Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions

AbstractIt is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady's notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series of objections are considered and responded to.

Get full-text (via PubEx)

Albert Einstein’s Epistemic Virtues and Vices

Epistemology & Philosophy of Science ◽

10.5840/eps202158468 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 58 (4) ◽

pp. 175-195

Author(s):

Vladimir P. Vizgin ◽

Keyword(s):

Field Theory ◽

General Relativity ◽

General Theory ◽

Special Theory ◽

Theory Of Relativity ◽

Mathematical Aspect ◽

General Theory Of Relativity ◽

Special Theory Of Relativity ◽

Epistemic Virtues ◽

The Universe

The article is based on the concepts of epistemic virtues and epistemic vices and explores A. Einstein’s contribution to the creation of fundamental physical theories, namely the special theory of relativity and general theory of relativity, as well as to the development of a unified field theory on the basis of the geometric field program, which never led to success. Among the main epistemic virtues that led Einstein to success in the construction of the special theory of relativity are the following: a unique physical intuition based on the method of thought experiment and the need for an experimental justification of space-time concepts; striving for simplicity and elegance of theory; scientific courage, rebelliousness, signifying the readiness to engage in confrontation with scientific conventional dogmas and authorities. In the creation of general theory of relativity, another intellectual virtue was added to these virtues: the belief in the heuristic power of the mathematical aspect of physics. At the same time, he had to overcome his initial underestimation of the H. Minkowski’s four-dimensional concept of space and time, which has manifested in a distinctive flexibility of thinking typical for Einstein in his early years. The creative role of Einstein’s mistakes on the way to general relativity was emphasized. These mistakes were mostly related to the difficulties of harmonizing the mathematical and physical aspects of theory, less so to epistemic vices. The ambivalence of the concept of epistemic virtues, which can be transformed into epistemic vices, is noted. This transformation happened in the second half of Einstein’s life, when he for more than thirty years unsuccessfully tried to build a unified geometric field theory and to find an alternative to quantum mechanics with their probabilistic and Copenhagen interpretation In this case, we can talk about the following epistemic vices: the revaluation of mathematical aspect and underestimation of experimentally – empirical aspect of the theory; adopting the concepts general relativity is based on (continualism, classical causality, geometric nature of fundamental interactions) as fundamental; unprecedented persistence in defending the GFP (geometrical field program), despite its failures, and a certain loss of the flexibility of thinking. A cosmological history that is associated both with the application of GTR (general theory of relativity) to the structure of the Universe, and with the missed possibility of discovering the theory of the expanding Universe is intermediate in relation to Einstein’s epistemic virtues and vices. This opportunity was realized by A.A. Friedmann, who defeated Einstein in the dispute about if the Universe was stationary or nonstationary. In this dispute some of Einstein’s vices were revealed, which Friedman did not have. The connection between epistemic virtues and the methodological principles of physics and also with the “fallibilist” concept of scientific knowledge development has been noted.

Get full-text (via PubEx)

A (Different) Virtue Responsibilism: Epistemic Virtues Without Motivations

Acta Analytica ◽

10.1007/s12136-018-0361-8 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 33 (3) ◽

pp. 311-329

Author(s):

Benjamin W. McCraw

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Virtues ◽

Virtue Responsibilism

Get full-text (via PubEx)

The epistemology of democracy: The epistemic virtues of democracy

Filozofija i drustvo ◽

10.2298/fid2001056p ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 31 (1) ◽

pp. 56-70

Author(s):

Snjezana Prijic-Samarzija

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Social System ◽

Epistemic Justification ◽

Collective Intelligence ◽

Theoretical Framework ◽

The Political ◽

Epistemic Values ◽

Epistemic Virtues ◽

Political Justification

The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of the epistemic justification of democracy and the best theoretical framework for harmonizing political and epistemic values. I also inquire whether the proposed division of epistemic labour and the inclusion of experts can indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without jeopardizing political justification. More specifically, I argue in favour of three theses. First, not only democratic procedures but also the outcomes of democracy, as a social system, need to be epistemically virtuous. Second, democracy?s epistemic virtues are more than just a tool for achieving political goals. Third, an appropriate division of epistemic labour has to overcome the limitations of both individual and collective intelligence.

Get full-text (via PubEx)