Cost-Sharing for Low-Income Workers: Health Insurance in the On-Your-Ownership Society

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 1229-1240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Von Korff ◽  
Malia Oliver ◽  
Paul Fishman ◽  
John Burbank
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
De-Chih Lee ◽  
Hailun Liang ◽  
Leiyu Shi

Abstract Objective This study applied the vulnerability framework and examined the combined effect of race and income on health insurance coverage in the US. Data source The household component of the US Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS-HC) of 2017 was used for the study. Study design Logistic regression models were used to estimate the associations between insurance coverage status and vulnerability measure, comparing insured with uninsured or insured for part of the year, insured for part of the year only, and uninsured only, respectively. Data collection/extraction methods We constructed a vulnerability measure that reflects the convergence of predisposing (race/ethnicity), enabling (income), and need (self-perceived health status) attributes of risk. Principal findings While income was a significant predictor of health insurance coverage (a difference of 6.1–7.2% between high- and low-income Americans), race/ethnicity was independently associated with lack of insurance. The combined effect of income and race on insurance coverage was devastating as low-income minorities with bad health had 68% less odds of being insured than high-income Whites with good health. Conclusion Results of the study could assist policymakers in targeting limited resources on subpopulations likely most in need of assistance for insurance coverage. Policymakers should target insurance coverage for the most vulnerable subpopulation, i.e., those who have low income and poor health as well as are racial/ethnic minorities.


1995 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 955-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn W. Madden ◽  
Allen Cheadle ◽  
Paula Diehr ◽  
Diane P. Martin ◽  
Donald L. Patrick ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Mark Merlis

Proposals to provide or subsidize health insurance for low-income families must take account of the fact that many workers have access to employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), but decline it because of required employee premium contributions. This article considers a tax credit for the employee share of ESI in the context of a broader program of income-based health insurance tax credits. Helping uninsured workers pay for available ESI could be more cost-effective than subsidizing their coverage in the nongroup market. The credit would also be available to workers who were already covered, both for equity reasons and to reduce the incentives for employers to drop coverage or for workers to shift to subsidized individual plans. One key issue is how to prevent employers from reducing their current health plan contributions to take advantage of the new funding. Other design questions considered by the article include whether workers should be able to choose between ESI and nongroup coverage, whether minimum benefit standards should apply for employer plans, and how to achieve a fair balance in subsidies for group and nongroup coverage.


2004 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 845-857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Jowett ◽  
Anil Deolalikar ◽  
Peter Martinsson

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (5) ◽  
pp. 1549-1574
Author(s):  
Richard Domurat ◽  
Isaac Menashe ◽  
Wesley Yin

We experimentally varied information mailed to 87,000 households in California’s health insurance marketplace to study the role of frictions in insurance take-up. Reminders about the enrollment deadline raised enrollment by 1.3 pp (16 percent) in this typically low take-up population. Heterogeneous effects of personalized subsidy information indicate misperceptions about program benefits. Consistent with an adverse selection model with frictional enrollment costs, the intervention lowered average spending risk by 5.1 percent, implying that marginal respondents were 37 percent less costly than inframarginal consumers. We observe the largest positive selection among low income consumers, who exhibit the largest frictions in enrollment. Finally, we estimate the implied value of the letter intervention to be $25 to $53 per month in subsidy dollars. These results suggest that frictions may partially explain low take-up for marketplace insurance, and that interventions reducing them can improve enrollment and market risk in exchanges. (JEL C93, G22, G52, H75, I13)


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