Political Reasonableness and Nature’s Otherness

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hailwood
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Natural World ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ecological Justice ◽  
Political Liberal

AbstractThis paper restates my argument that certain forms of liberalism can and should accept a non-instrumental perspective on the natural world. This perspective is unpacked in terms of ‘respect for nature’s otherness’. Liberalism is represented by Rawlsian political liberalism. I claim there are important congruencies between respect for nature’s otherness and the ‘reasonableness’ involved in political liberalism, such that the latter should incorporate the former. Following a suggestion of B. Baxter I reconsider these congruencies with particular emphasis on the roles of toleration and integrity. I also explain further why I think it arbitrary, rather than logically inconsistent, of the political liberal to exclude respect for nature’s otherness from her conception of the political. Finally I argue that insofar as liberalism embraces ecological justice on the basis of the considerability of non-human interests, it cannot consistently exclude respect for nature’s otherness.

scholarly journals Is Marriage Incompatible with Political Liberalism?

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 302-326
Author(s):  
Alison Toop
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The State ◽  
Differential Treatment ◽  
Political Institution ◽  
The Political ◽  
Current Structure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Liberal

This paper examines three arguments that claim marriage, as a political institution, is incompatible with political liberalism. These arguments are drawn from Elizabeth Brake 1 and Clare Chambers. 2 My purpose here is to determine which, if any, of the arguments show marriage to be incompatible with political liberalism. The “Neutrality Argument” claims that the political institution of marriage violates the political liberal principle of neutrality. I claim that no such violation occurs. The “Unjustified Discrimination Argument” alleges that marriage involves the state in unjustified discrimination. I suggest there are grounds for the differential treatment identified. The “Public Reason Argument” argues that marriage, as it is currently structured, violates the political liberal principle of public reason. I claim that its current structure can be justified by appeal to public reasons. I therefore conclude that none of these arguments successfully demonstrate that marriage is incompatible with political liberalism.

Political Liberalism and Ecological Justice

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek R. Bell
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
Ecological Justice ◽  
Political Liberal

AbstractLiberalism and ecologism are widely regarded as incompatible. Liberalism and (anthropocentric) environmentalism might be compatible but liberalism and (non-anthropocentric) ecologism are not. A liberal state cannot promote policies for ecological or ecocentric reasons. An individual cannot be both a liberal and a committed advocate of ecologism. This paper challenges these claims. It is argued that Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ is compatible with ecologism and, in particular, the idea of ‘ecological justice’. A Rawlsian state can promote ecological justice. A committed political liberal can also be a committed advocate of ecological justice. The argument is developed through a close textual examination of Rawls’s brief discussion of our duties to ‘animals and the rest of nature’. Rawls leaves far more scope for liberal ecologism than his critics have suggested. The proposed version of liberal ecologism is defended against charges of substantive and procedural bias toward humans and against nonhuman nature. Liberal ecologism may not be enough for some ecologists-especially ‘ecological constitutionalists’ seeking constitutional protection for nonhuman nature-but it is a serious and defensible political and moral theory.

SHOULD POLITICAL LIBERALS BE COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATIVES? PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE FAITH-BASED INITIATIVE

2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tomasi
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Liberal Politics ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Faith Based ◽  
The Past ◽  
Liberal Approach ◽  
Political Liberal

It is easy and popular these days to be a political liberal. Compared to ‘ethical liberals’, who justify the use of state power by way of one or another conception of people's true moral nature, ‘political liberals’ seek a less controversial foundation for liberal politics. Pioneered within the past twenty years by John Rawls and Charles Larmore, the ‘political liberal’ approach seeks to justify the coercive power of the state by reference to general political ideas about persons and society. Since it abandons the debates about personal moral value that have historically dogged liberal theory, political liberalism offers itself as a more latitudinarian, indeed a more liberal, form of liberalism. Being a political liberal is not the only way to be a good liberal, but this approach has become prevalent enough that I shall focus upon it here.

