Skepticism and Internalism

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54
Author(s):  
Halvor Nordby
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
World Knowledge ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
Cognitive Access

The skeptical Dream argument appeals to the possibility of dreaming. The skeptic holds that states of being awake are subjectively indistinguishable from possible dream states and that this means that we do not know that we are awake. This, the skeptic then claims, means that we have to accept that we do not have external world knowledge.It is natural to assume that there must be a connection between the Dream argument and epistemic internalism, the view that a belief is justified for a given person if and only if the person has cognitive access to all the factors that are needed for the belief to be justified. The problem, the skeptic thinks, is that in order for my belief that I am awake to be justified I have to have cognitive access to something that establishes that I am awake. But according to the skeptic, even if I am awake, this is not something I have cognitive access to. However, the more precise connections between internalism and the skeptical argument are not so clear.

scholarly journals The Appearance of Skepticism: Possibility, Conceivability and Infinite Ascent

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-107
Author(s):  
Sorin Bangu
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
Novel Strategy

AbstractThe paper articulates a novel strategy against external world skepticism. It shows that a modal assumption of the skeptical argument cannot be justified.

The Moral Transcendental Argument against Skepticism

2020 ◽  
pp. 333-352
Author(s):  
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
External World ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
Skeptical Hypothesis ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
The Subject

Transcendental arguments against skepticism claim that the skeptical argument depends on the falsehood or the unbelievability of the skeptical hypothesis. This chapter argues that the skeptic needs to presuppose the moral or practical rationality of the subject, requiring the existence of an external world with certain features (strongest arguments), the falsehood of the skeptical hypothesis (strong arguments), or the subject’s belief in such a world (weak arguments). The argument starts with rational agency and investigates the sense of moral obligation, moral motives, and virtues that would exist in “vat morality,” arguing that although the skeptic needs to presuppose the rational and moral agency of the subject, the skeptical hypothesis denies or undermines the subject’s agency. The chapter ends by considering whether the skeptic can retreat to Pyrrhonian skepticism to save the skeptical project, concluding that he cannot.

scholarly journals An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moti Mizrahi
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
Knowledge Closure

In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion (i.e., thatSdoesn’t know thatp) without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical hypotheses or knowledge closure.

scholarly journals Revisiting Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Argument in “Proof of an External World”

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Christopher Stratman
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
Ontological Claim

Abstract This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former is skepticism about the ontological status of fundamental reality, while the latter is skepticism about our empirical knowledge. Philosophers often assume that Moore’s response to “external world skepticism” deals exclusively with the former, not the latter. But this is a mistake. I shall argue that Moore’s anti-skeptical argument targets an ontological form of skepticism. Thus, the conclusion is an ontological claim about fundamental reality, while the premises are epistemic claims. If this is correct, then the conclusion outstrips the scope of its premises and proves too much.

Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming

2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Hetherington
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
External World ◽  
World Knowledge ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Contingent Existence

Descartes challenged himself to know that he was not dreaming, with the supposed price to be paid if he lacked that knowledge being his failure to have any knowledge at all of the contingent existence and features of an external world. And subsequent epistemologist after subsequent epistemologist has kept that Cartesian skeptical challenge alive. Recent non-skeptical responses to it — most notably, Robert Nozick's — have focussed on whether one's not knowing that one is not dreaming really does entail one's lacking all external world knowledge. Seemingly, Nozick is unworried by the prospect of one's never knowing that one is not dreaming. He does argue that no one ever has that knowledge, but he reassures us that this does not entail that people do not have a steady and satisfying supply of the more ‘Standard’ sorts of external world knowledge. As I will argue in this paper, though, I see no good reason to concede in the first place that one cannot know that one is not dreaming.

Thomas Reid's View of Memorial Conception

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-226
Author(s):  
Marina Folescu
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Good Grasp

Thomas Reid believed that the human mind is well equipped, from infancy, to acquire knowledge of the external world, with all its objects, persons and events. There are three main faculties that are involved in the acquisition of knowledge: (original) perception, memory, and imagination. It is thought that we cannot understand how exactly perception works, unless we have a good grasp on Reid's notion of perceptual conception (i.e., of the conception employed in perception). The present paper argues that the same is true of memory, and it offers an answer to the question: what type of conception does it employ?

PECULIARITIES OF MANIFESTATION OF MEANING DISSONANCE

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (10) ◽  
pp. 25-28
Author(s):  
Abakumova I.V. ◽  
Grishina A.V. ◽  
Godunov M.V.
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Dissonance ◽  
Personal Development ◽  
External World ◽  
Personal Meaning ◽  
Formation Processes ◽  
Common Mean ◽  
Personal Meanings ◽  
Modern Psychology ◽  
Meaning Systems ◽  
The Subject

Modern psychology considers meaning regulation, as an integral mechanism of personal development. A system of personal meanings develops in the processes of under-standing reality. Due to their polymodality personal meanings cannot be good or bad, but they are not the same. When confronted with unknown situations, the unevenness of the emerging personal meanings can lead to match or mismatch with the existing system of mean-ings. Coincidence, as agreement with a new fact, means meaning consonance. Mismatch, as a mismatch between new and existing information, means meaning disso-nance, as a kind of cognitive dissonance. An analysis of modern psychological literature shows that there are two main plans for the action of meaning dissonances: the dissonance of individual meanings in the implementation of real interactions and the dissonance of common mean-ings during the translation of interpersonal meaning formations. It is proposed to consider that meaning ac-quires a personal coloring due to the processes of both consonance and dissonance positioning of meaning con-structs in the meaning sphere of the subject. The revealed dichotomy of the meaning formation processes shows the possibility of manifestation of meanings bipolarity, which is revealed in the process of transition from the internal to the external world and in collisions with oth-er meaning systems. Then it can be assumed that the ef-fect of meaning dissonance manifests itself in two ways: firstly, in terms of real interactions as a discord of indi-vidual meanings, and secondly, in terms of translation of interpersonal meaning constructs as a dissonance of common meanings. In the course of such an external for-mation, meaning becomes already a personal meaning in the consciousness of a particular person.

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