scholarly journals Rozważania na temat represyjnych i prewencyjnych elementów odpowiedzialności odszkodowawczej na przykładzie instytucji odszkodowania karnego (punitive damages) w świetle orzeczenia Sądu Najwyższego oraz Trybunału Konstytucyjnego

2019 ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Maciej Kochanowski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Punitive Damages ◽  
Law System ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
German System ◽  
Polish Law

The verdict of the Supreme Court of 11 October 2013 (fi le I CSK 697/12) and the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 June 2015 (fi le SK 32/14) are discussed and their signifi cance for the understanding of punitive damages analysed. The main problem discussed in this paper is the question whether there is room under Polish law for punitive damages modelled a common law system and whether the adoption of this solution could possibly infl uence the basic premises constituting the liability for damages already adopted. The main focus has been put on the argumentation of the Supreme Court presented in its verdict regarding the possibility of enforcing by Polish courts a judgment in which a foreign court awarded punitive damages, and the arguments of the Constitutional Tribunal regarding the constitutionality of a legal provision establishing a possibility of fl at-rate damages, being awarded and increased in the event of the determination of guilt by the breaching party. Certain detailed provisions that are contradictory from the point of view of the fundamental assumptions underlying the liability for damages in Polish law and the laws of most European legal systems (and the German system in particular) are also examined. Further, a synthetic analysis of the positive and negative aspects of punitive damages identifi ed by other researchers is presented. This is followed by a mention of other institutions available under Polish law which may constitute an alternative to punitive damages, at least when it comes to the provision of an adequate preventive and punitive measure in the event of gross or culpable damage.

scholarly journals Equitable Compensation for Breach by Fact-Based Fiduciaries: Tentative Thoughts on Clarifying Remedial Goals

1969 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Jeff Berryman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Punitive Damages ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common

The Supreme Court of Canada has purported to distinguish the approach to quantifying equitable compensation from that applied to the quantification of damages in common law for breach of contract or tort. In particular, the rules associated with causation and remoteness and the application of evidential presumptions has dominated this discourse. In this comment the author suggests that these distinctions are adding to conceptual muddling of the fiduciary relationship and that it would be better for the court to embrace totally the sophisticated analytical rules of the common law rather than recreate new rules in equity. Further, he argues that the distinctive features of the fiduciary relationship would be better recognized through the application of punitive damages rather than the distortion of compensation principles.

scholarly journals A Common Law Perspective on the Supreme Court and its Functions

2019 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 15-43
Author(s):  
Richard Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Specific System ◽  
Law System ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law System ◽  
And Function

The text presents different attributes of the Supreme Court in common law and civil law systems. The author claims that the question of design and function of a supreme court, while important, is no more significant than the issue of its institutional status and evolution, i.e. something one could refer to as “legal culture”. Neither the “common law camp”, nor the “civil law camp” turns out to be monolithic in this regard. The distinctive history of the US Supreme Court is presented through the perspective of its statutory and procedural supremacy, as well as its power of constitutional adjudication. The author indicates that the supremacy of the US Supreme Court depends on many factors. Arguably, the most important attribute of the US Supreme Court’s supremacy is linked with the latitude offered to judges in common law system to “make law”, which stands in contrast to a limited judicial function in many civil law countries. The author argues that being a court in a common law system carries with it much broader authority. A supreme court in such a system is, as a result, much more supreme. The author concludes his comparative remarks by saying that it is not possible to proclaim the superiority of one specific system because there are too many variables that come into play with regard to respective nations.

scholarly journals Instrumentalne wykorzystywanie władzy sędziowskiej po wyroku TSUE – wieloaspektowa analiza legalnej korupcji

2020 ◽  
pp. 107-160
Author(s):  
Waldemar Walczak
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Personnel Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Right

The article presents considerations and multifaceted analyses of the conditions and motives of judicial decisions taken after the judgment of the TSUE 19 November 2019, in the context of how Poland’s judiciary system functions. It begins by explaining how to perceive and understand the essence of legal corruption in terms of the use of law, power and professional position. The possibilities of the intentional use of judicial power for specific needs and purposes is discussed in this context. The next part of the paper is devoted to a critical analysis of selectively interpreted right to a tribunal enshrined in art. 45 of the Polish Constitution in connection with other values enshrined therein. The right of every citizen to a fair and public hearing of their case, without undue delay by a competent, independent, impartial and independent court, is presented in terms of the constitutional perspective, the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. The problem outlined here is considered from the point of view of protection against the arbitrariness of authorities and the possibility of appealing against personnel decisions enabling employment to be taken up in selected positions in state institutions. Attention is paid to the privileged legal position of judges over other citizens. The issues described and the arguments presented in this article are entirely overlooked in the literature, as well as in public debate. What follows is an explanation of how TSUE rulings are interpreted differently by various public authorities. Reference is also made to the dictum of the Supreme Court judgment of 5 December 2019, which was issued in its Labour Law and Social Security Chamber. That process initiated specific actions and activities taken by individual groups of Supreme Court judges. Finally, the resolution of the combined three chambers of the Supreme Court on 23 January 2020, the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 20 April 2020, and divergent decisions regarding the implementation of the TSUE’s position of 8 April 2020 are discussed.

scholarly journals The Non-Professional Judge as a Component of Civic Culture in Poland

