-179
Author(s):  
Aaron Brian Davis

Faithful persons tend to relate to their religious beliefs as truth claims, particularly inasmuch as their beliefs have soteriological implications for those of different religions. For Christians the particular claims which matter most in this regard are those made by Jesus of Nazareth and his claims are primarily relational in nature. I propose a model in which we understand divine grace from Jesus as being mediated through relational knowledge of him on a compassionately exclusivist basis, including post-mortem. Supporting this model, I draw from Eleonore Stump’s hypothesis in her 2018 Atonement that the crucifixion of Jesus opens the divine psyche to all human psyches sufficiently for salvific mutual indwelling to occur, and from Gavin D’Costa’s conception of the descensus Christi ad inferos as the mechanism for grace’s accessibility post-mortem presented in his 2009 Christianity and World Religions. This model seeks to address ongoing, justified pastoral concern for the soteriological status of non-Christians while still treating Christianity as objectively true.

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-224
Author(s):  
Gilbert Meilaender

In this article Gilbert Meilaender responds to nine scholars whose papers (collected in this issue) analyze and interact with a variety of theological and ethical themes that emerge in his writing. Among those themes are the moral limits grounded in our embodied nature, the freedom to transcend those limits, the perfection of that nature by divine grace, the relation between political progress toward a common good and the kingdom of God, the place of religious beliefs in public discourse within a liberal democratic society, the meaning and scope of our responsibility to care for human persons at the beginning and end of life, and the meaning of our creaturely longing to rest in God.


Studia Humana ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-44
Author(s):  
Hans Van Eyghen

Abstract It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.


Jashore, a renowned district of Bangladesh whose has own ancient tradition and heritage which is surrounded by the various rivers, forests and various folk religious communities who lead their life like the heart of rivers. The Bhairav, the Chitra, the Begobati, the Kaputakhya, the Icchamati, the Mukteswaree, the Nabagonga, the Kumar, the Harihar, the Kobadak, the Mathabhanga, the Afra Khal, the Khatki, the Fatki, and the Bhadra are the ancient rivers of Jashore. The rivers have changed their own speed and path by the rules of eternal geonatural world and in these ways, watery, salty and sweet areas people follow the extraordinary style of religious beliefs which focus on the rivers and religious beliefs which focus on the rivers and religious paramount where the deities and entities of the people make up a resourceful religious culture. Like rivers and religions have changed their own facets and beliefs. The World religions are divided into two divisions. They are: (a) State recognized religions and (b) Folk religions. There is a good number of discrimination between state-recognized religions and Folk religions. The state-recognized religions are in two sections. They are: (a) Abrahamic religions and (b) Indian religions. Folk religions are community-based religions that may be national and international. Here will be shown about state-recognized were their women in what is how. The reviewer attempts to examine between state-recognized religions and folk religions where both of two, how to treat to the women.


1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-232
Author(s):  
John Churchill

There are three well-developed sorts of answer to the question ‘What kind of meaning is possessed by religious beliefs?’ The first sort regards religious beliefs as truth claims of the kind encountered in the natural and social sciences and in everyday life. Religious beliefs are claims about how things stand in some part of the world. They are to be counted as true or false depending on whether those claims correspond with how things in fact stand. On this reading, religious beliefs are at least in principle verifiable or falsifiable through experiences of appropriate types. There are of course different notions of ‘experiences of the appropriate type’. A Russian cosmonaut returned from space saying that there was no God. He regarded religious beliefs as falsified by the observations he made when he went into the sky and looked around. Others (for instance, John Hick in his concept of eschatological verification) think of religious beliefs as testable, not through ordinary sense experience, but through rather similar kinds of experiences (if any) after death. In either of these versions, the sort of meaning possessed by religious beliefs and the sort of truth or falsehood of which they are susceptible are not radically different from the sorts of meaning and truth typical of claims about empirical facts.


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