scholarly journals International Order and the Access Problem of the Defeated Hegemon: the Case of Russia in the Post-Cold War Era

2021 ◽  
pp. 25-38
Author(s):  
Gülteki̇n Sümer

It has been evident that Russia as the heir of Soviet foreign policy, could neither achieve to integrate herself into the international order, nor could the international order achieve to find a solution to Russian foreign policy identity quest. As long as Russia cannot find a stable and permanent status for herself in the world politics, her foreign policy will signify a permanent instability on the behalf of the international order. The current hegemonic international order is far from residing technical capabilities in terms of satisfying Russia’s foreign policy expectations, because it is unprecedentedly rigid in terms of allowing or refusing the incorporation of hegemonic power like Russia. While it cannot return to multipolarity, it could not set a community based international order either. Since the current international order was founded upon liberal anti-Soviet values, it entered into a lightness of exposing Russia to make clear-cut choices in her foreign policy. As much as the current international order was founded upon liberal anti-Soviet values, its demands from the new members would much higher that especially Russia would not easily adapt herself to.

1996 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark N. Katz

AbstractSince the breakup of the USSR in 1991, there has been significant change in Moscow's Middle East policy. During much of the Cold War, Moscow sought to project Soviet influence throughout even the far off Arab region of the Middle East. In the post-Cold War era, though, Russian foreign policy has focused on that part of the Middle East closest to the former USSR-the Northern Tier. This article will examine the major aspects of post-Cold War Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East in order to identify Moscow's multiple goals in the region and discuss Moscow's capacity for achieving them. First, though, a brief review of the different stages of Imperial and Soviet foreign policy toward the region is necessary in order to show the extent to which post-Cold War Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East has and has not changed.


Age of Iron ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 155-178
Author(s):  
Colin Dueck

This final chapter analyzes current geopolitical challenges, and offers US foreign policy recommendations. Leading reasons for existing discontent with the rules-based liberal international order are delineated, and a more realistic understanding proposed. Today’s geopolitical circumstances are outlined, region by region. Policy recommendations then follow, based upon the premise of regionally differentiated strategies of pressure. In sum, the chapter argues for a forward-leaning US foreign policy realism, based upon an understanding that the post–Cold War quarter-century and its competing optimisms are now officially over.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Browning ◽  
Pertti Joenniemi ◽  
Brent J. Steele

The chapter explores Denmark’s post–Cold War reorientation in foreign policy, where a previous emphasis on laying low and a reluctance to engage in military actions has been replaced by a willingness to support activist military engagement. The transformation has entailed a fundamental reappraisal of the Cold War past, where a once comfortable and ontological-security-affirming narrative has been recast as a betrayal of Denmark’s true being and its responsibilities for upholding a norms-based international order. The chapter argues that such self-shaming is designed to elicit anxiety and ontological insecurities that can only be salved through activist engagement. However, lacking sufficient resources itself, Denmark’s redemption is possible only by establishing a vicarious bond with the United States and partaking in American wars. In Denmark’s case, vicarious identification has therefore been central to driving change and reconstituting selfhood anew, rather than reaffirming extant identities as might be expected.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-81
Author(s):  
Regina Helle

Despite continued weak economic performance, Russia displays high determination to increase its global influence. On the one hand, hard power and the use of violence play a much greater role as foreign policy tools than a few years ago. On the other hand, Russia seems to be pursuing the goal of overthrowing the liberal international order, thereby also accepting long-term distortions of relations especially with the West. What are the links between Russia’s conflict-laden, aggressive foreign policy and the liberal international order? In this article, the conflictual dynamics between Russia and the West are primarily understood as conflicts over social status. An emotion-focused analysis of official Russian speech between 1994 and 2015 shows how the subjective status expectations of Russian decision-makers have affected their attitudes and policies towards the West and the post-Cold War liberal order.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-60
Author(s):  
N. N. Neklyudov

