Ford and Irwin Toy 30 Years Later: A Conversation with Justice Montigny

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Han-Ru Zhou

Thirty years ago, in a tense national political context, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered judgment in three cases that have had a profound impact on Canadian society and constitutional law: Ford v. Québec (A.G.) and its related appeal, Devine v. Québec (A.G.), and Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (A.G.) decided a few months apart1. Against the backdrop of language conflicts in Québec and constitutional reform at the national level, this Supreme Court trilogy established the foundations of freedom of expression and the application of the notwithstanding clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as the quasi-constitutional nature of Québec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Before the Supreme Court of Canada, the Government of Québec was represented by Yves de Montigny — now a Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal — as lead counsel. On the occasion of the trilogy’s 30th anniversary, Justice de Montigny was invited to the Université de Montréal, Faculty of Law, to share with first-year students his reflections on the three Supreme Court decisions as well as his experience as a young lawyer at the forefront of the major constitutional debates of the time.

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah ◽  
Amir Pichhadze

Abstract Rules targeting specific known schemes are not the only tools available in the battle against tax avoidance. Legal systems also use measures that apply generally. The U.S. for example has tended to rely heavily on general doctrines. One such doctrine which is discussed in part 2 of this chapter is the “economic substance” doctrine. Yet as Xiong and Evans recently pointed out “although such judicial doctrines can be used to deal with various aspects of complicated tax abuse judges tended sometimes to limit and sometimes to enlarge the scope of jurisprudential interpretation leading to substantial uncertainty and risk.” One way to limit the discretionary power of judges and overcome the uncertainty apparent in their judgments is by formalizing the doctrines as the US has done by codifying the “economic substance” doctrine in 2010. As explained in part 2 of this chapter a limitation of the “economic substance” doctrine whether it is established judicially or codified by statute may be its focus on the taxpayer’s intentions as the basis for attacking tax avoidance. Part 3 of this chapter goes on to explain that the U.S. could overcome this limitation by adopting a statutory General Anti-Abuse Rule (“GAAR”). GAARs also impose generally applicable limits on what constitutes acceptable (reasonable) tax arrangements. But they do so based on whether the arrangements are consistent with the legislature’s intentions as they were conveyed in the tax provision which the taxpayer is relying on for achieving the tax advantage in question. As Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) explained “by confining legitimate tax avoidance to schemes that are not inconsistent with the policy underlying the statutory provision invoked by the taxpayer GAAR effectively limits the scope of the principle in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster… that ‘[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be’.” Based on Canada’s experience with the GAAR parts 4 and 5 identify and explain the nexus between statutory interpretation and legislative drafting and the implications of this nexus on the application of a GAAR in the U.S. should Congress choose to take this route. Part 4 identifies that while the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has recognized the need to apply a purposive interpretation of Canada’s GAAR in order to ascertain parliament’s intentions in the relevant tax provision the court has also held that it will only give effect to those intentions which were clearly conveyed by the relevant provision and will not invent a legislative intention which parliament has failed to convey. Part 5 notes that such judicial restraint has also been taken by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore a similar approach could be expected by the U.S. courts should Congress adopt a GAAR. Therefore it would be up to Congress as it is similarly up to Canada’s Parliament to carefully and clearly draft its legislative intentions otherwise the effectiveness of a GAAR would be undermined.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 102-123
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

ABSTRACT In September 2013 in the case of Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of whether section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Charter, which grants Canadians the right to enter Canada was violated in a case where the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness declined to consent to the transfer of a Canadian citizen to serve his sentence in Canada where the sentencing state had consented to the transfer. Another issue was whether sections 8(1) and 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a) of the International Transfer of Offenders Act, which granted the Minister the discretion to consent or not to consent to the transfer, were contrary to section 6(1) of the Charter. In resolving the above issues, the Court referred to its earlier jurisprudence, academic publications and international law. Although the Court agreed with the government that the appeal was moot because the appellant had left the USA by the time it was heard, it held that it retained “a residual discretion to decide the merits of a moot appeal if the issues raised are of public importance” and that this case was one of public importance because “[t]he issues are likely to recur in the future and there is some uncertainty resulting from conflicting decisions in the Federal Court.” The purpose of this article is to highlight the interpretative tools invoked by the court and the implications of the judgement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 351-390
Author(s):  
Brian R. Carr ◽  
Brittany Finn ◽  
Ryan Wolfe

The authors of this article review the history and development of the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in section 245 of the Income Tax Act (Canada), for the purpose of assisting in the analysis of recent decisions of the federal and provincial courts of appeal. They discuss the inherent difficulty in construing section 245 and outline various tests that the courts could have employed to interpret its provisions. The authors then review three of the four decisions in which the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted GAAR—<i>Canada Trustco</i>, <i>Mathew</i>, and <i>Copthorne</i>. With that background, the authors contrast the different approaches to the provincial general anti-avoidance rules taken, on the one hand, by the Alberta Court of Appeal in <i>Husky Energy</i> and <i>Canada Safeway</i>, the Ontario Court of Appeal in <i>Inter-Leasing</i>, and the BC Court of Appeal in <i>Veracity</i>, and, on the other hand, by the Quebec Court of Appeal in <i>OGT</i> <i>Holdings</i> and <i>Iberville</i>. They then compare and contrast those approaches with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada on how GAAR should be interpreted. The authors also discuss the approach taken by the Federal Court of Appeal in four recent GAAR decisions—<i>Univar</i>, <i>Oxford Properties</i>, <i>594710 British Columbia Ltd.</i>, and <i>Birchcliff</i>. They compare and contrast that approach with the approaches of the provincial courts, and consider whether the Federal Court of Appeal's approach is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's pronouncements on GAAR. Finally, the authors offer some advice for tax planners based on the recent GAAR decisions of the various courts of appeal.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-516
Author(s):  
Denis Lemieux

