scholarly journals SKUTKI PRAWNE ORZECZEŃ TRYBUNAŁU KONSTYTUCYJNEGO W UJĘCIU CZASOWYM

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Roman Trzaskowski

Effects of Constitutional Tribunal’s Judgments in the Time PerspectiveSummaryThe problem of the time effects of the Constitutional Tribunal’s rulings remain within the area of interest of both constitutional and civil law scholars. It is widely discussed because of its enormous practical importance: more and more often the common courts and the Supreme Court have to deal with the laws which have been declared unconstitutional.The main question is whether the courts should apply the unconstitutional law while deciding on a case in which legally significant events had taken place before the law was declared null and void.The Polish Constitution does not give a clear answer to this question. The most important provisions seem to be contradictory, which makes it possible to use them as arguments for opposing positions.The scholars’ opinions differ significantly: some of them, followed by the Supreme Court, accept the so-called „retrospective” effect (the unconstitutional law cannot by applied), the others, together with the Constitutional Tribunal, take the opposite view. A few try to find a compromise.The proposition presented in this paper is to be classified as belonging to the third group.Indeed it seems that there is a need for a flexible approach. The time effects of a ruling shall be expressly stated by the Constitutional Tribunal. When the Tribunal fails to do so, the common courts have to asses themselves the rulings’ effects, being guided, among other things, by the principles of the civil law. There are strong arguments that the Constitution seems to favor the retroactive effect, yet it is not decisive. There are certainly situations, where a prospecitve effect shall be accepted: ultimately it is a question of balancing different constitutional and civil law values. 

1969 ◽  
pp. 144
Author(s):  
Gérald A. Beaudoin

L'auteur de cet article analyse la question du maintien des appels en droit civil la Cour Supr&me. Dans le contexte fSdSral canadien, il se declare favorable au maintien de ces appels. II trouve plus d'avantages que de disavantages. Le Canada ayant deux systdmes de droit privi, il convient que le plus haut tribunal du pays se prononce en ces matidres il s'agit d'une richesse pour notre pays. 11 moyen d'assurer la purete" de Vun et de Vautre systdme. The author of this article analyses the question of the retention of the civil law appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada. He is in favour of such appeals in our federation. We have in Canada two private law systemss one inspired from the Common Law of England and the other from "le droit civil" of France. It is appro priate for our highest tribunal to render judgments in both systems. This is great advantage for our country. Steps may be taken to assure the purity of both systems.


Author(s):  
Mauro Rocha Baptista

Neste artigo analisamos a relação do Ensino Religioso com a sua evolução ao longo do contexto recente do Brasil para compreender a posição do Supremo Tribunal Federal ao considerar a possibilidade do Ensino Religioso confessional. Inicialmente apresentaremos a perspectiva legislativa criada com a constituição de 1988 e seus desdobramentos nas indicações curriculares. Neste contexto é frisado a intenção de incluir o Ensino Religioso na Base Nacional Curricular Comum, o que acabou não acontecendo. A tendência manifesta nas duas primeiras versões da BNCC era de um Ensino Religioso não-confessional. Uma tendência que demarcava a função do Ensino Religioso em debater a religião, mas que não permitia o direcionamento por uma vertente religioso qualquer. Esta posição se mostrava uma evolução da primeira perspectiva histórica mais associada à catequese confessional. Assim como também ultrapassava a interpretação posterior de um ecumenismo interconfessional, que mantinha a superioridade do cristianismo ante as demais religiões. Sendo assim, neste artigo, adotaremos o argumento de que a decisão do STF, de seis votos contra cinco, acaba retrocedendo ante o que nos parecia um caminho muito mais frutífero.Palavras-chave: Ensino Religioso. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Confessional. Interconfessional. Não-confessional.Abstract: On this article, we analyze the relation between Religious education and its evolution along the currently Brazilian context in order to understand the position of the Supreme Court in considering the possibility of a confessional Religious education. Firstly, we are going to present the legislative perspective created with the 1988 Federal Constitution and its impacts in the curricular lines. On this context it was highlighted the intention to include the Religious Education on the Common Core National Curriculum (CCNC), which did not really happened. The tendency manifested in the first two versions of the CCNC was of a non-confessional Religious Education. A tendency that delineated the function of the Religious Education as debating religion, but not giving direction on any religious side. This position was an evolution of the first historical perspective more associated to the confessional catechesis. It also went beyond the former interpretation of an inter-confessional ecumenism, which kept the superiority of the Christianity over the other religions. As such, in this paper we adopt the argument that the decision of the Supreme Court, of six votes against five, is a reversal of what seemed to be a much more productive path on the Religious Education.Keywords: Religious Education. Brazilian Supreme Court. Confessional. Inter-confessional. Non- confessional.Enviado: 23-01-2018 - Aprovado e publicado: 12-2018


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 291
Author(s):  
Cezary Kulesza

<p class="PreformattedText">The gloss refers to the problem of the impact of bank employees’ performance on borrowers’ liability for fraud. The author approves the view formulated in the thesis of the Supreme Court that the employees of the injured bank were obliged to exercise special diligence in checking the accuracy of the documents submitted by the accused necessary to obtain a loan. The position taken by the Supreme Court in the commented judgement can be considered as at least a partial departure from the previous jurisprudence of the Supreme Court accepting that the victim’s contribution to the occurrence of fraud is not relevant to the responsibility of the perpetrators. The author, starting from the results of victimological research, accepts the view that the basis of criminal liability for fraud is the complex behaviour of the perpetrator (extraneous) and representatives of the injured bank (intraneus) and their mutual activity. In the last part of the commentary, the author indicates the specific obligations of banks when granting loans. He also emphasizes the inclusion in civil law of the victim’s contribution to damage as a basis for its mitigation.</p>