The study of Russia’s foreign policy poses something of a paradox. On the one hand, Russia’s actions are viewed as aimed at revising the existing rules-based order built by the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, on numerous occasions, one pinpoints that Russia has devised a language similar to the Western nations to justify its foreign policy. I call the phenomenon that explains this paradox the game of interpretation. The article illustrates how Russia is engaged in the game of interpretation with the West in the post-Cold War order by Russia’s appliance to the norm of humanitarian interventions. By analyzing the Russian discourse during the Russo-Georgian War (2008), I demonstrate how the Russian foreign policy leadership reproduces similar narrative patterns used by the West during the Kosovo War (1999). Exemplifying the game of interpretation by humanitarian interventionism is not accidental. Humanitarian interventionism is studied in the literature as being characteristic of the Western ‘ethical foreign policy’ originated by the end of the Cold War, with Russia being depicted as either skeptical or as an unequivocal opponent of such an approach in world politics. Methodologically, the work builds on quantitative and qualitative analysis of selected texts compiled from the archives of NATO and the US State Department, as well as the website “Kremlin.ru” and the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry.


1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 81-106
Author(s):  
M. A. Muqtedar Khan

This paper seeks to understand the impact of current global politicaland socioeconomic conditions on the construction of identity. I advancean argument based on a two-step logic. First, I challenge the characterizationof current socioeconomic conditions as one of globalization bymarshaling arguments and evidence that strongly suggest that along withglobalization, there are simultaneous processes of localization proliferatingin the world today. I contend that current conditions are indicative ofthings far exceeding the scope of globalization and that they can bedescribed more accurately as ccglocalization.~H’2a ving established thisclaim, I show how the processes of glocalization affect the constructionof Muslim identity.Why do I explore the relationship between glocalization and identityconstruction? Because it is significant. Those conversant with current theoreticaldebates within the discipline of international relations’ are awarethat identity has emerged as a significant explanatory construct in internationalrelations theory in the post-Cold War era.4 In this article, I discussthe emergence of identity as an important concept in world politics.The contemporary field of international relations is defined by threephilosophically distinct research programs? rationalists: constructivists,’and interpretivists.’ The moot issue is essentially a search for the mostimportant variable that can help explain or understand the behavior ofinternational actors and subsequently explain the nature of world politicsin order to minimize war and maximize peace.Rationalists contend that actors are basically rational actors who seekthe maximization of their interests, interests being understood primarilyin material terms and often calculated by utility functions maximizinggiven preferences? Interpretivists include postmodernists, critical theorists,and feminists, all of whom argue that basically the extant worldpolitical praxis or discourses “constitute” international agents and therebydetermine their actions, even as they reproduce world politics by ...


Author(s):  
Daniel Deudney

The end of the Cold War left the USA as uncontested hegemon and shaper of the globalization and international order. Yet the international order has been unintentionally but repeatedly shaken by American interventionism and affronts to both allies and rivals. This is particularly the case in the Middle East as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the nuclear negotiations with Iran show. Therefore, the once unquestioned authority and power of the USA have been challenged at home as well as abroad. By bringing disorder rather than order to the world, US behavior in these conflicts has also caused domestic exhaustion and division. This, in turn, has led to a more restrained and as of late isolationist foreign policy from the USA, leaving the role as shaper of the international order increasingly to others.


2021 ◽  
pp. 187936652199975
Author(s):  
Richard Sakwa

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the idea that the fall of the Berlin Wall represented the beginning of the unification of Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev talked in terms of a “Common European Home,” an idea that continues in the guise of the project for a “Greater Europe.” However, right from the start, the transformative idea of Greater Europe was countered by the notion of “Europe whole and free,” whose fundamental dynamic was the enlargement of the existing West European order to encompass the rest of the continent. This was a program for the enlargement of the Atlantic system. After some prevarication, the enlargement agenda proved unacceptable to Moscow, and while it continues to argue in favor of transformation its main efforts are now devoted to creating some sort of “greater Eurasia.” There remains a fundamental tension between Atlanticist and pan-continental version of the post-–Cold War international order in the region. This tension gave rise to conflict and war: in 2008 (the Russo-Georgian War) and again from 2014 (Ukraine), and to what some call the Second Cold War. The continent is once again divided. However, pan-continentalism is far from dead, and although Greater Eurasian ideas have thrived, some sort of Greater European continentalism remains on the agenda. Is this, though, no more than a “sad delusion” or a genuine possibility?


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