In this paper, the author deals with the legal foundations of judicial control over errors of law allegedly committed by administrative authorities. The paper also considers the scope of error of law on the face of the record as a ground of review. More specifically, the author has examined all the decisions rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Federal Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada in 1980 and 1981 where there was an allegation of error of law. From this statistical analysis, the author describes and explains the different, and seemingly contradictory, results achieved by these different jurisdictions. The author adds some comments on the constitutionality of privative clauses excluding judicial review of non-jurisdictional errors of law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Gonzalez

The duty to consult has been the subject of many trials and headlines, yet many still feel as though the consultation process is faulty. Relying on recent caselaw from the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal, I trace the evolution of the duty to consult from its inception to the latest major cases. I suggest that the current process can be improved to better engage all parties, (i.e. Crown, regulatory agency, industry proponent, Indigenous peoples), with a stronger emphasis on efficiency and reconciliation. I rely on the work of Matthew Hodgson to further solidify my consultation framework by advancing the idea of a specialized tribunal charged with reviewing the adequacy of consultations.


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Jochelson

In R. v. Labaye, the Supreme Court of Canada finally retired the community standards of tolerance test of obscenity. The test had been the subject of much academic critique, a matter that reached its zenith in the period following Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), in which a gay and lesbian bookshop contested the procedures and legislative regime of customs officials in detaining its imports. The engagement in the literature on the efficacy of the community standards test that followed was often heated, always interesting, and ultimately unresolved. To date, we have not seen any clarifying applications of the newly proposed harm test by the Supreme Court, nor have we seen a profound articulation in any lower courts. Subsequently, the academic discussion has slowed to a crawl. In this article, the author reviews four accounts of the community standards test that were prominent following Little Sisters, and asks if the newly proposed Labaye standard meets their concerns. The Labaye case provides much fodder for the previous critics and supporters of a community standards of tolerance approach to analyze. After a critical analysis of the new Labaye test, the author concludes that the concerns have not been muted by the retirement of the community standards test, even if the voices have been. The engaged voices heard in the aftermath of Little Sisters should not hold back and they should not abandon the work to be done in obscenity law and freedom of expression discourse generally.


1969 ◽  
pp. 861
Author(s):  
Peter McCormick

This paper reports the results of a statistical survey of the success rates of appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada. Appeals from all provinces were examined, but in his analysis Professor McCormick focuses on the Alberta Court of Appeal. The variables he discusses include the geographic and political composition of the Supreme Court, the mix of cases from different areas of the law, the length of experience of Court of Appeal judges, and the presence or absence of dissenting opinions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Aufi Imaduddin

The national exam is a form of national level learning evaluation that has been set by the government to determine student learning outcomes. However, in the implementation of the national exam has a negative impact on students, teachers and schools. So lately there has been a renewed discourse about the elimination of the national examination, it began with the policy of the Indonesian Minister of Education and Culture to abolish the national examination in 2021. Especially if we examine further that legal efforts to stop the implementation of the national examination have existed since 2006 and the peak in 2009 was the decision of the Supreme Court number: 2596 K / PDT / 2008 which in essence required the government to stop the implementation of the national examination before resolving various existing problems. Therefore, the writer is interested in asking logically to think about the urgency of abolishing the national exam after the decision of the Supreme Court. In this paper, the method used by the author is a qualitative method based on social facts that occur based on juridical reasons based on the laws and regulations related to research. The results of this study found that the implementation of the national exam has claimed justice for students in obtaining their human rights in obtaining education that has been mentioned in the 1945 Constitution and is not in accordance with educational thought according to Ki Hajar Dewantara, as well as causing various depressive pressures which have an impact on their minds stressed and suicidal students. The implementation of national exams has also revoked justice for teachers, where teachers in their teaching are supposed to educate students well and develop their students' thinking instincts, with the national examination the teacher only drills students to memorize and do exercises that lead to the national exam. Recalling also that the implementation of national examinations in a juridical manner in the decision of the Supreme Court has violated various laws and regulations regarding education in Indonesia. Therefore, the elimination of the national exam will give back the right to justice for students, teachers and schools according to their respective proportions.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin

Proprietary estoppel provides one of equity’s most powerful remedies. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which arises when one party acts on the reliance of the promise of another. The promise and corresponding reliance creates a quasi-contract with reliance acting as an alternative to the consideration usually required in contracts. Proprietary estoppel is distinct from other equitable estoppels in that a proprietary estoppel can act as a ‘sword’ and form the basis of a cause of action. If all of the parts of proprietary estoppel are made out, a court can modify or create property rights to satisfy the equity.With regard to the Canadian experience, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently noted that proprietary estoppel has received “somewhat uneven treatment in Canada.” It is within this context that the Court of Appeal for British Columbia split on the proper scope for the Supreme Court of Canada. In Cowper-Smith v Morgan, the Supreme Court of Canada has both clarified the test for — and arguably expanded the scope of — proprietary estoppel in the context of promises exchanged between children over their mother’s care during her lifetime. The fact that a party lacks an interest in the disputed property at the time of the promise does not negate the obligation of fulfilling the promise. Instead, when the party responsible for the expectation has or acquires sufficient interest in the property, proprietary estoppel will attach to that interest and protect the equity. This article will discuss the law of proprietary estoppel in other jurisdictions and how the Supreme Court of Canada has infused this remedy with greater flexibility to satisfy the equity.


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