scholarly journals 1. Synechism & Metaphysical Realism

2020 ◽  
pp. 76-86
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Brigitte Falkenburg

Abstract The paper presents a detailed interpretation of Edgar Wind’s Experiment and Metaphysics (1934), a unique work on the philosophy of physics which broke with the Neo-Kantian tradition under the influence of American pragmatism. Taking up Cassirer’s interpretation of physics, Wind develops a holistic theory of the experiment and a constructivist account of empirical facts. Based on the concept of embodiment which plays a key role in Wind’s later writings on art history, he argues, however, that the outcomes of measurements are contingent. He then proposes an anti-Kantian conception of a metaphysics of nature. For him, nature is an unknown totality which manifests itself in discrepancies between theories and experiment, and hence the theory formation of physics can increasingly approximate the structure of nature. It is shown that this view is ambiguous between a transcendental, metaphysical realism in Kant’s sense and an internal realism in Putnam’s sense. Wind’s central claim is that twentieth century physics offers new options for resolving Kant’s cosmological antinomies. In particular, he connected quantum indeterminism with the possibility of human freedom, a connection that Cassirer sharply opposed.


Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar Heidemann

AbstractRealism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Robinson Guitarrari

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p285 The understanding of conceptual relativity in Putnam’s and Kuhn’s writings should not be restricted to the claim that the existence is relative to, but not in virtue of, a conceptual scheme. This approach does not capture some significant differences between their positions about the notion of conceptual scheme. We understand that the thesis of conceptual relativity contains a statement about the close relationship between conceptual scheme and content, and another claim about the differences between conceptual schemes. Based on these two formal requirements, we propose a reconstruction of the Putnam’s treatment of it and show how it can be understood from Kuhn’s perspective of scientific development. We defend that, although both fulfill a critical role against metaphysical realism, they are applied to distinct domains: while Putnam’s conceptual relativity is in the record of the conceptual structure of scientific theories and presupposes a choice between cognitively equivalent conceptual schemes, Kuhn considers the field of the dynamics of development of science. Thus, we note relevant scientific cases of conceptual relativity that do not involve semantic incommensurability.


Dialogue ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Davies

It is now over 15 years since Hilary Putnam first urged that we take the “narrow path” of internal realism as a way of navigating between “the swamps of metaphysics and the quicksands of cultural relativism and historicism” (1983, p. 226). In the opening lines of the Preface to Realism with a Human Face, a collection of Putnam's recent papers edited by James Conant, Putnam reaffirms his allegiance to this narrow path, unmoved by Realist murmurings from the swamps and laconic Rortian suggestions that only the quicksands are a proper metaphilosophical abode for those willing to confront our lack of epistemological and metaphysical foundations. If there are changes to be discerned in these writings, Putnam avers, they pertain only to the burden allotted to different considerations in the overall economy of his argument: “It might be said that the difference between the present volume and my work prior to The Many Faces of Realism is a shift in emphasis: a shift from emphasizing model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism to emphasizing conceptual relativity” (p. xi).


Author(s):  
Jon Mills

Abstract In our dialogues over the nature of archetypes, essence, psyche, and world, I further respond to Erik Goodwyn’s recent foray into establishing an ontological position that not only answers to the mind-body problem, but further locates the source of Psyche on a cosmic plane. His impressive attempt to launch a neo-Jungian metaphysics is based on the principle of cosmic panpsychism that bridges both the internal parameters of archetypal process and their emergence in consciousness and the external world conditioned by a psychic universe. Here I explore the ontology of experience, mind, matter, metaphysical realism, and critique Goodwyn’s turn to Neoplatonism. The result is a potentially compatible theory of mind and reality that grounds archetypal theory in onto-phenomenology, metaphysics, and bioscience, hence facilitating new directions in analytical psychology.


2019 ◽  
pp. 45-66
Author(s):  
Fred Dallmayr

This chapter considers that, because of predatory selfishness, democracy requires the cultivation of ethical and spiritual resources for which it turns to the Aristotelian tradition of shared “virtuous” life. It begins with Alasdair MacIntyre, who profiles virtue ethics against two modern alternatives: “Morality,” a set of abstract rules anchored in the cogito, and “expressivism,” the pursuit of selfish preferences. By contrast, virtue ethics focuses on the concrete, character-related conduct nurtured by prudent judgment in a societal context, though there are some drawbacks to this view, especially the legacy of “naturalism” and essentialism. The chapter next presents the “little ethics” of Paul Ricoeur and his effort to link Aristotle with Kant, “teleology” with “deontology.” The chapter finally turns to Gadamer’s ethics which purges Aristotle of metaphysical “realism” or naturalism and presents ethical conduct not as a factual endowment but as “process of ongoing self-transformation” and (spiritual) “humanization.”


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