scholarly journals PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF INTELLECTUAL DEFERENCE

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij

AbstractIt is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady's notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series of objections are considered and responded to.

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Beth E. Elness-Hanson

Having one's voice heard and being known by one's name are foundational aspects of respect and human dignity. Likewise, being able to contribute to shared understanding is at the core of epistemic justice. This intercultural and post-colonial inquiry of Gen 16 considers the Egyptian Hagar-known by her foreign Semitic name meaning "Fleeing One"-as an example of epistemic injustice. Integrating Miranda Fricker 's work on epistemic injustice, this study espouses the justice of hearing and seeing the marginalised and oppressed, as exemplified by Yhwh. As the Egyptian woman's voice- once ignored-gives testimony within the text to a fuller understanding of God, so also listening to/seeing other contemporary African scholars' voices/writings opens one's ears/eyes to fuller understandings of God today. These voices include the seminal work of David Tuesday Adamo, a vanguard in African biblical hermeneutics, in whose honour this examination is written.


1989 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 758
Author(s):  
Ronald L. Cohen ◽  
E. Allan Lind ◽  
Tom R. Tyler

1980 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman K. Denzin

AbstractThe study of the organization and experiencing of emotion in everyday life is called for. A phenomenology of emotion is proposed and its relevance for the study of deviance and deviant conduct is suggested. The foundations of an interpretive social psychology are sketched, drawing upon the works of William James, Scheler, Husserl, Schutz, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. The “cognitive bias” in traditional symbolic interactionist thought is criticized, as are the works of Erving Goffman.


2018 ◽  
pp. 95-112
Author(s):  
Gaelle Demelemestre

The Rawls theory of procedural justice is being subjected to criticism oh theoretical approaches named “Theory of recognition” (A. Honneth, A. Caille, Ch. Lazzeri) emphasing the importance of subjective interactions in the development of the meaningful representation as used by the society to be included as part of its existence. This article intends to show how, by a critical recovery of American interactionism and lessons provided by this school of social psychology. Ernst Tugendhadt shows, on a philosophical level, the importance of the individual enrolment in a dialogical space where are making up the meaning of language used, the standard of right and good, and the notion of truth.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiren Bai

This paper describes two kinds of epistemic injustice – discriminatory and distributive. The former is provided by Miranda Fricker; the latter is based on David Coady’s work which means unequal access to epistemic goods, especially knowledge. I will firstly identify distributive epistemic justice within an epistemic structure of society and discuss its basic principles for distributing knowledge. Then I will argue that there is Fricker’s discriminatory epistemic injustice in scientific knowledge distribution. And this kind of epistemic injustice will finally lead to distributive epistemic injustice. The possible way to diminish these epistemic injustices is expanding the diversity in science.


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