Author(s):  
Anna Moskal

Does forgiveness nullify the effects of previous disinheritance? The legal nature of forgiveness is the subject of passionate debates among the representatives of civil law doctrine. According to the dominant position in the literature, forgiveness is an act of affection or its manifested expression of forgiveness of the perpetrator of experienced injustice and related to this grudge. This institution has been applied three times in the Civil Code — once with the donation agreement, twice in regulations of inheritance law. Article 1010 § 1 provides that a testator cannot disinherit eligible for legal portion if he forgave him. The wording of the above article indicates that accomplishment of disinheritance in case if testator eligible for legal portion has previously forgiven. The legislator did not, however, determine the effects of forgiveness in relation to previous disinheritance. In the act of 1971, the Supreme Court accepted that such forgiveness would automatically nullify the effects of disinheritance, and could be made in any form. In recent years, lower courts have begun to question the Supreme Court's position, and judges increasingly refer to the critical statements of numerous doctrines. As it was rightly stated, admitting the possibility of invoking the forgiveness made after disinheritance poses a serious threat to the realization of the testator’s will, who, by forgiving, does not necessarily want to revoke the effects of his previous disinheritance. The postulate of de lege ferenda is, according to the author of the article, giving of freedom of judging the effects of forgiveness to the courts and each examination of the forgiving testator’s will on the possible abatement of the consequences of previous disinheritance.]]>


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-118
Author(s):  
Simeneh Kiros Assefa

The criminal law is adopted as a means of achieving the common good; it is interpreted and applied by the court. The judge chooses the type of legal theory and method to employ in the interpretation and application of the criminal law. Such theories may be acquired from higher norms or from the decision of the Supreme Court. Because such choice of theory and method determines the outcome of the case, the judge is also expected to be guided by the doctrines in criminal law inspired by the values of rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, enshrined in the Constitution. This article examines how courts harmonise the application of the positive criminal law with the non-positivist theories of higher norms. After reviewing various criminal rules and their judicial application, it finds that the court applies the criminal law as it is written in disregard of the non-positivist theories of higher norms, at times in contradiction to the basic doctrines of the criminal law itself.


2018 ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman

Viewing habeas corpus through a legal lens frequently misleads. The common law “rule” against controverting the return to writs of habeas corpus was commonly evaded through devices permitting judicial examination of the underlying facts and law. In many cases concluding “writ denied,” the prisoner in fact obtained “habeas corpus without the writ.” Failure to understand this explains why the Fourth Circuit performed so badly in rejecting the challenge of Yaser Hamdi to his detention as an enemy combatant. The Supreme Court very properly reversed that decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), resulting in the prisoner’s speedy release when the government was confronted with having to actually prove in court the claims it had made on paper.


Author(s):  
Andrew Burrows

Torts and breach of contract are termed common law wrongs because they were historically developed in the common law courts. Equitable wrongs are civil wrongs that historically were developed in the Court of Chancery. Despite the fusion of the common law courts and the Court of Chancery by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873–1875, much of the substantive law has not been fused. One example is the continued distinction between common law and equitable wrongs. In a rational fused system, nothing should turn on whether a civil wrong is common law or equitable. But that is not the present law.


Author(s):  
Michael Ashdown

The present state of the law must now be treated as authoritatively set out by Lord Walker in Pitt v Holt, and to a lesser but still important extent by the earlier judgment of Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal in the same case. This chapter, however, is concerned with the earlier development of the Re Hastings-Bass doctrine. Its purpose is to establish the doctrinal legitimacy of the rule in Re Hastings-Bass as an aspect of the English law of trusts. Whilst this is primarily of academic and theoretical concern, in view of the Supreme Court’s reformulation of the law into its present shape, it is also of practical importance. In particular, the future application of the doctrine to novel situations will depend upon understanding the precise nature and scope of the rule propounded by the Supreme Court. That decision cannot simply be divorced from the many decided cases which preceded it, and from its place in the wider compass of the law of trusts.


Author(s):  
Wojciech Sadurski

After transforming the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) into an active ally of the government, the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)) party in Poland embarked upon the comprehensive subjection of the entire judicial system to the executive, and in particular to the president of the Republic and the minister of justice/prosecutor general (MJ/PG). This chapter discusses how, for this purpose, the National Council of Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (KRS)) was packed with the party faithful thanks to a changed system for selecting members of the KRS (they are now directly elected by Parliament, rather than by judges). It also deals with how the effect of the new law on the Supreme Court was a brand new court composition with a pro-PiS majority: this was created by combining early retirement for incumbent judges and increasing the number of seats on the Court. The chief justice’s constitutionally guaranteed term of office has been extinguished. It also looks at another statute, on the common courts, that has strengthened the power of the MJ to control court presidents, and hold judges accountable for their verdicts through a new disciplinary procedure. Finally, the chapter looks at how the prosecutorial system (prokuratura) was merged with that of the MJ, with the MJ becoming the ex officio PG, producing a deeply politicized system of public prosecution.


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