Epistemic Reasonableness and Respect for Persons

Theoria ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (161) ◽  
pp. 66-90
Author(s):  
Zhuoyao Li
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
The Political ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
First Order ◽  
Epistemic Dimension ◽  
Liberal Perfectionism ◽  
Radical Solution ◽  
Political Liberal

Recent discussions by Martha Nussbaum and Steven Wall shed new light on the concept of reasonableness in political liberalism and whether the inclusion of epistemic elements in the concept necessarily makes political liberalism lose its antiperfectionist appeal. This article argues that Nussbaum’s radical solution to eliminate the epistemic component of reasonableness is neither helpful nor necessary. Instead, adopting a revised understanding of epistemic reasonableness in terms of a weak view of rationality that is procedural, external and second-order rather than a strong view that is substantial, internal and first-order can help political liberalism maintain an epistemic dimension in the idea of reasonableness without becoming perfectionist. In addition, political liberalism can defend a stronger account of respect for persons against liberal perfectionism on the basis of the revised understanding of epistemic reasonableness. Both arguments serve to demonstrate the strength of the political liberal project.

The Origin and Future of Political Liberalism

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 639-656
Author(s):  
Kevin Vallier
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
New Work ◽  
Adequate Model ◽  
Liberal Tradition ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Turn ◽  
Political Liberal

This essay reviews Paul Weithman’s new work – Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn. Weithman’s book has two aims, first to explain why Rawls recast his political theory and second, to defend a particular interpretation of political liberalism. In contrast to other reviews, this essay addresses the latter aim. I challenge Weithman’s defense of political liberalism on two grounds: (1) that it fails to adequately grapple with pluralism about justice and (2) that it does not provide an adequate model of stability for the right reasons. I conclude that these two weaknesses in an otherwise excellent book suggest a promising future for the political liberal tradition, one that is more comfortable with indeterminacy and less comfortable with deliberative restraint.

Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Process Philosophy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Static View ◽  
Process Oriented ◽  
The Right ◽  
Political Right

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.

The Political Liberalism of the New York Nation, 1865-1932

1953 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 850
Author(s):  
Russell Kirk ◽  
Alan Pendleton Grimes
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political

La Idea de “Razón Publica” (y su Revisión) en el Último Rawls

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Public Good ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Political Philosopher

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.

scholarly journals The light of freedom in the age of enlightenment - part 1: The Netherlands

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-166
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Molnar
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
The Political ◽  
Religious Philosophy ◽  
Central Thesis ◽  
Central Topic ◽  
Age Of Enlightenment ◽  
Radical Enlightenment

The central topic of the article is the importance of the freedom for the Age of Enlightenment, as well as ties connecting philosophy of Enlightenment and political liberalism. Furthermore, the author?s central thesis is that the light that began to enlightened the reason in the Age of Enlightenment had nothing to do with God or nature, but solely with human freedom. As Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftsbury, noted in one of his letters, freedom shed the light on two countries at first: the Netherlands and England. The author is also disputing the thesis developed by Jonathan Irving Israel in his recent books Radical Enlightenment and Enlightenment Contested that the movement of radical Enlightenment in 18. century was almost exclusevly inspired by the political and religious philosophy of the Dutch Baruch de Spinoza. Although Spinoza?s contribution to the radical Enlightenment is clear and evident, he could be also perceived as a thinker who inspired some currents of moderate Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment as well.

scholarly journals How “political” is Quong’s political liberalism?

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-56
Author(s):  
Enrico Zoffoli
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Sharp Contrast ◽  
Short Paper ◽  
The Political ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly ?political? conception of liberalism. I argue that Quong?s own take on this point is more distinctively ?political? than Rawls?s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens? comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong?s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an ?overlapping consensus?) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong?s critique, which encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls?s doctrine of the overlapping consensus. I will call them the ?sincerity objection? and the ?liberal objection?.

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