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-132
Author(s):  
Dariusz Kużelewski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Justice System ◽  
Civic Culture ◽  
Gradual Reduction ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Polish Law ◽  
Justice Of The Peace ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract The objective of the paper is to present the role of the non-professional judge in Poland as an important manifestation of civic culture based on citizens’ activity in the sphere of justice among other things. The paper also highlights the importance of an appropriate selection of citizens who are to adjudicate and possibly place restrictions on access to judicial functions using the example of Polish law. The last part addresses the problem of the gradual reduction of the participation of lay judges in the Polish justice system and the controversial attempts to halt this trend, such as the introduction of lay judges to the Supreme Court and the start of discussions on the introduction of the justice of the peace to common courts.

scholarly journals SKUTKI PRAWNE ORZECZEŃ TRYBUNAŁU KONSTYTUCYJNEGO W UJĘCIU CZASOWYM

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Roman Trzaskowski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Time Effects ◽  
Area Of Interest ◽  
Retroactive Effect ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Common

Effects of Constitutional Tribunal’s Judgments in the Time PerspectiveSummaryThe problem of the time effects of the Constitutional Tribunal’s rulings remain within the area of interest of both constitutional and civil law scholars. It is widely discussed because of its enormous practical importance: more and more often the common courts and the Supreme Court have to deal with the laws which have been declared unconstitutional.The main question is whether the courts should apply the unconstitutional law while deciding on a case in which legally significant events had taken place before the law was declared null and void.The Polish Constitution does not give a clear answer to this question. The most important provisions seem to be contradictory, which makes it possible to use them as arguments for opposing positions.The scholars’ opinions differ significantly: some of them, followed by the Supreme Court, accept the so-called „retrospective” effect (the unconstitutional law cannot by applied), the others, together with the Constitutional Tribunal, take the opposite view. A few try to find a compromise.The proposition presented in this paper is to be classified as belonging to the third group.Indeed it seems that there is a need for a flexible approach. The time effects of a ruling shall be expressly stated by the Constitutional Tribunal. When the Tribunal fails to do so, the common courts have to asses themselves the rulings’ effects, being guided, among other things, by the principles of the civil law. There are strong arguments that the Constitution seems to favor the retroactive effect, yet it is not decisive. There are certainly situations, where a prospecitve effect shall be accepted: ultimately it is a question of balancing different constitutional and civil law values. 

Evolution of the Roman Republican Senate: Composition, Election, and Judicial functions (Part 1)

2021 ◽  
pp. 62-77
Author(s):  
L. L. Kofanov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Significant Part ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The World ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Gradual Transformation

The paper deals with the Roman senatus in the period from 5th to 3rd century BC, from the point of view of its composition, completion and selected competences. As to its composition, in the most arcaic times of the Roman state, the senate was an assembly of the heads of clans (patres gentium), who represented the ideas of patricians. The autor presents gradual transformation of the composition of the senate and switch towards the inclusion of the plebeians. It describes also the process of the cooptation of the members, rules of which incurred fundamental changes from the hereditary principles to the regulation given by statutes. A significant part of the article is devoted to the judicial functions of the Senate and the relationship between the iudicium senatus and the iudicium populi, the transformation of the Senate court from a regional body to the highest, global court of the entire Mediterranean. It’s noted that if the original Roman Senate de iure was the judicial authority only one of the Latin Confederation, later after 338 BC, it becomes the Supreme court of the Latin Union, and by the end of the Republic is transformed into the «Supreme Council of the world».

Knowing Habeas Corpus When You See It

2018 ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government ◽  
Enemy Combatant

Viewing habeas corpus through a legal lens frequently misleads. The common law “rule” against controverting the return to writs of habeas corpus was commonly evaded through devices permitting judicial examination of the underlying facts and law. In many cases concluding “writ denied,” the prisoner in fact obtained “habeas corpus without the writ.” Failure to understand this explains why the Fourth Circuit performed so badly in rejecting the challenge of Yaser Hamdi to his detention as an enemy combatant. The Supreme Court very properly reversed that decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), resulting in the prisoner’s speedy release when the government was confronted with having to actually prove in court the claims it had made on paper.

Remedies for equitable wrongs

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Burrows
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Substantive Law ◽  
Court Of Chancery

Torts and breach of contract are termed common law wrongs because they were historically developed in the common law courts. Equitable wrongs are civil wrongs that historically were developed in the Court of Chancery. Despite the fusion of the common law courts and the Court of Chancery by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873–1875, much of the substantive law has not been fused. One example is the continued distinction between common law and equitable wrongs. In a rational fused system, nothing should turn on whether a civil wrong is common law or equitable. But that is not the present law.

British Virgin Islands

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arabella di Iorio
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Virgin Islands ◽  
British Virgin Islands ◽  
Law System ◽  
The Common ◽  
Eastern Caribbean ◽  
Common Law System ◽  
Trust Law

The legal system of the British Virgin Islands is a common law system based on the English model, comprising statute law and binding case precedents. The principles of English common law and equity apply in the BVI (subject to modification by BVI statutes) pursuant to the Common Law (Declaration of Application) Act (Cap 13) and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Virgin Islands) Act (Cap 80) respectively. The general principles of trust law are based on English law.

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