Lying

This chapter, ‘Lying’, examines how peacemakers respond to renewed violence during peace negotiations and the implications for recurrent war and non-violent politics. Specifically, it investigates how and why foreign peacemakers misrepresented the political dimensions of Darfur’s violence for a critical year when war broke out and escalated rapidly. A careful textual analysis of peacemakers’ public statements and internal institutional knowledge gives evidence to how they either stayed conspicuously silent despite mandates or accountabilities requiring them to speak out, or depoliticized the violence, thus distancing the conflict from the realm of Sudan’s ‘north-south’ peace negotiations. Further, the chapter argues that peacemakers actively turned a blind eye to the SPLM/A’s surrogate violence in Darfur and, for a time, also gave a green light to the government’s counter-insurgency. That peacemakers might lie per se is not of interest; lies are a feature of politics in the public realm. However, lying is prone to exacerbate violence when, coming from those claiming to make peace, it serves to deny a public realm for political justification or condemnation of violence.

Truth and Uncertainty in Political Justification

Political deliberation and decision-making typically take place in circumstances of substantial uncertainty about what should be done. Some of this uncertainty concerns decision-relevant empirical facts and some of it concerns decision-relevant normative facts. It is widely accepted that uncertainty about empirical facts should make us cautious and that political justification must take such uncertainty into account. Some have argued, however, that uncertainty about empirical and normative facts is not symmetrical, and that normative uncertainty does not demand the same caution. This chapter argues that the argument against symmetry does not work in the political context and that political justification must take normative uncertainty into account.

From Toleration to Laïcité

This paper traces the history of the philosophical and political justification of religious tolerance from the late 17th century to modern times. In the Anglo-Saxon world, John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) gave birth to the doctrine of the separation of Church and State and to what is now called secularization. In France, Pierre Bayle refuted, in his Philosophical Commentary (1685), the justification of intolerance taken from Saint Augustine. Following him, Voltaire campaigned for tolerance following the Calas affair (1763), and the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) imposed religious freedom which, a century later, resulted in the uniquely French notion of laïcité, which denies religion any supremacy, and any right to organize life in its name. Equality before the law takes precedence over freedom: the fact of being a believer does not give rise to the right to special statutes or to exceptions to the law.

The epistemology of democracy: The epistemic virtues of democracy

The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of the epistemic justification of democracy and the best theoretical framework for harmonizing political and epistemic values. I also inquire whether the proposed division of epistemic labour and the inclusion of experts can indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without jeopardizing political justification. More specifically, I argue in favour of three theses. First, not only democratic procedures but also the outcomes of democracy, as a social system, need to be epistemically virtuous. Second, democracy?s epistemic virtues are more than just a tool for achieving political goals. Third, an appropriate division of epistemic labour has to overcome the limitations of both individual and collective intelligence.

Posimperialismo, estudios ibéricos y enfoques comparativo-sistémicos

This chapter focuses on the fact that there is no founding theory of Iberian Studies, no ‘Iberian Reason’, and the field assumes its foundation without historical and political justification. The article argues that a theory of postimperialism is the only way to ground the field. Finally, it argues that a systemic approach, following the theories of Even-Zohar, will only legitimise State reason, against which Iberian Studies must theorise. Finally, the article argues for a postmarxist-lacanian approach whereby violence and political fantasies can be studied in a non-systemic way. It concludes with a short analysis of Fernando Aramburu’s Patria, Dolores Redondo’s Trilogy of Baztan, and Eider Rodriguez’s short stories.

Inequality in Education

This chapter reviews research on the history of inequality in education. Across the globe and since the advent of formal schooling, children from wealthier families have had access to more education, and more costly education, than their less affluent peers. More physically and intellectually advantaged children have also, on average, had greater educational opportunities than their less fortunate peers. Yet within this general historic truth lies considerable variation in terms of how, to what extent, and by what political justification educational inequalities have existed and persisted. Historians have sought to explain variations in inequality in education across time and place and to situate those inequalities within a larger sociohistoric context. One overarching finding from this large and varied body of research is that reform of school systems’ organization and practices is frequently a necessary but insufficient strategy in reducing inequalities in education.

Criminal Responsibility and Neuroscience: No Revolution Yet

Since the 90’s, neurolaw is on the rise. At the heart of heated debates lies the recurrent theme of a neuro-revolution of criminal responsibility. However, caution should be observed: the alleged foundations of criminal responsibility (amongst which free will) are often inaccurate and the relative imperviousness of its real foundations to scientific facts often underestimated. Neuroscientific findings may impact on social institutions, but only insofar as they also engage in a political justification of the changes being called for, convince populations, and take into consideration the ensuing consequences. Moreover, the many limits of neuroscientific tools call for increased vigilance when, if ever, using neuroscientific evidence in a courtroom.

The Ideology of the Regional State

This chapter analyses the way in which the Visconti justified their seigneury and their expansionist policies on an ethical and political level. They attempted to set themselves up as paladins in the war against tyranny—now seen not in its traditional sense as one of the degenerate forms of government, but as a division of the political body, a prime cause of war and an obstacle to peace. Through this intrepid conceptual twist, pro-Visconti circles were thus notably successful in deflecting any delegitimizing accusation away from their masters, while at the same time elaborating an ethico-political justification for their expansionism: a first glimpse, here, of the ideological foundations of the regional state.